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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced in 2013 and has attracted much attention 
from many countries. Promising significant investments all over the world, including in Europe, 
the BRI has prompted vibrant discussion regarding how it will shape international politics. 
While many studies have been published on how the BRI is influencing trends in different 
countries and regions, there has not been any research on how those countries try to socialize 
the BRI during their interaction with China. This dissertation aims to contribute to the by 
looking at if the level of a country’s affiliation with the EU, which is usually considered as 
being a normative power, equals the level of EU norms present in China’s BRI interactions with 
that country. The dissertation used a qualitative content analysis of official agreements and 
other documents related to China’s BRI interactions with our three case countries (Italy, Latvia, 
Serbia) to study the topic. The dissertation also studied what norms were present in the BRI 
when the BRI was first defined in 2015 to be better able to see what norms originate from the 
EU. To complement our data and give our data more context, we have also conducted expert 
interviews with country experts as well as EU-China experts while also utilizing second hand 
or tertiary sources if it is needed. The dissertation concludes that the EU’s internal norms are 
affecting the BRI and the level of affiliation to the EU matters. The more a country is affiliated 
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with the EU, the more EU norms are present in China’s BRI interactions with said country. 
Affiliation levels and EU norms present in China’s interactions can change over time and be 
affected by the case country's attitude towards, and dependency of, the EU.   
Keywords:  
Belt and Road Initiative, The European Union, Normative power EU, CEE-China Relations. 
1. Introduction  
While there have been academic papers written and discussions had on how the Chinese Belt 
and Road initiative (BRI) affects the European Union, no discussion has yet to be done on if 
the BRI is affected by the European Union (EU). The international system has been formed by 
the western powers, with all the norms and most institutions that comes with it (Johnston, 2019). 
Therefore, this dissertation observes a need to understand how the BRI has been affected by the 
norms of the EU.  
This dissertation aims to understand if the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is influenced by the 
European Union’s internal norms when China is through the BRI interacting with European 
countries. By doing so, this dissertation hopes to understand better the BRI as well as China’s 
relation to the EU and the success or failure of the EU’s normative influence.   
The agency of small actors, such as EU countries, to have a say in and be able to shape the 
interactions with larger ones, such as China, has been overlooked in the research done regarding 
the BRI. This paper also aims to highlight the possible influence these smaller actors can have 
on their relations with China in the context of the BRI.  
The EU has been named a normative power because of their ambition of promoting norms 
internationally. Normative power is important for the EU as the EU lacks other types of foreign 
policy instruments due to the EU not being an actual state. The EU lacks policy instruments 
such as an independent military and having a typical decision-making structure. The norms 
promoted by the EU in their external relations are, according to Sicurelli (2010, p. 13), the same 
norms that are in the foundation of the European Union. Sicurelli (ibid) further writes that the 
way international actors interpret these norms may have consequences for the EU’s foreign 
policy preferences as these norms might influence the EU’s relations with the actor in question.   
The focus of this dissertation is the Belt and Road initiative, which is a Chinese global 
development strategy, containing many different projects, that seeks to improve connectivity 
between China and large parts of the rest of the world. Affecting over 62% of the world’s 
population (Bird, Lebrand & Venables, 2019, p.2), the project can put China into a position of 
significant influence over the countries involved in the Initiative and have significant 
ramifications for the power balance of the world (Chatzky & McBride, 2019). The BRI stretches 
from China to Europe, covering a large variety of countries, including countries in Central and 
East Europe (CEE) (Mitrovic, 2019, p.206). Before the BRI launched, another initiative was 
ongoing in CEE called the 16+1 framework. The 16+1 contained 16 countries from CEE, 
inducing both Latvia and Serbia, which are two of the countries this dissertation will focus on, 
and China (being the +1). Some of these countries are within the EU, while others are in the 
accession process of joining the EU. The 16+1 framework now seems to be integrated into the 
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BRI. China is now coming with real promises of investment (Brown, 2017). The 16+1 has 
changed its name to the 17+1 as Greece has become a member (Kavalski, 2019). 
 
1.2 Research Question  
The research questions this dissertation aims to answer is: Are the internal norms of the EU 
affecting China’s Belt and Road Initiative related interactions with European countries and if 
so, how does the level of affiliation to the EU affect the degree of norms noticed in the 
interactions? 
This dissertation defines “Interactions” as agreement writing, official statements and 
documents, projects, and other types of actions concerning the BRI. These norms can, for 
example, be present in the language used in the documents, agreements, statements, the actions 
taken during projects, and other deeds. Answering the research questions would answer which 
normative affect the EU has on China in relation to the BRI in Europe and explain the normative 
power of the EU.  
Hypothesis: The EU’s internal norms will be reflected differently in the language and deeds 
China use in their BRI interactions with our case countries depending on the affiliation of the 
country to the EU. A higher degree of affiliation should mean more EU norms in China’s 
interactions with the country. 
1.3 Scope 
This study will focus on the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe and the European Union. While 
the BRI is much larger than just the initiatives efforts in Europe, this dissertation will not 
explore the Initiatives efforts in these other regions.  
This dissertation will focus on three different countries, Italy, Latvia, Serbia, to analyse and 
understand the effect of European norms on the BRI. We will first analyse China’s different 
actions, agreements, speeches, and more concerning the BRI that are related to our case 
countries, to see what norms are present in them. After that, we will compare them with the 
norms present in the EU, as discussed before. We will not limit the norms we are going to look 
for; instead, we are going to perform our analysis and see what norms are present in our data 
and compare them with the internal norms of the EU. The main goal is to show norm diffusion.  
As the BRI is an ongoing initiative, we need to limit the time scope of the study as things might 
change during the time of this study. The study’s scope will be from 2010 to September 2019, 
covering the lifespan of the BRI with a three-year margin to study the context of our case 
countries and their relations with China even shortly before the BRI’s creation. Furthermore, it 
also gives us the ability to understand the context of the BRI better. We will not cover the 17+1 







1.4 Case Countries 
To answer our research question, we are going to use three case countries. The purpose of using 
case countries is that they will give us clear examples we can try our hypothesis and research 
question on. The case countries used are Serbia, Latvia, and Italy. 
The overall reason for choosing these countries are the different levels of association they have 
with the EU. Serbia is a country that is in the process of joining, Italy is a core and founding 
EU state and Latvia a relatively new EU nation-state.  
Before conducting this dissertations research, this dissertation conducted a preliminary study to 
see if the cases were suitable and to see if there were any norms present at all. Some of the 
internal norms that the preliminary study has found in the EU’s Lisbon treaty’s article 2 are 
norms regarding: “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights”. Furthermore, in article 3, norms regarding cultural preservation and sustainable 
development are found (EU, n.d. p.15). The preliminary research has also shown that the BRI 
has some of the EU’s normative language in their memorandum of understanding with Latvia, 
Serbia, and Italy. The memorandums written between China and our case countries are 
advocating cooperation, sustainability, peace, and mutual benefits (Republic of Latvia and 
People’s Republic of China, 2019, p. 1-5. & Italian Republic., and the People’s Republic of 
China, 2019, p.1-6) as well as the rule of law (People’s Republic of China, Hungary, and 
Republic of Serbia, 2015).  
1.4.1 Serbia 
The first case country is Serbia, who applied for full EU membership in 2009, was confirmed 
as a candidate in 2012 and is now having accession negotiations with the EU (BBC, 2014). 
Serbia has a problematic past, and current difficult diplomatic situation with Kosovo. This 
difficult diplomatic situation is an obstacle in their membership into the EU (Brajshori, 2019). 
While still not being an EU country, Serbia is to some extent integrating into the European 
Union and is going through a process of socialisation into the EU’s norms and rules through 
the accession negotiations process (Braniff, 2010, p.180). Serbia is a part of the 17+1 
framework and is a Belt and Road Initiative member (Kavalski, 2019). Serbia has portrayed 
itself as China’s leading partner in Europe and has already received substantial investments 
from China (Surk, 2017).  
This dissertation chooses Serbia as a case because of them being in the process of joining the 
EU while being a part of the EU enlargement strategy (Holman, 2017, p.7). As Serbia is not yet 
a full EU member, they have freedoms that the other two countries do not have regarding what 
norms and regulations they need to follow. Serbia being a 17+1 member and Serbia’s strong 
relations with China and the EU, make them a compelling case to study.  
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While we acknowledge that countries like Albania and North Macedonia are countries that are 
in the EU accession process, their accession negotiations with the EU started in March 2020, 
after our cases were selected (Pisonero-Hernandez and Smerilli, 2020). Montenegro was one of 
our other candidates, as they are on their way of joining the EU. The accession date is set to 
2025 and Montenegro has been argued to be likely to achieve what is required of them for 
joining (Lilyanova, 2018, p.1). With all this said, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro 
are all smaller countries than Serbia and from what we have seen have significantly less 
interactions with China. Serbia both has a better depth of data, deeper and longer interactions 
with China, and represents its category of countries well, making generalisation easier.  
1.4.2 Latvia 
The second case country is Latvia, which is a relatively new EU country situated by the Baltic 
sea. They joined the EU in 2004 and have been a rapidly developing country. Latvia has, in the 
past, been a Soviet state but became a democracy directly after their independence (Matthews-
Ferrero, Bruge, and Steenland, 2019). Latvia is a well-integrated country in the EU that have 
had different important political roles (Austers, 2014, p.31 & 39). Latvia has a central part in 
the 17+1 as they host the Logistic Coordination Centre and is a member of the BRI 
(Pendrakowska, 2017, p.500). Latvia joined the BRI in 2016 (Yongqi and Yun, 2016) and are 
to act as a relationship facilitator between other EU countries as well as the Eurasian Economic 
Union. Latvia is also a trade hub in the region (Kols, 2017).  
This dissertation picked Latvia as a case because of their membership in the EU, 17+1, and 
BRI. Latvia is a relatively new EU member, joining the EU in 2004, which makes them 
interesting to study. The process of joining the EU is a lengthy process that makes the country 
adapt to EU regulations, norms, and institutions (European Commission, 2016). Hence, if the 
EU integration has worked, these norms should be present in China’s interactions with Latvia. 
While there are other new EU members, such as Romania and Croatia, it seems their 
interactions with China in relation to the BRI are relatively small, compared to even Latvia. We 
have been unable to find sufficient data or possibilities of collecting data that would allow for 
good analysis. We argue that Latvia can be used to generalise these new EU countries involved 
in the 17+1 relatively well, as they are a key part of this framework as we have discussed before.  
1.4.3 Italy 
The third and last case country is Italy. Italy is a country in the Mediterranean that has been a 
central part of European economic and political unification. Italy has the third-largest economy 
in the Euro-zone but has, in recent years, suffered from economic problems (CIA World 
Factbook, 2019). Italy has historically been a terminal into Europe for the ancient Silk Road. In 
2019, Italy became the first G7 country to join the BRI and have created controversy in the EU. 
Through the BRI, China has opened up the possibility of investing in developing Italian ports 
and giving Italy back its historical role as a trading terminal into Europe once again (Lau, 2019).  
The reason this dissertation choose Italy as a case is due to Italy being a core EU state and a G7 
member (Toussaint, 2011). Furthermore, Italy is a country that has not had any institutional 
relations with China previously (Rizzi, 2018, p. 239-278). While Latvia is an EU country 
connected to China through the 17+1, Italy has no such previous connections to China as 
previously mentioned. Italy should have a higher association with the EU than Latvia as Italy 
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was a founding member and have not had any strong associations with China before the BRI. 
The reason we did not choose other core-EU states such as Germany and France are due to 
these countries not having the same kind of relationship with China. France and Italy have not 
signed any BRI MoU’s with China. Italy is the only core EU state that has done so and is a 
significant case that is more valuable to study compared to other cases.  
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
In the background section, coming up next, the EU as an actor in the international arena will be 
discussed in order to give some context on the BRI. In the same chapter, we will also be defining 
the internal norms of the EU, which this dissertation will use in its analysis. Thereafter, we will 
look at the background of the BRI to better understand the meaning, scope, and importance of 
the initiative, before moving on to presenting our definitions and theories. In the definitions and 
theories section, we will discuss social constructivism, define norms, and socialisation as well 
as the different micro-processes of socialisation and the EU’s different socialisation methods 
before finishing the chapter with some criticism against socialisation theory. The next chapter 
is the literature review. In the literature review, we will look at the literature on institutional 
norm diffusion, literature on the BRI, the existing world order and Europe, and some literature 
on EU as a normative power.   
In the chapter on research design, we will discuss our methodology, which is a qualitative 
content analysis using a socialisation theory from social constructivism. As a part of the 
methodology, this dissertation will analyse the EU’s social environment, giving us some context 
on the EU as a social environment, as required by our theoretical framework. After that, the 
dissertation presents an analysis of the BRI’s 2015 policy document to establish the norms that 
are already found in the BRI. After establishing a methodology, the dissertation analyses the 
case countries with the theories discussed in previous chapters. Each country also has a sub-
section with inputs from expert interviews. After this, the dissertation will present notes from 
EU-China experts not directly related to our cases, but that contribute to our understanding of 
the normative power of the EU on China’s BRI interactions in Europe.  
The dissertation discusses the findings in the discussion chapter. In this chapter, all parts of the 
analysis become tied together. In this chapter, the dissertation shows a country comparison and 
then answers the research question and try the hypothesis.  
In the conclusion section, the dissertation then discusses the weaknesses and strengths of our 
research and our findings. It also explains some challenges that the dissertation faced. After 






2.1 EU as an Actor in the International Arena 
To better understand the EU and the norms of the EU, we first need to establish what the EU 
is. The European Union is a union of 27 countries. Together they form a political actor that has 
more influence in the world than what any of the member countries can have by themselves. 
The reason the EU can represent these countries in international relations is the Lisbon Treaty 
which gave the EU the legal ramifications of becoming an international actor. For example, it 
gave the EU the ability to join an international organisation or sign international treaties in the 
areas of its attributed powers (Panizza, 2019). The Treaty of Lisbon had an immense effect on 
the structures and norms of the European Union. It defined the power the EU had and made the 
EU a fully legal actor in the international space. It also defined the principles of the European 
Union regarding human rights and democracy (Panizza, 2019, p.2) as well as norms about free 
and fair trade, sustainable development, loan taking and investment requirements (Bonde, 
2009). The Treaty of Lisbon is one of the documents this dissertation will analyse to understand 
the EU’s norms and regulations better as the treaty contains the EU’s norms.  
Going back to this dissertation’s theoretical approach, Manners (2002, p.236) argues that the 
EU is a normative power that can shape what is standard in the international space. The EU, as 
a normative power, is characterised by its mutual principles and their willingness to disregard 
Westphalian conventions and pool together their sovereignty (ibid, p.239). After the atrocities 
of the world wars, the EU countries pooled their resources to keep and strengthen peace and 
liberty. The EU is a post-Westphalian cross-cutting polity and is a new type of player in the 
international space with actor qualities, Manners argues (ibid, p.239-240). 
2.1.1 EU Norms and Regulations 
Now that we know where the normative power of the EU comes from, we can look at the EU’s 
norms. To be able to identify how the EU’s norms have affected China’s BRI’s interactions in 
our case countries, we first need to know what the EU’s norms are. These norms will be later 
used in our analysis to understand how the EU has affected China’s BRI interactions with our 
cases. The EU has many norms and regulations regarding Human rights, trade, investment and 
more (EU, n.d). The Lisbon treaty and different other policy documents contain these norms. 
These norms have been collected on the EU’s website, worded as goals and values:  
(1) Promote peace, (2) EU’s values and (3) the well-being of its citizens. (4) Offer freedom, (5) 
security and (6) justice without internal borders.  
(7) Sustainable development based on price stability and balanced economic growth, a highly 
competitive market economy with social progress and full employment, and environmental 
protection, 
(8) Combat social exclusion and discrimination, 
(9) Promote scientific and technological progress, 
(10) Enhance solidarity and social, territorial, and economic cohesion among EU countries, 
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(11) Respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, 
(12) Create an economic and monetary union who uses the euro as its currency (ibid), 
(13) Human dignity, (14) Freedom, (15) Democracy, (16) Equality, (17) The Rule of law, and 
(18) Human rights.  
These norms are to be a starting point for our research, and we can compare them with the 
norms we have found in the BRI, but we also need some more detailed academic research on 
the topic to establish which of these norms appear in practice.  
Looking at Manners (2002, p.242-244) research, he has identified some of the same norms this 
dissertation has through studying a series of treaties, declarations, policies, criteria, and 
conditions. In the EU’s laws and policies, one can find these norms. These are:  
(1) Peace and (2) liberty - based in the defining futures of the post-war period in west European 
politics.  
(3) Democracy, (4) the rule of law, (5) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – 
took shape during the cold war due to the importance of differentiating democratic western 
Europe from communist eastern Europe. 
(6) The aspiration to have social solidarity - found its importance in becoming a countermeasure 
to the drive of liberalisation in the single European market act and economic and monetary 
union. 
(7) Anti-discrimination - norms and measures arose from worries about racism and persecution 
of minorities in the early 1990s as well as from progressive social legislation. 
(8) Sustainable development - became an essential norm after the Rio Earth summit when it 
became a part of the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
(9) Good governance - arose from the resignation of the European Commission in 1999, the 
concern for double standards when applying EU’s demands for democratic reform in the central 
and east European countries as well as in recognising the vital role of good governance in 
successful aid programmes (ibid, p.243-244) 
Another aspect of the EU’s norms is economic norms related to the liberal open market. These 
norms dictate public procurement (Bovis, 2012, p.1-2), competition, free trade, market-oriented 
and non-interference by states in the market (Mulder, 2019, p.18-22). 
While this dissertation is not to discuss how China has socialised the EU, it might still be 
interesting to see how this has happened. One example of how China has through the BRI 
socialised the EU is the EU’s adaptation of a new connectivity policy (Gaens, 2018, p.21., & 
Joshi, 2019, p.1). The policy connectivity document: “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building 
blocks for an EU Strategy” (European Parliament., The Council., the European Economic and 
Social Committee., The Committee of the Regions., and The European Investment Bank, 2018) 
outlines different connectivity norms of the EU. The three central norms connected to EU’s 
connectivity approach are sustainable connectivity, comprehensive connectivity, and rules-
based connectivity.  
Sustainable connectivity: Connectivity should be economically, fiscally, environmentally, and 
socially sustainable in the long term (ibid, p.2).  
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Comprehensive connectivity: Connectivity seen as about networks and the flow of people, 
goods, services, and capital that is passing through them. The institutions emphasise the 
importance of synergies between different networks of transportation. Furthermore, they 
highlight people’s rights and interests as central to policies regarding connectivity (ibid, p.2).  
International rules-based connectivity: For people, goods, services, and capital to move 
efficiently, fairly and smoothly, there is a need for rules and regulations. For there to be 
interoperability of networks and trade across borders, there is a need for internationally agreed 
practices, conventions, rules, technical standards that are supported by international institutions 
and organisations (ibid, p.3)  
Because these connectivity norms are presented as a result of the BRI, this dissertation will not 
have a broader focus on them. They will not contribute to understanding how the BRI has been 
affected by the norms of the EU.  
2.1.2 EU as a Social Environment 
The theoretical framework this dissertation is going to use requires us to understand the EU as 
a Social Environment. This section of the dissertation will cover this so we can draw from it 
later on in the analysis. We are taking help from the excellent summary done by James McBride 
(2019) as well as information from the European Commission (2016).  
The EU is an exclusive and large institution that is based on representative democracy. Each 
country has delegations that are equal to the size of its population. The EU’s democratic rule 
has challenges, and there are EU-Sceptic governments in the Union right now, but the EU still 
has much legitimacy. The voting procedures in the legislative body of the EU, the European 
Parliament, is done by qualified majority voting. The European Parliament has power over the 
EU budget, legislative powers, meaning they can shape laws that have to be implemented by 
member nations and much more. The European Council can set up EU policy agendas that form 
the EU’s long-term focus. In short, the mandate of the EU is robust (McBride, 2019). 
EU members must follow the EU’s laws and regulations, but they still have autonomy over 
many areas that the EU do not control. The EU controls the custom union, business competition 
rules, trade agreements, and monetary policy for eurozone countries.  
There are also some shared competencies that the member state’s national governments can 
legislate if the EU has not already done so. The fields that this is possible are the single market 
(free movement of goods, services capital, and people), agriculture, regional development 
spending, transportation, energy, consumer, and environmental protection as well as public 
health, research, and technology (ibid). The EU has received different levels of authority over 
different areas from member states. These are known as competencies. These exclusive 
competencies are areas in which no national governments can pass laws. Only the EU can do 
so. These areas include much of the core activities of the EU. These include the business 
competition rules, customs union, trade agreements, and, for eurozone countries, the eurozone’s 
fiscal policy. 
National governments are allowed to legislate in areas that are shared competencies. The 
national governments can only legislate in these areas if the EU does not already have related 
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laws. These laws apply to the single market, which provides for the free movement of capital, 
services, goods, and people. It also applies to regional development spending, agriculture, 
energy, transportation, environmental and consumer protections, and research and technology 
as well as public health (ibid).  
Supporting competencies are areas in which the EU can only bolster activities that have already 
been undertaken by member states. They include culture, education, sport, and many social 
policies. The EU also has a mutual foreign and security policy. It covers diplomacy, security, 
and defence cooperation. The national government sets the mutual foreign and security policy 
through the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The decisions regarding the mutual 
foreign and security policy must be unanimous, giving the member states substantial power. 
Member states also remain free to make their foreign policies. This legal framework gives the 
EU member countries a level of autonomy in the areas that are not already clearly legislated or 
are within the exclusive competencies. National governments are sometimes in different 
situations forced to adapt legislation, such as the to be mentioned case of Italy on investment 
standards (ibid).  
To join the EU, one needs to go through EU accession procedures. First, the country becomes 
a candidate for EU membership. This candidacy qualifies them for participating in formal EU 
membership negotiations but does not guarantee this process to happen. The country needs to 
get unanimous agreement from all members of the EU Council on a framework or mandate for 
negotiations with the candidate country. When the EU seems fit, the EU starts formal 
membership negotiations with the country. This process involves adopting EU laws, preparing 
to make reforms in judicial administrative, the economic sector as well as other sectors 
necessary for the country to meet the EU’s conditions for joining. These are known as accession 
criteria. When the negotiations and reforms taken as a result of the negotiations have come to a 
place where all parties are satisfied with them, the country can join the EU. For a more detailed 
explanation of these procedures, please follow the link that this section is using as a reference 
(The European Commission, 2016).  
The social environment of the EU is hence a very persuasive environment with considerable 
social influence. Through the legislation and policies created through the EU’s framework, the 
EU can form norms of countries. The social environment should have a socialising property 
that is rather strong towards countries that a part of it, countries that aim to join it, as well as 











The Belt and Road Initiative was proposed by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in October 2013. 
It is a development strategy that aims at creating connectivity and cooperation between 
participating countries. Although it aims to connect countries, via policy, infrastructure, trade 
and culture, the Initiative emphasizes that it respects the country’s sovereignty. In the core of 
the Initiative objectives, one can find mutual benefits for the countries involved and collective 
security. These countries are primarily the ones situated on the former Silk Road and the ones 
on the Maritime Silk Road (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015). 
On land, the Initiative aims to build a new Eurasian land bridge and to develop international 
transport routes. The sea component of the Initiative aims to build smooth, safe, and efficient 
shipping routes to connect significant seaports (Ibid). The Initiative will include more than 130 
countries primarily across Asia, Europe, and Africa. It will cost significant amounts of money. 
Other countries have raised significant criticism against the BRI because of lack of 
transparency, lack of controls (over-lending to countries that cannot pay back) and other issues. 
China has promised to meet these issues, but the criticism still stands (Li and Han, 2019). 
2.2.1 Setting and China Insight 
This paper will use the 2015 BRI policy document in our analysis. It was the first policy 
document that outlined the BRI’s goals and visions (National Development and Reform 
Commission People’s Republic of China, 2015). We will use this document to understand what 
norms originally came from the BRI to be able to say which EU norms are a result of norm 
diffusion. Later in the methodology chapter, the theoretical implications of this will be 
discussed. As a part of our method, we also need to understand the context of our data. Hence, 
this section of the text will discuss the context of the 2015 BRI policy document. We will be 
using our expert interviews, that will be discussed later in the method section, as well as Chinese 
government sources and academic sources. To understand the 2015 BRI policy document, we 
also need some understanding of the context of China and the BRI. The BRI policy document 
was written in 2015 and was the first document released to the public about the goals and 
objectives of the BRI.  
Professor G. Stahl (Personal Communication, 23 February 2020) means that the initiative has 
developed over time. At first, it looked far less ambitious and was more focused to link up 
China to neighbouring countries. Now it has become a catchword for the external dimensions 
of Chinese initiatives. Among the broad titles of the BRI, one also has concrete projects and 
activities related to investment and development projects, some of which are related to EU 
countries. The Swedish Expert (Personal Communication 11 February 2020) means that the 
BRI is a normative tool for China that is meant to spread China’s normative power.  
To give context on some of the values present in the BRI, it is also worth noting some of China’s 
overall policy directions. The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China (2011) has written in a white paper that peaceful development, upholding world peace 
and promoting joint development and prosperity for all countries in the path of development 
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China has chosen. To achieve this, China is to, among other things, work for equality and 
mutually beneficial cooperation (ibid).  
China has received criticism from the west for giving preferential treatment to state-owned 
Chinese companies and questioned if Chinese companies can compete fairly on the 
international market due to the support these enterprises get from the Chinese government (Lee, 
2018). China has over the years, when dealing with countries without open tender procedures, 
made deals that are giving China preferential treatments, such as giving loans and make 
investments that make the countries have to rely on getting their products and services from 
Chinese companies (Kopinski, Polus & Taylor, 2012, p. 48), further deepening the criticism 
towards China. This practice has also been continued in the BRI. Ghossein, Hoekman, and 
Shingal (2018, p.3-31) have made a study of how different public procurement processes have 
been done concerning the BRI, and through the limited data they had, they were able to 





3. Literature Review 
This literature review will present literature that explores the EU as a normative power, research 
on BRI and the European Union as well as research on Norm diffusion. No academic papers 
are investigating how the EU has affected the BRI, nor any journalistic articles that this research 
has been able to find. Hence, before even going into a review of the literature that covers 
subjects that are close to the subject of this dissertation, we can already see a need to study this 
topic.  
3.1 Institutional Norm Diffusion  
Institutional norm diffusion is a widely discussed topic. Park (2006) explores how international 
organisations (IO) promote and diffuse norms in world politics. She asks the question: “where 
do norms come from?” (ibid, p.345). She concludes that IO’s are norm consumers that are 
socialised by states and non-state actors. Furthermore, she concludes that the identity of the IO 
and the influence norms have within the IO determine the appropriate behaviours of actors 
within the international system (ibid, p.353). IO’s identity is influenced by the social structures 
that they act within. They may also be socialized by NGOs and transnational advocacy networks 
through direct or indirect processes. (ibid, p.359).  
In his PhD dissertation, Ring (2014) further explores norm diffusion concerning the 
international system, and he asks the question: “Why do states express support for norms that 
go against their underlying beliefs?” (ibid, p.vi).  He identifies three aspects of the international 
system: Hierarchy, Neighbourhood, Identity, as well as four social mechanisms: Coercion, 
Competition, Emulation and Learning. These can lead to the spread of norms in the international 
system, he argues. He does a quantitative analysis with the help of the four mechanisms 
previously mentioned and compares three dynamic patterns across different model 
specifications (ibid, p.24-41). He then applies his framework to the diffusion of quotas for 
women’s representation and finds that weak states learn to adapt this method from other weak 
states in their neighbourhood. Competition is a driving mechanism in this, he argues (ibid, p.85-
141). He also studies the diffusion of human rights norms. He concludes that human rights 
treaties are adopted in relation to worse human right behaviours. He explains that strong 
European countries were the first to sign the Convention Against Torture and that weaker states 
adopted it in a regionally contingent pattern. He argues that not only institutions spread norms, 
but rather countries adapt norms also through their neighbours. Meaning, a country does not 
need to belong to the same institutions to be able to be affected by the nearby countries’ norms 
(ibid, p.145-175). 
ASEAN is an institution that has been discussed as a normative player in its region.  Allison-
Reumann (2017) has written an article about the norm diffusion capacity of ASEAN.  She 
defines ASEAN’s norms as: “non-interference, respect for sovereignty, informality, and 
consensus” and mean that they primarily reflect processes of interaction.  The article studies 
ASEAN’s norm diffusion by exploring two diffusion mechanisms – enmeshed and innocuous 
as well as analysing the challenges connected with norm diffusion (ibid, p.5).  She managed to 
conclude that ASEAN had weak norm diffusion capabilities, but that more research is needed 
(ibid, p.25-26). She argues that ASEAN manages to effect other countries through norm 
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diffusion but that this effect is small compared to the EU. She focuses on regional norm 
distribution as well as how different ASEAN is from the EU in the aspect of norm diffusion 
towards its members (ibid, p.12).  
Checkel (1999) discuss Europe and the EU’s norm diffusion and institutions (ibid, p.107-109). 
He explores two issues he has found in the constructivist study of norms: “Reintegrating agency 
into largely structural accounts and unpacking its arguments at the national level” (ibid, p.83). 
In his paper, he adds social content to the concept of diffusion to be able to explain the 
motivation that domestic actors must accept new normative prescriptions. Further, he argues 
that the previously mentioned actors will vary cross-nationally as a function of state-society 
relations (ibid).  
The discussion on norm diffusion is ongoing, and institutions are a big part of the discussion.  
While institutions play a significant role in norm diffusion, there are researchers such as Ring 
(2014) who also present other aspects that might lead to socialisation, such as geographical 
aspects and the strength and coherence of the country’s government (ibid, p.145-175). 
This dissertation is going to contribute to this research through one of the steps that are going 
to be used to answer the research questions. We will be further contributing to the understanding 
of how institutions socialise states into their norms and how different levels of engagement with 
the institutions might lead to different levels of socialisation.  
3.2 Literature on the BRI, the Existing World Order and Europe 
This dissertation has been unable to find any articles on the topic of how European norms affect 
China through the BRI. Nevertheless, some articles are covering the relationship, impact on and 
implications for EU and China regarding the BRI.  
Casarini (2015) discuss the economic opportunities and possible risks presented by the BRI. 
The BRI, he argues, will present the EU with significant political challenges. These challenges, 
he argues, are based on the interest of EU countries in the initiative leading to a further divided 
EU that has difficulties creating common positions against China. He also presents the risk of 
populist backlash and a worsened relationship with the US (ibid, p.1-10)  
The BRI is not the first time the EU has been engaged with Chinese institution building. The 
16+1 framework is something that Vangeli (2017) discusses in his article. He studies how China 
has constructed the 16+1 as an institution and how China is complementing its economic 
approach with institution-building as well as policy coordination. He concludes that the 16+1, 
its policy coordination and the role of institution building will remain central in the relationship 
between China and the countries involved in the 16+1 framework (ibid, p.101).  
When it comes to the BRI effecting EU China relation, the BRI creates a complicated situation 
with both challenges and opportunities for EU and China (Zhao, 2016, p.8). The EU is, 
according to Zhao welcoming China to take on more responsibility in international development 
but Zhao means that the EU is worried about the BRI’s lack of transparency rules might threaten 
the competitiveness of EU enterprises (ibid, p.8). Zhao seems to conclude that the EU should 
be open for the cooperation and that it might become mutually beneficiary (ibid).  
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Another essential question to be asked is if the EU matters for China’s BRI and how Europe/the 
EU fit into China’s strategic narrative (Zeng, 2017, p.1). Zeng argues that the EU and Europe 
is not a focus of China and that Europe plays a marginalized role in China’s policy discussion 
(ibid, p.1). This article puts perspective into China’s view on the EU but is not including any 
normative discussion, nor any discussion of how the BRI is affected by the EU. It does, 
however, point out that China is taking on the EU as individual member states and not a unity, 
which might contribute to our understanding of China’s approach (ibid).  
China’s opening-up policy is another aspect that takes space in the academic discussion about 
China’s foreign relations. It is meant to enhancing China’s role in global governance (Ohashi, 
2019, p.1). The BRI is seen as a new grand strategy in of said opening-up policy. Ohashi (2019, 
p.1-17) argues that the BRI is a part of China’s growing role in global governance in large 
international economic regimes. He argues that China is a significant beneficiary of the existing 
world order and that China does not seek to restructure it. Regardless of China’s intentions, the 
BRI is still a challenge to the international economic regimes of the world (ibid, p.1-17).  
The literature on China’s institution-building is extensive but is not covering the aspects of 
socialisation or cultural implications. This paper has not found any discussions on how Chinese 
institutions abroad, like the 17+1 and the BRI, have been affected by international norms. China 
must adapt to international norms that that was created by the western countries, and hence this 
dissertation is set out to study if these norms have any effect on the BRI.  
3.3 EU as a Normative Power – Critique and Arguments 
This dissertation is partly studying the normative power of the EU. The EU has been positioned 
by scholars as a normative power, and there is a long discussion ongoing regarding that claim.  
Other scholars will argue that the normative power of the EU is none-existing, and that the EU 
is unable to socialise actors. This section will discuss the literature on this topic.  
Skolimowska (2015, p.111) is one of the academics that are critical to the EU’s normative 
power. EU integration, specifically in the context of foreign affairs, has turned out to be a harder 
experience than expected, she argues. She further writes that between the member states, there 
is a lack of unity and cohesion in their reactions to, as well as resolving, international issues. 
This is the result of EU member states diverse interests. They cannot form characteristic traits 
of the EU in their international relations. She questions that the EU is a normative power, as the 
EU fails to satisfy some essential aspects of one such power. She calls for better and neutral 
tools of analysis to understand the EU’s activities in the international sphere (ibid. p.111).  
Sjursen (2006) problematises the concept of the EU as a normative power as it lacks precision, 
is normatively biased and that it is problematic to call the EU a force for good without 
identifying criteria and assessment standards that make it possible to study and value of such a 
claim. She also asks how we can know if the EU’s pursuit of norms is legitimate. She defines 
one such method of legitimisation as looking at how the normative power would act to 
strengthen the international legal system. From this perspective, the EU’s approach to 
international affairs has a level of tension to in, she argues (ibid, p. 235) 
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Savorskaya (2015), contrary to the others argue that the EU is a unique integration of states that 
has the power via their ability to change the international communities’ ideas of norms 
(Savorskaya, 2015, p.71). She concludes that soft power is a contrast to hard power and does 
not apply to the EU because it is mainly a concept connected to the US (ibid, p.71). Further, 
she specifies that the EU’s founding rules and norms are implemented in the EU’s foreign 
policy (ibid, p.72).  
Bialasiewicz, Giaccaria and Minca, (2012) studied the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and EU macro-region building as a way of socialising countries into EU norms. The EU Macro-
regional initiatives have the goal of widening the EU’s territoriality beyond and across the EU’s 
current borders (ibid, p.60-61). The macro-regions are problematic as they bundle up widely 
different countries together that do not always cooperate well. The Macro-regions had the 
purpose of socialising the countries into EU norms, of creating stability and peace around the 
EU’s borders by making them into friends (ibid, p.63-68). In recent years, this has changed 
somewhat to focus more on security and stability (ibid). They argue that these attempts have 
failed somewhat due to the EU using too general strategies and the political instability of, for 
example, the Mediterranean (ibid).  
Börzel and Lebanidze (2017, p.17) mean that the EU’s attempts to promote democracy and the 
rule of law in its neighbourhood regions has been acknowledged as a failure by researchers. 
Most of the European neighbour countries that are affected by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) have, after ten years still not shown high qualities of democratic development. 
The exceptions to this are Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Tunisia. While these exceptions 
exist, the EU is still surrounded by failed and authoritarian states (ibid). The reason for the 
failure of the ENP has been argued to be because of the lack of membership opportunity as an 
incentive as well as a lack of coherence in EU’s external governance. This limits the 
transformative power of the EU in its neighbourhood.  
Börzel and Lebanidze (2017, p.17) further argue that the EU’s transformative power’s main 
issue is the selective sanctioning of non-compliance with democracy standards. The selective 
sanctioning is caused by conflicting objectives of the EU concerning the neighbouring 
countries. These conflicting objectives can be found in the conditions for the EU’s application 
of democratic conditioning. First, there must be an absence of a democratisation-stability 
dilemma; secondly, there must be a presence of pro-democratic reform coalitions. If these are 
not present, the EU will probably prefer authoritarian stability over uncertain democratic 
change (ibid, p.18). The ENP need to offer the neighbouring countries incentives in return for 
domestic reform, other than institutions (joining the EU). These can be increased financial aid 
and advanced access to the EU’s internal markets in exchange for greater liberalisation (ibid, 
p.18).  
This democratic socialisation (including the rule of law norms) of EU neighbours is not 
prioritised over other foreign policy goals of the EU. These can be trade, energy security and 
stability. This mindset is what has undermined the ENP’s democratic socialisation that is done 
through conditionality. The socialisation into EU’s norms in their neighbouring countries is 




Börzel and Lebanidze (2017, p.21) argue that the effectiveness of democratic socialisation 
through conditionality is dependent on the consistency of it. When the EU uses democratic 
conditionality, it leads to democratic progress or democratic breakthrough. Examples of this 
can be seen in Georgia, Moldova, Tunisia, and Ukraine. The only exception to this is Belarus 
where the democratic conditionality has been inconsistent and undermined by both Russia and 
Western actors that stabilised the regime of the country. The golden carrot of EU membership, 
or rather the lack thereof seems to be the reason for the EU’s democratic conditionalities 
ineffectiveness of promoting democracy in the European Neighbouring Countries (ibid, p.22). 
The low attractiveness of incentives is one reason for the low transformative power of the EU 
in its neighbourhood; another is the lack of coherence. Coherence means the capability of the 
EU to speak as one and overcome institutional complexities in the EU’s foreign policy arena. 
The reason for the EU’s limited influence on democracy in the ENP is caused by the member 
states being unable to agree about how and when to use democratic conditionality. The high 
degree of EU’s coherence does not lead to the effectiveness of the application of democratic 
conditionality by the EU. The example of Belarus is an example of this as the pressure of the 
EU failed to reach its results (ibid, p.22-23) 
To conclude, some of the main criticism that could argue against the theory I am applying is: 
The EU lacks consistency and unity to be able to socialise countries. Different member states 
have competing interests that prevent the EU from socialising the countries into EU norms as 
this might compromise these interests. Having a combination of both pressure and incentives 
that is consistent leads to socialisation. The lack thereof will not succeed, and the EU is divided 
on the BRI. 
Most of the studies presented here have focused on EU socialising countries outside Europe or 
trying to socialise them without having the incentive of joining the EU. All the countries studied 
in this dissertation are ether EU members or in the process of joining the EU. The BRI has the 
incentive of wanting to act within the EU. Something that could be argued as problematic is 
that the EU is divided on their approach to the BRI (Peel and Hornby, 2019) 
This dissertation is going to engage in the discussion regarding the EU being a normative power, 
as this is one of the central parts of this study. While there have been many studies regarding 
this topic, this dissertation is hoping to engage the topic with this new set of cases to give a 
more contrasted view on the matter as well as engage the cases with different theories than the 




4. Definitions and Theory 
4.1 Social Constructivism  
This dissertation is going to use social constructivism as its core theory. Within social 
constructivism, we find the other theories used in this dissertation.  
The debate around social constructivism starts with if state actions are affected by structures, 
such as anarchy and distribution of power, or processes which entails interactions, learning, and 
institutions (Wendt, 1992, p.391). Wendt (1992, p.395) argues that anarchy is what states make 
of it. Meaning there is no inherent anarchism in the world order, rather anarchism in the world 
order is just a social construct, created by the nation-states themselves (ibid). 
Collective meaning is what decides over the structures that shape our actions. An example of 
this is that if two warring factions decide that a war is over, it is over. Actors in the international 
arena have their own identities, and these identities are all within socially constructed worlds. 
A state may also have different types of identities that they define themselves. These definitions 
that actors hold about each other and themselves form the structure of the social world (ibid, 
p.397-398).  
Institutions are stable sets or structures of identities and interests. The structures usually take 
the form of norms and rules. These hold motivational power only if the actors are socialized 
and participant in collective knowledge. Institutions are constructed entities that need the 
existence of actors’ ideas about how the world works. They are nothing but beliefs while still 
being real and objective. Identities and interests are internalized through institutionalisation, 
but institutions are also built from identities (ibid, p.399).  
4.2 Norms 
This dissertation is going to use Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein’s (1996, p.10) definition of 
norms. A norm is a collective expectation regarding correct behaviour for a specific identity. 
At times, norms operate like rules which are defining and, hence constituting an identity. One 
example is how a president’s power within a government is defined, compared to the power of 
other individuals, found in the government. To get recognised, validated, and responded to as 
an international actor, one needs to perform specific normative actions that come with being an 
international actor. Norms also shape how we act when meeting different types of 
circumstances. For example, how an international actor reacts to humanitarian distress. To 
summarise, norms can both constitute identities by “generating expectations about the proper 
portfolio of identities for a given context” (ibid) or regulate behaviours for already established 
identities by “generating expectations about how those identities will shape behaviour in 





4.3 Socialisation  
This dissertation will use Johnston (2008) theory on Socialisation found in his book “Social 
States – China in International Institutions” to analyse how the norms of the EU have affected 
the BRI and to analyse the three cases. The reason this book is chosen is because of its critical 
and developing characteristics. We will compliment Johnston’s (ibid) theory with other 
scholars as well to give more depth.  
The EU already has its norms and policies that need to be respected if one wishes to act within 
Europe. This dissertation has previously hypothesised that norms diffuse when a country is 
dealing with the EU; hence, they should also affect the neighbours that have close relationships 
with the EU (European Council, 2018). Compliance with institutional norms is one of the things 
one can use socialisation theory to study (Johnston, 2008, p.1). This theory will help us better 
understand how the countries in question have been affected by membership and proximity to 
the EU.  
In social constructivism, socialisation is a central concept. It is a well-adapted approach to study 
normative socialisation as it sets out with the view that institutions and norms form international 
actors in their behaviour in the international space. Social constructivism holds the belief that 
social relations construct or make individuals into the type of person they are (Johnston, 2008, 
p.15).  
Checkel (2005, p.804) defines socialisation as a process of inaugurating actors into the rules 
and norms of a specific community. When an actor adopts a given communities rules, the theory 
means that the actors start following a logic of appropriateness, instead of purely a logic of 
consequences. The actor can do this by learning a role, acting appropriately in the contexts 
without necessarily agreeing with the norms, or by internalising the norms (ibid).  
Johnston (2008, p.20) means that socialisation is a process were social-interactions leads 
novices to adapt normative ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (ibid). Through the practice of 
social interactions, countries internalize and gain performance competence in socio-cultural 
defined contexts. Socialisation is the complete and consistent initiation of an actor into the 
objective world of a society or part of said society. Socialisation provides actors with identities 
that give them a specific place in the world (ibid, p.20-21). Socialisation involves 
internalisation. Internalisation means accepting and adapting to norms, making them into the 
way one observes events and do things. The process of socialisation has the purpose of creating 
membership in a society where members take for granted the same understanding of their 
society (ibid). In political science, Socialisation is defined as a process where people learn to 
adapt themselves to the values, attitudes, norms, and behaviours accepted by the ongoing 
system (ibid, 21). In IR, socialisation is defined as a process that results in the internalisation 
of norms (ibid).  
Institutions such as the EU can be social institutions. In these social institutions, the actor’s 
expectations converge. Inside the social institutions, members socialise each other through 
interactions such as meetings (Checkel, 2005, p.807-809). International agents, such as 
international organisations, have teaching values and are constructing domestic institutions and 
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procedures inside states. These reflect emergent international norms and practices. This has led 
to states following these norms and practices, regardless if they go against their material welfare 
or security interests (Johnston, 2008, p.16).  
Norms are transmitted in an institutional environment, where the institution itself or actors that 
are a part of said institution try to transfer norms of the structure to new members. The new 
member tries to process these norms, filter it through prior features of identity before they 
mediate the development of foreign policies and practices that govern interactions with other 
actors and institutions. When interacting with these policies and practices, original social 
structures and institutional environments are reproduced and possibly modified (ibid, p.17).  
While China is not a part of the EU, nor have any interest in joining the EU, China is acting 
within EU borders and neighbourhoods. This dissertation’s hypothesis is that China must hence 
adapt to their norms when interacting with EU member states and their neighbouring countries. 
Hence, although China is not a part of the EU, this dissertation argues that they still need to 
adapt to EU norms as they are dealing with countries that are limited by the same norms as well 
as trying to act within the territory of the institution. We do not argue that the norms of the EU 
will be diffused to the entirety of the BRI or China, but we argue that the EU’s norms should 
be diffused at least to some extent. It is not within the scope of this study to quantify to what 
extent EU’s norms diffusing to China. Due to the nature of the BRI, i.e. an initiative that needs 
to be negotiated and agreed upon between actors, we can argue that at least the norms found in 
our data are norms that have been accepted and not objected to by China and our case countries 
during their negotiations. This means that there is minimally the shallowest form of 
socialisation taking place if we find norm diffusion mechanisms in our data.  
Socialisation is something that actors in world politics, such as China and the EU, try to do to 
each other. International institutional life can be treated as an environment where social 
interactions, not being dependent on material rewards and punishments, may change things in 
their preferences and beliefs. This behaviour could explain to us the conditions of international 
cooperation (ibid, p.20). The effect of socialisation is the most crucial aspect of the process and 
depends upon how the actor adapts the norms taught to them. This is the aspect that we will 
need to focus on in this research as it is here that micro-processes are at work in world politics. 
We need to see if, and how, socialisation micro-processes are working regarding the EU and 
the BRI (ibid, p.18). Micro processes are usually the way that socialisation occurs. The 
transformation of norms and values happen through mimicking, social influence, and 
persuasion. These processes are likely to be interactive with each other (Johnston, 2008, p.22).  
4.3.1 Mimicking 
Mimicking is the practice of copying the behavioural norms of a group to navigate through an 
uncertain environment. Mimicking is usually used to adapt to uncertainties before any detailed 
end-means calculation of the benefits of adapting to the group (ibid, p. 23). Mimicking can also 
come from the will to persuade another actor. Hence, mimicking could be a behavioural 
outcome for persuasion and social influence (ibid, p.24). Mimicking other members of a group 
or society can be found in the way actors develop procedural constraints, work habits and 
standard operating procedures to be able to function inside an institution (ibid, p.24) minimally. 
23 
 
Mimicking can be done to get access to resources or some other type of carrot. For an actor to 
get access to act in the EU or a country, they might want to or have to Mimic the norms of the 
EU (Wiener, 2004, p.197-198). Through mimicking norms in their interactions with EU 
countries, an actor can also start to adopt the same norms in the norms they adhere to in their 
other international cooperation (Greenhill, 2010, p.130).  
Mimicking was detectable by studying how the norms in the BRI’s interactions in the EU 
countries might differ from the norms in the BRI’s 2015 document. We looked at the 
development of procedural constraints, work habits/action plans, and standard operating 
procedures to see if they are like what the BRI outlined in their 2015 document. This way, we 
studied how the BRI is mimicking EU norms to be able to operate within the EU’s institutional 
framework and the vicinity of the EU.  
We can establish that this type of socialisation is at play when we see that China is adopting 
certain norms but only for a short period of time. Mimicking is visible if China is adopting 
norms to handle an uncertain environment that they want to operate inside. Mimicking can also 
be a result of China trying to avoid social influence consequences such as criticism or being a 
result of persuasion. If mimicking is present, we can then see that China has adapted itself to 
that specific norm of the EU and will then at least to some extent diffuse that norm through its 
interactions with our case countries.   
4.3.2 Social Influence 
The micro-process of social influence is when a new actor’s behaviour is judged by the in-group 
and rewarded with encouragement or by being given status markers. The judging can also take 
the shape of punishment by opprobrium and status devaluation (Johnston, 2008, p.24). Park 
(2014, p.338) also means that shaming can be a way of social influencing an actor to shape 
itself after norms. Punishments can also take the form of shunning, exclusion, and demeaning 
the actor for not acting according to what is expected of them. Coercion can also be used as a 
part of the socialisation process if material power is used for normative purposes (ibid).  
A part of social influence is also the connecting of interests, attitudes, and beliefs in one attitude 
system to another. Attitudes towards trade can, for example, be connected to attitudes regarding 
sustainability (Johnston, 2008, p.25).  
Checkel (2005, p.809) describe this micro-process as intergovernmental reinforcement and 
describe it as a method international institution use to offer governments a positive incentive. 
Such an incentive could be rewarded, such as being allowed to act within the EU, with the 
condition that the government adopt and complies with the institution’s norms. For this to work, 
the target government needs to perceive the reward worth it compared to what is required from 
them. The institutions also need to be strong enough to be able to put pressure on the 
government to follow their norms and see the cost of putting pressure on the government as 
worth it (ibid).  
Social Influencing was detected by studying if the BRI has been formed by the judgment of the 
actors involved. For example, if a speech by a foreign minister of one of the case countries 
rewards China in a statement for following European norms. Furthermore, the connection of 
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interests, attitudes, and beliefs in one attitude system to another was analysed by looking at how 
different themes interact with each other.   
If China is criticized for something, given praise for something or if China is given any other 
type of reward or punishment, or is coerced in any other way and then adopts a norm in response 
to this in their interactions with our case countries, we can then say that the diffusion of that 
norm is a case of norm diffusion through the micro-process of social influence.  
 
4.3.3 Persuasion 
The last micro-process is persuasion. It is the process were new actors in a system are convinced 
to follow and see norms, values and causal understandings as correct through a process of 
cognition (ibid, p.25) A successful persuasion process can the cause of the gap between actors 
basic causal understanding getting smaller (ibid, p.26). In socialisation, it involves changing 
opinions, minds and attitudes regarding effect and causality when there is no explicit coercion 
(mental or material) going on (Park, 2014, p. 338). This process can create common knowledge 
or what Johnston (2008, p.26) calls “epistemic conventions” that may or may not be 
cooperative. It can also lead to homogenization of interests.  
Persuasion can be detected when the data shows the actors are using a process of cognition to 
get China to see and follow the EU’s norms, values, and causal understandings as correct. An 
indicator of success is if the normative world view of China and the normative world view of 
the EU become more similar. This can be seen in the data from how common knowledge is the 
same or different.  
If we can see that norms are developed through the processes of cognition without the use of 
coercion between actors and EU norms are becoming are adapted into the countries BRI 
interactions, we can then conclude that norm diffusion has happened through persuasion.  
4.4 EU Socialisation  
Björkdahl (2012, p.82) identifies the EU as a norm-maker who has a strong commitment to a 
particular set of norms and who will advocate said norms in order to cause normative change.  
The norm-maker has normative power, meaning the ability to change the normative beliefs of 
others. The EU is defined as a norm maker that is a norm community. In norm communities, 
norms define the interests and identity of the community members. The members of the 
community share expectations about what is considered appropriate behaviour and the norms 
that are considered to be a part of the appropriateness (ibid, p.83). A norm community might 
be able to influence other actors outside their members. The purpose of this is usually to create 
normative change in line with the community’s normative standards and to recruit new 
members. Norm diffusion might also be done in order to strengthen the community’s norms, 
identity, and coherence (ibid).  
Knowing the specific micro-processes of socialisation, then how does the EU socialise other 
actors? According to Manners (2002, p.244), the EU’s normative power stems from six factors. 
The first factor is “Contagion” (ibid). The diffusion of norms is a result of the unintentional 
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diffusion of ideas to other political actors from the EU. Meaning, EU is leading by “virtuous 
example” (ibid), and other political actors are seeing the EU as a role model for regional 
integration. 
Informational diffusion is based in the EU’s strategical communication through, for example, 
new policy initiatives as well as declarations from heads of the EU’s different institutions (ibid).  
Procedural diffusion is when the EU institutionalise its relationship with a third party. Examples 
of this are inter-regional cooperations agreements, membership of an international organisation 
or enlargement of the EU (ibid, p.244).  
Transference diffusion is when the EU exchange goods, trade, aid, or technical assistance with 
another actor through mostly substantive or financial means. During such transactions, there 
might be an export of EU norms and standards or a carrot and stick method of financial rewards 
and economic sanctions can be used to force norms onto an actor (ibid, p.245).  
Overt diffusion is a result of the physical presence of the EU in a non-EU state or international 
organisation. This can take the shape of member state embassies or other political 
representations abroad as well as monitoring missions in war-torn countries (ibid). 
Cultural filters are the final factor that forms norm diffusion. Cultural filters affect the impact 
of international norms and pollical learning in non-EU states and organisations leading to 
learning, adapting, or rejecting norms. The cultural filter is created by “an interplay between 
the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subject of 
norm diffusion” (ibid, p.245). 
Björkdahl (2012, p.84) also identifies Norm negotiation as a way the EU is socialising other 
countries through norm-diffusion. This method is similar to the previously mentioned micro-
process of persuasion. The EU can also socialise their member countries and other countries 
through a variety of economic and political sanctions if they do not follow the EU’s norms 
when interacting with EU countries (Greenhill, 2010, p.128). If a country chooses not to follow 
the norms of the EU, when they are interacting with the EU and its member states, the EU can 
through different actions withhold international cooperation goods (ibid, p.129).  
Furthermore, Pu (2012, p.341) has argued that socialisation is a two-way process, and this 
dissertation argues that in the case of the EU and China, this can be apparent. While we will not 
engage in this discussion in this dissertation, as it is outside our scope, we will just shortly touch 
on one aspect of it here as it still holds importance.  
4.5 Criticism Against Socialisation Theory 
Pu (2012, p.341) argues that socialisation is a two-way process. That states socialise each other. 
As a whole, actors are not just socialisers or socialisees, Pu (2012, p.346-347) further writes. 
Actors can act as proactive agents who can influence the content and outcome of the 
socialisation process. The one-way process that Johnston discuss is ignoring the agency in 
international politics, and that agent has agency to shape social and political change. China 
should hence also be able to socialise the EU into some of its norms (ibid, p.347).  
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Another point brought up is that if a state was not a founding member of an institution, then 
there is no inherent obligation to abide by the existing norms of that institution (ibid, p.348). 
This does, however, not hold for the EU as the EU require its members to abide by the existing 
norms of their institutions.  
Another critique of the theory is that one should not take the success of socialisation for granted. 
The country being socialised could resist. China could be resisting the normative pressure of 
the EU and that the EU might hence not be able to affect China with its norms (ibid, p.348). 
This dissertation is aware of this and is hence not taking this for granted. Instead, trying to ask 
if the BRI is affected by EU norms (ibid, p.348-349). While this dissertation acknowledges that 
countries socialise each other, the scope of this dissertation is limited to study the effect of EU 
norms on the BRI. Further research should be done in the future on the normative impact of the 
BRI on the EU.  
Van Esch and de Jong (2019, p.183-184) bring up national culture as a factor. They argue that 
national culture takes president over the norms of the EU when EU member states decision-
makers need to make a decision. Hence, socialisation into EU norms might not be adequate 
when they go against the countries own culture (ibid). This dissertation is aware of this and will 
consider this as one explanatory factor if the hypothesis does not hold.  
There are also arguments against smaller states being able to influence larger states norms. We 
hence notice a need to address why we believe that China’s norms regarding the BRI’s actions 
in Europe can be influenced by small countries such as our case countries. Scholars have studied 
how smaller countries, like the Scandinavian countries, can be norm entrepreneurs and change 
international and other countries’ norms around different questions. Ingebritsen (2002, p.11) 
discuss how Scandinavian countries despite their dependent economies, a weak military, and 
small states have been able to act as norm entrepreneurs and influence global eco-politics, 
conflict resolution, and the provision of aid. Björkdahl (2013, p.333) argues that small states, 
such as Sweden, can have great success in being norm entrepreneurs and altering the normative 
architecture of peace and security. Kronsell (2002, p.287) also argues against the argument that 
small states do not have power in international relations as norm-setters, and positions Sweden’s 




5. Research Design and Analytic Framework. 
This dissertation will apply a research design based on qualitative content analysis as described 
by Drisko and Maschi in their book called Content Analysis (2015). Other than that, secondary 
literature will be used to supplement and contextualise the content analysis. Expert interviews 
will also be done with different researchers who are regional expert to get a local and expert 
perspective on the BRI and get access to local data that language barriers are preventing this 
dissertation from finding it.  
5.1 Epistemology  
This dissertation has adopted Wendt’s (1999, p.1) constructivism epistemology. Wendt (ibid) 
argues that rather than the structure of human association being decided by material forces, it 
is primarily determined by shared ideas. Actors identities and interests are not given by nature; 
instead, they are constructed by ideas. The world is constructed from shared perceptions rather 
than having objective reality (ibid). Through this understanding, we can say that China’s 
approach towards different EU countries is not just dictated by natural norms, rather through 
socially constructed norms. Based on this premise, this dissertation has performed a qualitative 
content analysis to be able to understand if the different norms present in the EU are affecting 
the BRI’s interactions with European countries. The qualitative content analysis is an analysis 
of different normative patterns in data. It can help us understand how China is being affected 
by EU norms. 
5.2 Qualitative Content Analysis Method 
After collecting the appropriate data, this dissertation has first expanded the data with context, 
meaning and nuance by understanding the environment the data was created. To do this, we 
will explain which context the country at the time of the agreements being signed. The purpose 
of expanding the data is to get a better understanding of its meaning and nuances, to be able to 
dive deeper and better analytical responses (Drisko and Maschi, 2015, p.94).  
After that, we started to analyse different normative themes present in the data. The original 
2015 BRI document was first analysed, to give us a base understanding of what norms already 
are present in the BRI, before we analysed the actions of China concerning the BRI in the three 
different case countries by themselves. The themes represent the different types of norms 
detected in the data. Each of the three countries was analysed by themselves before, in the end, 
being compared. When the comparison was made, we were able to see if the EU’s norms are 
affecting the BRI. If the norms of the EU are effecting the BRI, and our hypothesis is correct, 
then we can assume that the EU has done its job to make sure that their norms are respected in 
the countries in question and that the norms are also respected in the country’s relations with 
China on the BRI. If the norms of the EU are not reflected on the country’s relations with China 
on BRI, we can analyse the reason for this and see if this is caused by the norms not being 
upheld, to begin with regardless of the BRI or China. With the help of the original 2015 policy 
document detailing the BRI (National Development and Reform Commission People’s 
Republic of China, 2015) we also saw the original, uninfluenced form of the BRI. By comparing 
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the findings from the original 2015 BRI policy document with what we found in China’s BRI 
interactions in relation to the case countries, we got a better understanding of if the norms we 
observe in China’s BRI interactions have always been a part of the Initiative or could be a result 
of socialisation. 
Parallel to this, we performed interviews with regional experts. The content of the interviews 
was determined by the findings of the first preliminary qualitative content-analysis that was 
done somewhat early in the research. After that, we complemented the data with secondary 
data-sources to get a deeper understanding of the BRI. The data from the interviews and 
secondary data sources were tied in together with the qualitative content analysis to reach a 
conclusion.  
After the interviews, this dissertation applied the theories specified previously to understand 
our findings further and answer the research questions. The goal of finding themes was that it 
helps us to identify and highlight the most relevant and meaningful parts of the data as well as 
help us see differences within the themes (Drisko and Maschi, 2015, p.93).  
The steps presented hereafter has been done once on each actor. 
5.3 Text Analysis 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
This dissertation has used an extensive collection of official documents such as the 
Memorandums of understanding between China and the different case countries, the 2015 
document detailing the BRI (which seems to be the first complete policy document publicly 
distributed) (National Development and Reform Commission People’s Republic of China, 
2015), project plans and documentation as well as other types of texts and actions related to the 
BRI, EU and the three countries to answer the research question. To complement our data, this 
dissertation has conducted interviews with experts on the dissertations case countries and EU-
China relations. This dissertation primarily gathered data from open sources and have contacted 
governments and ministries to get access to documents not publicly available. Some of the 
documents gathered have been key to understanding China’s BRI interactions with these 
countries. The ministries and government officials were email and called throughout three 
months, trying to find the correct people to get access to the documents requested. Information 
requests were also created, and both the Serbian Government and the Italian government gave 
access to some documents. The Latvian government had already made available the documents 
needed in this research. The sources are primarily official websites of the different actors in 
question, documents, and agreements as well as press releases. Other data sources that are going 
to be used are the memorandum of cooperation between China and the countries, as well as 
press releases. Other examples of data sources are the EU’s European Council’s websites.  
Furthermore, the secondary literature has been used to supplement our understanding of the 
EU, countries, and their relation to China through the BRI.  
Qualitative expert interviews have been performed, and during these interviews, the experts 
have been asked for additional documents, articles and such that could be used in the content 
analysis and contextualisation. The interviews will be constructed based on the initial rounds 
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of data-collection to complement the data found. The interviews will complement the official 
data sources discussed before to give the research more depth. This is especially important 
concerning actions done in the BRI as there are few openly available documents on them.  
The experts were chosen based on their previous experiences working with the BRI, and new 
experts were contacted based on the recommendations of other experts. Different types of 
experts were contacted as well, such as  EU-China experts with no specific country expertise 
but that had substantial knowledge on the BRI, academic country experts and people with 
professorial experience working with the BRI such as journalists or practitioners with a solid 
IR background.   
5.3.2 Sampling 
The sampling method for data one use influences the data’s trustworthiness and transferability 
as well as the credibility and applicability of the qualitative content analysis (ibid, p.96).  
The qualitative sampling method that was used is an ongoing “iterative” method that takes 
places simultaneously as data collection and analysis. The purpose of this is that it helps us to 
acquire a thorough and good enough sample for qualitative studies (ibid).  
The practical methodology that was used for doing iterative sampling followed Drisko and 
Maschi (2015, p.96-102) methodology. The method is described below, and we explain how it 
has been done by us: A preliminary data collection was suggested in the methodology, and then 
the data collected was to be analysed as described further down the text (ibid, p.96-97). After 
that, the method required us to review and revise the initial sampling plan, based on the 
preliminary data collection and the analysis (ibid). This was to be done based on its 
appropriateness to the research question, the amount of information they provide and adequacy 
for exploring the research question (higher is equal to more prioritised), and the thoroughness 
(meaning containing potential disconfirming or elaborating evidence). Future sampling 
decisions were determined based on the results of the analysis (ibid). As we performed these 
steps, this paper narrowed down the data-sample, removing data that turned out not to be 
relevant or of high quality. A large amount of data was discarded due to not being related to 
BRI, despite being initially collected as such. Data was to be collected and review again until 
we had a large enough data-sample to be able to do our analysis and there were no newer data 
to be found or any more additions to the themes found (ibid). We did this process over a long 
period of time, and as we got access to more and more data, we also found other documents and 
people to of interests to include in our study. As Drisko and Maschi (ibid, p.97) described it 
would do, the iterative approach to sampling provided us with the ability to expand and alter 
the sample to provide adequate information. We did not know of all types of documents, and 
people were available until during the data sampling process, making the iterative approach 
very useful.  
The Interview participants and secondary literature were selected on the same principles.  
Where there is lacking data, the secondary sources and interviews supplemented and 
contextualise as well as deepen the sample. For example, an article on a BRI project might give 




This dissertation used open inductive coding as the coding method as described by Drisko and 
Maschi (ibid, p.104). Open coding is the practice of identifying relevant categories and labelling 
them descriptively. Each category used is close to the original content, relevant and modifiable 
(ibid, 104). The reason this dissertation chooses this coding method is that this dissertation 
argues that it ensures precision and flexibility. Despite that this dissertation had already 
identified norms in the EU, this dissertation did not use them as we argue that it could bias the 
study as it would limit our understanding. There might be other norms present in the BRI that 
are not the same as the norms present in the EU, and these can further our understanding.  
The first step of coding the data was familiarisation, which means, reading through the data to 
get a preliminary overview. Familiarisation helps a researcher get a sense of the study as a 
whole and the different parts as well as awareness of context and nuance. This part of the study 
helps researchers become informed about the content in their data. A researcher is able to see 
key patterns and connections within the data through this method (ibid, p.102). We followed 
this method of coding and achieved the desired results that we described above. At this stage, 
we then created preliminary categories, as was also described by the method (ibid).  
After a researcher further analyses the data, one can then establish the main categories and the 
subcategories within them by better seeing the key patterns and connections within the data 
(ibid, p.104). This was done in this research as we created our categories. For example, one 
main category is Sustainable Development, and a sub-category was made to be Social 
Sustainable Development. The data connected to sustainable development was found in an 
MoU where the nature of the two nations cooperation was being discussed. Data we found could 
be categorised into Sustainable Development, and then sub-categorised into Environmentally 
Sustainable Development. Drisko and Maschi (ibid, p.104) argue that subcategories are used to 
structure the content of each category as well as providing a more detailed and nuanced 
understanding (ibid, p.104). This was once again something we used in our research. The 
categories are based on trends found in the data, connected to the research question. 
After 10% and again after 50% of the data being coded, a formative reliability check of the 
coding frame was performed (ibid, p.105). This being a modification of Drisko and Maschi’s 
(2015, p.105) original method where they only did one check. This change was added to present 
an early revision and then a later one to increase the quality of the coding. Drisko and Maschi’s 
(ibid) reliability check entails revisiting the coding frame to discarding rarely used code and 
reviewing the coding hierarchy. After that, the coding process continues (ibid). When this 
process was done, and all coding was done, a summative check was performed in the same 
manner as the previous review was done, as recommended by Drisko and Maschi (ibid). The 
purpose of these checks is to give the possibility for revision of the research question. They are 
also done to allow for final changes in the coding categories (ibid). At this last stage, we did 
not do major revisions in our paper. 
After doing our coding, it was used as the base of our analysis. The coding of the data helps us 




5.4 Validity and Reliability 
To ensure the validity and reliability of our coding, we ensured the consistency and quality of 
coding by using a codebook with strict definitions of categories and subcategories as suggested 
by Drisko and Maschi’s (ibid, p.107). This ensures that other researchers can validate the 
research and that the dissertation reliably coded the data throughout the process (ibid, p.107). 
While these efforts might help with validity and reliability, it would have been more optimal if 
the dissertation were able to use other researchers to review the data during the research process. 
Because of the limitations of this dissertation, this was not possible.  
5.5 Methodological Issues 
While the analysis is going to perform interviews, the interviews will not be more dangerous 
than everyday hazards. Furthermore, we will just be using data already available in the public 
domain. Hence the research is not required to be reviewed by an ethics panel (Drisko and 
Maschi, 2015, p.95). To ensure interviewees safety if they feel professionally or personally at 
risk by participating, we will offer them the option to be anonymous and handle their data with 
utmost security. After the study is done, any personal information will be deleted.  
In the data collection period, we predicted and faced some issues. When it comes to the BRI, 
there is a lack of transparency when it comes to documents and agreements. While this is an 
issue, this dissertation argues that one can counteract it by trying to get access to more 
documents from the actors involved or try to puzzle together statements and online sources to 
get a good and nuanced picture. Using secondary sources and interviews helped us to get around 
this issue. The data already found in the preliminary research was proven to be enough to 
conduct an analysis to a satisfactory level. However, by supplementing it with more data, partly 
through secondary sources, contacting our case country governments, and interviews, this 
dissertation was hoping to get a deeper understanding of than what the data already found can 
offer. This was successful. 
Qualitative content analysis, as a method, has its issues. Qualitative content analysis can be a 
time-consuming method, prone to human error and resource-draining. Nevertheless, this was to 
be avoided by applying a proper and systematic method, as was suggested by Stan (2010, 
p.226). The method has also been criticised for being too simplistic and descriptive (ibid, 
p.229). This dissertation acknowledges this issue and argues that by using it to do a comparative 
analysis and combining the content analysis with socialisation theory, we make it more complex 








5.6 Data Analysis  
The coding process was a large part of the analysis. When this was done, the coding of the data 
regarding the BRI and the BRI’s efforts in the country’s was presented. The themes were to 
then be visually comparable, and one should be able to see similarities, which turned out to be 
true. The final step of the analysis was to analyse the similarities between the different actors 
and see if the normative chain between the countries and the BRI exists or if it is not there.  
If the EU’s norms are affecting the BRI, we could see the EU’s norms in the BRI’s interactions 
with the countries. For example, if the theme of sustainable development is present the EU and 
the BRI’s interactions with the countries, this will be an indication of EU norms transferring 
over to the BRI. To than study the effect of the level of affiliation to the EU, we studied the 
number of norms transferred over from the EU to the BRI’s interactions and check if the norms 
were already present in the BRI. The hypothesis presented before entails that if the country is 
closely affiliated with the EU (such as a core EU member), then they should have a higher 
number of EU norms transferred over to the BRI than a country that has lower levels of 
affiliation. The level of affiliation was measured by if they are core member states, a recent 
member state or in the process of becoming a member state. 
To be able to see if the level of affiliation to the EU matters for how the BRI is affected by EU 
norms, we found contrasts in the different degrees of affiliation. If the same number of norms 
were present in all cases studied, then this would mean that the level of affiliation does not 
matter. It could also mean that the BRI already had all the norms from the start and have 
consistently been applying them to all the countries they worked with. If the norms were present 
in the BRI from the beginning, we could see this by studying the 2015 BRI document. If the 
norms found were already present in the BRI’s original policy document to the same degree as 
it was found in China’s BRI interactions with our case countries, we cannot say that the BRI 
was affected by the EU’s norms. 
Furthermore, to analyse the norms found in the data, we have compared them with norms found 
in the EU to see which ones are missing. The missing ones were added together with the norms 
found into the dataset called “Norms” which will be discussed below. Meaning if sustainability 
is missing from the themes, it has been added to the dataset as it is an EU norm. The reason for 
doing this is that we will then be able to see where norms exist and where they are missing. To 
simplify the visualisation, we removed the EU norms from our tables that were not present in 
any of our cases, with a few exceptions.  
To present the data, this dissertation has used a comparative table to show the similarities and 
differences found in the data. The table was used separately in each country. The table shows 
the flow of norms from the EU over to the BRI as well as checks if the BRI already contained 
the norm, to begin with. The dataset “Norms” is the start of the chain, checking if the norms are 
present in the EU, in China’s actions through the BRI concerning the case country studied and 
if the norm already existed in the BRI. This method was chosen as it is concise, simultaneously 
presents large amounts of data, clearly order the data displayed and was useful for the last stage 
of the analysis, namely applying theory to the results (ibid, p.111). Having the extra check on 
the BRI original document will also increase the value of the research as it removes the 
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uncertainty factor regarding if the norm was already present in the original form of the BRI. If 
it was, it means that the BRI was not affected by that EU norm in that case.  
The matrix is represented by Figure 1 and will show us if the chain of norm diffusion is present 
or where it breaks.  
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Table 1 created by the author as a pedagogical tool to explain the analytical process. The tables in the analysis will not contain the norm 
diffusion calculation column. Please note that the numbering of norms as EU-Norm 1.1 etc. is just for the pedagogical purposes of this graph. 
The same is true for the last column to the right side.  
“Norms” is a syntax that contains the normative themes the analyses have found in the data + 
some of the missing EU norms. The EU norms have a “EU-” written before their name represent 
EU norms like Norm: 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.6,1.7,1.8,3.1,3.2. “Commonality” (Uncommon, 
Common, Very Common) measures how common something is in the dataset we have on each 
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country. “Importance” (Not important, Fairly important, Important) measures if the norm is 
found in important places or take up much focus in the documents, showing that it is valued as 
important by the two parties. “BRI 2015” is a check on the 2015 policy document to see if the 
norm is found in the document, and it checks the two parameters as well. Something can also 
be “None-existent”, meaning that the norm is not present at all in the documents that have been 
studied. The reason why Non-existent and Uncommon both are an option is that there are some 
examples where the norm is only mentioned a few times or maybe just once, making it 
uncommon, while at other times it is not mentioned at all, making it non-existent. 
The commonality and importance of a norm are dependent on a few key factors. How common 
a norm is depending on how often it is mentioned in all our data and how much space it takes 
in the documents. How much space the norm takes in our data is compared with the amount of 
space other norms take up in the data, meaning the commonality of a norm is dependent on the 
commonality of other norms. Meaning, if norm A (the most common norm) is mentioned ten 
times, it makes norm B not be common if it is only mentioned three times while if norm A is 
mentioned five times, Norm B being mentioned three times it would be common. After 
establishing the commonality of the norm, we can then establish the importance of it. 
Commonality plays a small role in the importance of a norm, but it can be an indicator of how 
much importance is put on a norm. Primarily, the importance of a norm is determined 
qualitatively by the relevance it has for BRI in our case. For example, even if a norm is only 
mentioned once or twice, it can be described as the foundation of the countries BRI interactions, 
or that the agreement is to be based on that norm, making it rather important. A norm that is 
common can also not be that important if the norm is not given much value in the places it 
appears. One example of this is how a norm is just discussed in a roundabout way, or not given 
more attention than just being vaguely mentioned. The stronger a language, the more the norm 
is discussed in greater detail, the more important it is valued by the analysis. The importance of 
a norm is also, to a small extent, dependent on the importance of other norms (to a significantly 
smaller extent than the dependency of commonality).  
The commonality and importance of the sub-themes are first decided, before moving on to the 
main themes. The main themes do not have any specific analytical value and act more like a 
category to help us organise the sub-theme norms. Therefore, we do not analyse the main norm 
themes to see if they are cases of norm diffusion. The reason for this is that with cases like 
liberalism norms, there are a lot of other liberal norms that are not present in the BRI and that 
we do not include in our analysis or listing. Meaning, even if the main themes would indicate 
norm diffusion from our data, it would be a skewed result, not really representing that broad 
category of norms it is named after. Therefore, our analytic focus is put on the sub-themes, 
which are focused enough for this dissertation to be able to analyse. The main theme of the 
norms is not compared with others but are rather an average value of the sub-theme. The 
commonality and importance of these norms are decided by combining the values of the 
importance and commonality of the sub-themes and then dividing them with the total number 
of sub-themes in main themes. In the cases that the main theme of the norm has is mentioned 
directly, such as sustainable development, we will count it as its own sub-theme. If the result 
ends up being in between two numbers, we will round up or down based on how close they are 
to ether value. For example, if the average of the commonality of the main theme of a norm is 
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1-1.4 than that means that that norm is uncommon, while if it is 1.5-2.4, it means that it is 
common and 2.5-3 it means it is very common. If a norm is set to be non-existent in a case, then 
this norm is not counted, as we are looking for the mean of the norms present in our case. The 
non-existent value is present for us to be able to analyse the differences between our different 
cases better while the importance and commonality of our main norm theme are present to give 
us an average of the values of the norms present in the main theme and help us better visualise 
and organise our findings and data.  
The key documents, such as plans of implementation of the BRI, original BRI MoU’s and key 
press-releases, are more weighted in this assessment than some of the other documents due to 
their centrality to these agreements. Smaller agreements have less importance for the country’s 
interactions, and for example, could be more focused on specific projects, making them less 
important in our evaluation of the cases norms.  
The three different values found in Commonality and Importance are also equal to the numerical 
values of 0, 1, 2 and 3. Meaning, if the parameter called importance in “Norm 1” is equal to 
Important, then that is equal to a three while it is equal to 2 if it is Fairly important, one if it is 
not important and 0 if it is None-existent. After we establish the two parameters in both the 
2015 BRI policy document and in our case countries, we can compare the norms in our case 
country with the norms of the BRI 2015 policy document to see if norm diffusion has taken 
place.  
The Norm diffusion column identifies the likelihood of the presence of the norm in our case, 
being a result of norm diffusion. The options are Norm diffusion, Possibly Norm diffusion and 
No Norm diffusion. Norm diffusion means that the chain of norm diffusion holds and the norm 
transfers from the EU to the BRI. A norm shows norm diffusion if the added-up number 
between the case country and the BRI 2015 policy document is 3 or 4, as we see in norm 1.1-
3. It can also be an example of norm diffusion even if the number is 2. This requires that the 
norm in the BRI 2015 policy document is uncommon and not important while the norm in our 
case is common and fairly important as well as the dissertation clearly qualitatively seeing the 
difference between the norm in the 2015 BRI policy document and the case, as seen in norm 
1.5. If the norm is none-existent in the BRI 2015 Policy document than we can also establish 
that there has been a case of norm diffusion, even if the numerical value of the norms only adds 
up to 2.  
Possibly Norm Diffusion means that there is no direct chain found in the data but that we cannot 
rule out the correlation. It could also mean that something is unclear. In the case of Possible 
Norm Diffusion, the norm will be more scrutinised and discussed later in the text. For a norm 
to be classified as Possible Norm Diffusion, it needs to have a point of one or two. Examples 
of these are norm 1.6,1.7 and 1.8. Norm 2.1 is also Possible Norm Diffusion and an example of 
a norm that is not an EU norm. This is why it is not a case of Norm diffusion. The norms that 
are not EU norms but have a stronger presence in the case than what they have in the BRI 2015 
Policy document will also be Possible Norm Diffusion. None of the norms that are none-EU 
norms will be classified as Norm Diffusion. 
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No Norm diffusion means that norms have not transferred over at all and that there is no 
correlation or that the norms were already present in the BRI. For a norm to be red, the norm 
needs to have a higher value or equal value in the BRI 2015 policy document than what it has 
in our case. Meaning that the value needs to be zero, as seen in Norm 3.2 or negative as seen in 
Norm 3.1. 
5.7 Applying Theory 
This dissertation did, after finishing the qualitative content analysis, start applying Johnston’s 
(2008) theory on socialisation to understand the empirical findings.  
To analyse the presence and effect of socialisation, we need to check: 
1. what the characteristics of the social environment are that the actors are interacting with each 
other. If the environment has teaching- or agent-like properties, we need to identify what norms 
and associated behaviours that actors in the environment are supposed to adopt and ideally 
internalise. Find the ideology present in the social environment that is the EU (Johnston, 2008, 
p.26-27).  
2. We also needed to identify how these normative characteristics develop or hold back the 
socialisation process. 
3. Lastly, we needed to identify how the actors interact with the environment and what the 
policy processes through which newly socialized actors act upon in the broader social 
environment.  
The BRI’s socialisation could be analysed in Europe because even if the socialisation doesn’t 
affect the whole of China or even whole of BRI, it will affect the diplomats and decision-makers 
that are dealing with the EU and EU nations as these will need to negotiate within the EU:s 
framework (ibid, 27). Furthermore, international institutions often possess a link between the 
presence of specific normative structures that are found in institutions with the implementation 
of said norms in the actor’s behaviour at a unit level (ibid, p.29-30). Institutions usually have 
identities, specific traits, as well as missions and normative cores (ibid, p.30).  
It is also important to understand how institutions, such as the EU vary as social environments 
in ways relevant to socialisation as this determines the level of persuasion and social influence 
(ibid, p.30-31). This understanding would help us to understand the normative straight of the 
EU. 
1. We need to understand the nature of membership – Small of exclusive/large and inclusive,  
2. The franchise is the other aspect we need to understand. Meaning, if the authoritativeness of 
members is equally distributed or distributed unevenly (legitimately).   
3. If decision rules require unanimity, consensus, majority or supermajority etc.  
4.  The mandate needs to be understood, as well. The mandate to provide information, to 
deliberate and resolve as well as to negotiate and legislate.  
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5. The autonomy of actors from principals. Looking at if they are low or high.  
Different combinations of these five create different kinds of social environments and lead to 
different amounts of persuasion and social influence (ibid, p.31).  
When this is done, the next step was to analyse the effect of the EU’s norm diffusion on the 
BRI. To do this, we needed to look at the different micro-processes of socialisation: mimicking, 
social influence, and persuasion. These we studied by applying the theory of these processes 
onto the content analysis results to see if we can see any patterns that resemble any of these 
three behaviours. We did this to better understand how they are evident in the EU, how they 
affect EU neighbours, and how they are affecting the BRI in Europe. 
5.7.1 2015 Belt and Road Initiative Policy Document 
To be able to apply our theory on something, we also need to have a different variable that 
shows us what norms are initially from the BRI and what norms are coming from the outside. 
Looking at the original BRI document, we can see that there are a bunch of norms present. 
These can give us insight to which norms that are present in China’s interactions with our case 
countries are more likely to come from China initially. Appendix 1 shows the themes and sub-
themes used in the analysis below and Appendix 3 contains all the different pieces of data that 
we have used in the analysis of the 2015 BRI policy document.  
Liberal Norms 
Liberal Norms are not that prominent the BRI. Few liberal norms appear, and peace seems to 
be the only relevant norm present. 
 
Peace is brought up in a few different places, some of them mentioned in appendix 3, and seems 
to be one of the more central norms of the initiative due to the weight it is given.  
In the policy document, China claims that the BRI inject new positive energy into world peace. 
The initiative is claimed to lead to a more harmonious world where people can live in peace 
and prosperity. The BRI is to be in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence.  
Equality is framed as one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence but is not mentioned 
more than that in the document, making it not so common. It is an undertone of the document, 
giving it some importance.  
Cooperation 
Cooperation has one norm connected to it that is relevant, while having another minor norm 
that is not as present but is an undertone, giving it some importance. 
 
Mutual Benefit is a recurring norm throughout the entire document. It seems to be one of the 
guiding norms of the BRI. It is in many formative places of the document, giving it importance 
to the BRI.  
The BRI is to be a win-win cooperation, built on mutual benefits for the parties, which is 
repeated throughout the text repeatedly.  
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This is the only mutuality norm not going under the “mutuality” theme as we argue it fits better 
with the cooperation theme as it is solely about mutual benefits through cooperation. Being a 
sub-category of cooperation rather than mutuality.  
Common Development Is only mentioned once but is an undertone of the document. It is rare, 
but of some importance to the initiative. The initiative is to promote common development and 
prosperity.  
Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is brought up in the policy document a few times. Mostly, 
environmental sustainability is discussed, and there is a complete lack of economic 
sustainability. In the policy document, China writes that the BRI aims to realize balanced and 
sustainable development in the countries involved.  
 
Environmentally Sustainable Development Norms are present in the document and rather 
prevalent. Yet, there is some contradiction in this norm, as they also discuss developing fossil 
fuel industries which are not so environmentally sustainable  
In the policy document, we can read that China encourages the promotion of green and low-
carbon infrastructure construction and operation management where they are to take into full 
account the impact climate change has on construction. Wind power, solar power and other 
clean and renewable energy sources are to be developed together. In the same sentence, fossil 
fuel development is also propagated for. 
Socially Sustainable Development is discussed in relation to poverty. It is minor and not 
central in any way to the BRI, at least from the perspective of this document.  
Fairtrade 
There is only one fair-trade norm present in the 2015 document, but it has large importance to 
the BRI, seen from the policy documents perspective.  
Open and Market Economy Norms appear in different parts of the text and are given much 
importance. In the policy paper, China promises to be committed to their opening-up policy, 
and to build a new pattern of all-round opening-up, and to integrate China deeper into the 
world’s economic system. The BRI is to help China in this endeavour. China also promises that 
the Initiative will follow market operations, abide by market rules, international norms and let 
the market allocate resources while letting enterprises act independently.  
Good Governance  
Good governance is missing some of its key components but has a relevant presence in the 
policy document.  
Financial Security is not given much space or importance in the agreement, but it is still present 
as a goal to achieve. The policy document promotes a sound business environment to be shaped 
within the related regions and countries. The countries are to push forward negotiations on 
bilateral investment protection agreements and double taxation avoidance agreements to protect 
the lawful rights and interests of investors.  
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Inclusive Norms can be found in some key areas of the policy document, and while it is not 
too common, it has an importance to it. China writes that they want to build a regional economic 
cooperation architecture that is inclusive. The BRI is to be inclusive and harmonious. The 
Chinese government also advocates inclusiveness in the initiative.  
Transparency Norms Are a small norm that is not too visible. Mentioned a few times, it is not 
given much importance ether.  In the policy document, it is written that the countries should 
lower non-tariff barriers and jointly improving the transparency of technical trade measures.  
Culture norms  
Cultural norms are found in the sense that the BRI want to promote the spreading of different 
cultures among the nations. This is given some importance and is fairly common.  
Preservation of Cultural Heritage is not discussed more than being mentioned once. 
Meaning, this norm had a small amount of importance to the BRI. The policy document 
encourages the actors to jointly apply for and protect World Heritage sites. This is the only 
cultural heritage preservation action mentioned, and it is not well defined or discussed.  
Cultural Diversity Norms are discussed to a greater extent. The policy document encourages 
cultural diversity along the BRI and gives it some importance. In the policy document, China 
means that the BRI will promote cultural exchanges among the members of the initiative.  
Enhancing cultural exchanges is said to be one of the aspects required for mutual benefit and 
common security.  
Mutuality Norms 
Mutuality Norms are widely discussed, and some of them are given a lot of importance.  
Mutual Understanding Norms are present in the agreements to a small extent and are not 
displayed as too important outside the cultural sphere. In the policy document, China writes 
that the BRI will contribute to mutual understanding for the people of the countries involved in 
the initiative. The initiative is to enhance mutual understanding to gain common development 
and prosperity and peace and friendship.  
Trust is an important norm in some of the key aspects of the BRI. It is not common, but where 
it appears, it takes a prominent role. In the policy document, China writes that the BRI will 
contribute to mutual trust among the populations of the countries involved in the initiative. 
Mutual trust is again mentioned as a way to gain mutual peace and common development and 
prosperity.  
Respect is another norm that has not been mentioned much but has been mentioned in defining 
places. China means that the initiative will lead to people in the initiative countries respecting 
each other more. Mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is argued 
to be one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence that the BRI wants to achieve.  
Mutual Recognition of Standards is a norm that is rarely expressed and do not seem to have 
much relevance. Mutual recognition of regulations, improved cooperation in the field of 
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inspection and quarantine, certification and accreditation and standard measurement is also 
encouraged in the countries along the BRI by the policy document.  
Economic Integration is a norm that is common and appears in relatively important parts of 
the document. The BRI is said in the document to be embracing economic globalisation with 
deep integration of markets, economic policy coordination and in-depth regional cooperation 
of higher standards. The Initiative is to build a community with shared interests, destiny, 
responsibility featuring economic integration.  
Government Control/planned Economy Practices 
This is a norm with little mention and relevance in the 2015 policy document.  
Preferential Investment Possibilities is the only component this norm has, and it is not a 
common, nor relevant aspect of the policy document. Speeding up Investment facilitation by 
the involved governments in the BRI is encouraged in the BRI policy document.  
Table 2 – BRI Norms   
Norms Commonality Importance 
Liberal Norms Common Important 
Peace Common Important 
Equality Uncommon  Fairly important  
Cooperation Common Important 
Mutual Benefit Very common Important  
Common Development  Uncommon Fairly important 
Sustainable Development Common Fairly important 
Environmental Development Common Fairly important 
Social Development Uncommon  Not important 
Fairtrade Common  Fairly Important 
Open and Market Economy  Very common Important 
Transparency Uncommon  Not important 
Good Governance Common Fairly Important 
Financial Security  Uncommon  Not important  
Inclusive Norm Common Fairly important 
Culture Norms Common Fairly important 
Preservation of Cultural Heritage Uncommon Not important 
Cultural Diversity Common Fairly important 
Mutuality Norm Uncommon Fairly Important 
Mutual Understanding Norms Uncommon Not Important 
Trust Uncommon Important 
Respect Uncommon Fairly important 
Mutual Recognition of Standards  Uncommon Not Important 
Economic Integration Common Fairly Important 
Government Control /planned 
Economy Practices  
Uncommon Not Important 
Preferential Investment Possibilities Uncommon Not important 
Table 2: Table prepared by the author. It is describing the commonality and importance of different 




In this section, we are going to have the previous sections in mind on EU as a social 
environment, as required by our theory, as well as the norms found in the 2015 Belt and Road 
Initiative document when we are looking at our case countries and the documents we have 
collected from them. We will give short summaries and one or two examples per norm. To give 
context to the data we have, we will use the interviews we have done and a few third-party 
sources. We will understand our data by applying our theory on a country by county basis.  
The data-gathering process took a long time, and all case countries’ academics, ministries and 
even some journalists were contacted to get access to documents and perspectives on the topic. 
The research contains documents that are not released to the public, and a few classified 
documents as well.  
Due to the qualitative nature of this dissertation, both indicators and keywords are used to 
identify the different themes and sub-themes in the coding of the data. They are listed in 
Appendix 1. A norm indicator could be the countries agreeing on having joint cultural events 
in each other’s countries, which would indicate cultural diversity norms. The events can be 
worded differently (music month, culture year, film event and more.) but are still described as 
cultural events.  
In Appendix 2, one can see the data collection and sampling process used. In appendix 3, one 
can read the full results of the qualitative content analysis, while in the sections below, one will 
read summaries of the data displayed in Appendix 3. In Appendix 3, one can also see the list of 
documents used for each country. In Appendix 4, one can read the summarised interviews and 
the profiles of the people interviewed. Nine interviews were done, and around 35 documents 
were coded and analysed.  
Looking at Johnston (2008, p.26-27) method of analysis that we previously discussed, we need 
to identify the characteristics of the social environment that the actors are interacting with each 
other. This has been done first in the section about the EU and EU norms and will now be done 
at the beginning of this section of the paper. We have also seen how the EU, through their 
legislations and enlargement procedures, develop the socialisation processes as well as how the 
actors interact with the norms. We will further be delving into these topics throughout the 
coming section. We will now be analysing the results of the qualitative content analyses through 
the three micro-processes that Johnston’s presented. The documents used have all been listed 
and explained in Appendix 3.  
6.1. Italy 
In the case of Italy, being the largest country of our cases, we have a large sample size 16 
documents that we have analysed. They are a diverse selection, and the only type of agreement 
of relevance that was not found was agreements on education. It is unclear if there is any such 
agreement. The ministry of education of Italy has been reached out through different channels 
to but choose not to respond.  
The Euro-sceptic and EU norm sceptic Italian government that signed the BRI MoU was not 
the same government that first started the BRI negotiations (G. Pompili, Personal 
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communication, 13 February 2020). Already in 2017, before the populist EU-sceptic 
government took power in Italy, negotiations were on the way about signing a BRI MoU (ibid). 
The EU-sceptic Italian government were looking for other actors to cooperate with to lessen 
their reliance on the EU. One possible partner was China (G. Pugliese, Personal 
Communication, 07 February 2020). 
The BRI negotiations were sped up due to pressure from the Leagues and Luigi Di Maio, the 
now former leader of the Five-Star Movement and Michele Geraci, undersecretary of the 
ministry of economic development, willingness to get closer to China. Mr Di Maio sped up the 
BRI negotiations during the import-export fair in Shanghai. During the meeting, Di Maio and 
Geraci promised Chinese officials that Italy would join the BRI. When they got back from the 
expo, the League started being more critical towards the BRI, not supporting the signing of the 
MoU. March 2019, the date that Italy joined the BRI had already been decided for a state visit 
for when the MoU and other agreements were going to be signed. Domestic worries appeared 
about Italy being the first G7 country to join, and worries were expressed from the Trump 
administration (G. Pompili, Personal communication, 13 February 2020).  
Poggetti (2019) write a similar story to what Pompili describes in her interview and highlights 
that Italy needed foreign investment to further grow their stagnating economy, but that the 
League changed their mind about the BRI when the U.S. started criticising Italy for considering 
joining the BRI. When Italy started to consider cancelling their signing of the BRI, China 
threatened to cancel investments (ibid), that were said to be worth 2.8 million dollars, according 
to Smith and Loon (2019).  
Italy decided that they would sign the MoU, but that it would have a clear commercial profile 
and open the doors for other EU countries to join the BRI. The government tried to calm Italian 
sceptics and the U.S. by fixing the language of the MoU to make it more EU friendly (G. 
Pompili, Personal communication, 13 February 2020). 
Looking at Italy joining the BRI from this perspective, we can see that Italy’s hand was partly 
forced to sign the MoU in order to not lose out on the investments they needed to promote the 
growth of their economy. Despite this, they made efforts to minimise the backlash.   
Michele Geraci, an undersecretary of state at the Italian Ministry of Economic Development 
and a strong proponent of the BRI in Italy, wrote himself in an article in the Financial Times 
that the MoU contains language and concepts that bring the BRI project closer to the EU best 
practises on issues of transparency, making sure the playing field is level and climate change  
(Geraci, 2019).  
This shows that Italy intentionally tried to socialise China into the Norms of the EU through 
the BRI. The reason for this, based on our expert interviews and the statement of Geraci, seems 
to be to calm down and lessen the EU’s and US’s criticism and backlash.  
Here we can see a case of mimicking as has been discussed previously in this dissertation. China 
is adapting its interactions with Italy, with the help of Italy, to handle the uncertain environment. 
The uncertainty is caused by the possibility of a backlash from both the US and the EU. To 
handle this uncertainty, diminishing the possibility of the EU sanctioning the agreement, we 
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can see that China adapted its interactions with Italy to mimic the norms of the EU. Partly, this 
might have been done to prevent the use of the micro-process of social influence, where the EU 
could sanction both Italy and China for stepping outside of the EU’s normative framework.  
Dr G. Pugliese (Personal Communication 07 February 2020) further means that in 2019, China 
had a lot of pressure from both inside and outside regarding the BRI. In China, there was a lot 
of scepticism against the BRI, even from elite members of the Communist Party.  Elite members 
thought that the BRI was a waste. This helped Italy in its negotiations with China, making China 
scaling the BRI down concerning Italy and abiding by international good practice. Italy joining 
helped China as Italy became a symbol of the BRI’s possible success and showed that the BRI 
is something that can be adapted and re-defined if it is needed (ibid). This is again something 
mentioned by Pei (2019) who highlight the uncertainty and scepticism against the BRI from the 
Chinese elite.   
Outside of the normative language, Italy was not putting forward many demands in the 
negotiations. The Chinese side dictated the terms, and it was China’s text. Italy only added the 
last part where they agree that all decisions that Italy make must be decided within the 
framework of the EU (G. Pompili, Personal communication, 13 February 2020).  
The League changed their mind on China and the BRI after initially supporting it. A delegation 
from Italy went to Taiwan, and the League used their social network to make the visit public. 
The League also raised the Hong Kong issues, but all this was not a result of EU norms, rather 
it was a result of U.S. influence. The League wanted to get closer to the Trump Whitehouse, 
according to Ms G Pompili (ibid).  
None of the BRI projects has been done yet in Italy. After the MoU was signed, The U.S. and 
the E.U. asked Italy to approve the golden-power law. This law gives the government control 
over foreign direct investment into the country’s strategic infrastructure. Italy was asked by the 
EU to adopt this law on a country level due to the BRI, which the Italian government ended up 
doing (ibid). The law should influence China’s future actions in Italy (ibid). 
The Leagues resistance against China is not influenced by the EU, as both leading parties are 
EU-sceptic in the government, but rather more about the Leagues admiration for the Trump 
administration, according to Ms Pompili (ibid). 
Here, due to the norms originating from the U.S. and not the EU, we cannot establish that this 
change of attitude towards China is connected to an EU micro process of socialisation.  
6.1.1 Norms  
We can see EU norms that have influenced China’s interactions with Italy. In 5 clear cases, one 
can see that EU norms in the agreements that were either not present in the BRI initially or that 
have a significantly more substantial presence in the Italy-China agreements then they have in 
the original BRI document. There are also seven other norms that ether are not explicit EU 
Norms and that are initially in the BRI 2015 policy document, or that are to a rather small extent 






Sustainable development is a significant norm in China-Italy BRI interactions. Sustainability is 
brought up in many different documents as something that needs to be adhered to in 
investments, development and cooperations. It is something the parties want to advocate. 
However, they do not always specify what type of sustainable development they mean.   
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the countries further discuss the need to promote 
sustainable development, in line with the Paris Accord on Climate change and in-line with the 
2030 Agenda.  
Sustainable Environmental Development is the most present of the sustainability norms. It 
is the one that has been the most clearly defined as well, and the parties put considerable 
importance to this norm. In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties highlight 
the importance of the Paris Accord on Climate change. The parties also agree on developing 
sustainable connectivity, sustainable energy, and to cooperate on environmental protection.  
In the BRI 2015 Policy Document (called BRI-PD henceforth) it is a common and relatively 
important norm, meaning that it is a bit unclear whether there has been any norm diffusion 
through socialisation done here, or if this norm has become more important due to 
developments such as the Paris accord on climate change that was signed a year later than the 
BRI-PD was published.  
Sustainable Economic Development is only outright mentioned in one of the documents. It 
has a small impact and relevance on the countries BRI interactions. In the core BRI MoU 
between Italy and China, the parties agree that their BRI interactions are to be guided by 
sustainable growth norms. The countries agree that they are to develop connectivity following 
a financially sustainable approach and have an approach of circular development. Investments 
are also supposed to be economically viable (sustainable). They are also to help other countries 
in this matter together. This norm holds the same importance and communality in China’s 
interactions with Italy as it does in the BRI-PD, meaning there is no explicit socialisation 
happening concerning this norm.  
Societal Sustainable Development is also a minor norm that is mentioned a few times. It seems 
to be a fairly important norm due to the actors defining It as a norm they should work towards 
socially sustainable investments. In the joint press release between Italy and China on the 
strengthening of their global strategic partnership, the two countries highlight their support of 
implementing the 2017-2020 Italy-China action Plan to further boost cooperation in the areas 
of sustainable urbanisation and to work towards socially sustainable investments. They are also 
to help other countries in this matter.  
Social sustainable development norms are non-existent in the BRI-PD. This dissertation argues 
that this is an example of transference diffusion. Transference diffusion is a process that 
commonly happens during an exchange of services or knowledge as well as during investment. 
Through the action plan and the investments, norm diffusion happens through transference 
diffusion. This dissertation would also argue that this is a case of the micro-process of 
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Persuasion due to the norm establishing that they are to work towards socially sustainable 
investments, creating a mutual normative world view.  
Good Governance 
Good governance norms are highly visible in the two nations agreements with each other. It is 
the largest norm present in our data and is almost found in all documents. 
 
Financial Security is the smallest norm in this category of norms and is only really mentioned 
in one document. In the original China-Italy BRI MoU, the two countries agree to communicate 
and coordinate on fiscal, financial, and structural reform policies to create a favourable 
environment for economic and financial cooperation. This norm is equally present and robust 
in the BRI-PD, indicating that there is no norm diffusion. 
The Rule of Law norm is highly relevant and shows respect for Italy’s EU membership. It is 
present in almost all the agreements and is a central norm in many agreements. In the core BRI 
MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to work per their respective domestic laws and 
regulations, in accordance with their respective international obligations. At the end of the core 
BRI MoU, Italy and China agree that their MoU will be interpreted per the legislations of the 
Parties as well as international laws, and for Italy, the obligations Italy have from their EU 
membership.  
This norm does not exist in the BRI-PD, and this dissertation argues that this is a case of the 
micro-processes Social Influencing and Persuasion. Social Influencing due to the reason this 
norm is present. The dissertation argues that this norm is likely to be present in all these 
documents due to the EU’s harsh criticism in the past of China’s financial dealings, where the 
EU believes that China has disregarded the rule of law and responsibilities of European 
countries they have worked in, as described by Peel and Brunsden (2019).  
It is also a case of Persuasion, due to the two countries reaching a common understanding that 
the rule of law is to be upheld. It becomes common knowledge. The strong presence of this 
norm is a legitimisation of the EU, as the parties agree that the agreements are to respect Italy’s 
obligations towards the EU. The strong presence indicates that China understands the 
importance of these obligations.  
Inclusiveness is another common EU norm in the agreements. It is in core places for the 
agreements, making it reasonably relevant. In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, they 
agree that they want to strengthen cooperation and promote regional connectivity with an 
inclusive framework beneficial to all. In the MoU, the countries also agree to promote inclusive 
growth. This norm is equally important in the BRI-PD, meaning there is no norm diffusion 
present regarding this norm.  
Accountability Norms are a common norm and are important. Accountability Norms are 
norms that are present throughout the document, very vaguely, but can be seen when reading 
between the lines.  In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to make 
sure consistency and complementarity with existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
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mechanisms and with regional cooperation platforms. The countries dedication to these values 
shows a will to keep promises and to be responsible for one’s obligations.  
This same kind of promise of upholding their responsibilities in existing cooperations is found 
in many different documents in the same place that the rule of law norm is found. Accountability 
norms are not present in the BRI-PD and are a most likely a result of Social Influencing, due to 
the EU criticising China of not being accountable and conducting debt trap diplomacy 
(Brattberg & Soula, 2018).  
Liberalism 
Liberal norms are common and seem to be somewhat relevant in the country’s agreements with 
each other. There are some specific liberal norms present, while many are not, which is a 
common theme among all our cases.  
Equality Norms are noticeable in the agreements, both as a way they want to approach each 
other and in how they want to shape the global arena. In an MoU on cooperation in science, 
technology and innovation, the countries agree to base their promotion and support of 
cooperation between their research entities and institutions on the principle of equality. Equality 
is slightly more common and important in China’s BRI interactions than what it is in the BRI-
PD. It is not a large enough difference for us to be able to say that there is a norm diffusion 
present for sure. We will get back to this later.   
Peace as a norm in international relations is present and highlighted as important for both 
parties. It is a minor norm in the number of mentions, but the two countries have put much 
importance to it. In a joint press release between Italy and China, the two countries say that 
their strategic partnership is aimed at contributing to world peace. In the core BRI MoU, the 
parties promise to work towards promoting regional peace. This norm is weaker in China’s BRI 
interactions with Italy than in the BRI-PD, and hence we cannot see that there has been any 
norm diffusion.  
Human Rights Norms in the international arena were only slightly touched upon, and is not 
discussed in-depth, but is still relevant to bring up. In the joint press release between Italy and 
China, the countries write that they want to strengthen the role of the UN in actions to protect 
human rights. This norm is not present in the BRI-PD, meaning that this is probably a case of 
norm diffusion. It is not a strong norm in the interactions between the two countries, but it 
should still be a matter of mimicking. China is an authoritarian state and has been highly 
criticised for its illiberal actions in the past, including human rights violations (Peel & 
Brunsden, 2019). China could be mimicking this norm in the agreements to be able to find 
acceptance for their cooperation with Italy. The mimicking is likely a result of social influence 
due to it being a response to the criticism against China.  
Cooperation 
The norm of cooperation is spread out and at times, strong in the agreements. It is present in 
some core places, making it an important norm for China-Italy BRI interactions. None of the 
norms in this theme is stronger in China-Italy BRI interactions than what they are in the BRI-
PD. Hence, we cannot confirm the presence of norm diffusion.  
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Mutual Benefit Cooperation Norms are what gives the cooperation norm its importance. This 
norm is outlined as a goal for how the cooperation is to be done under the BRI. In the core BRI 
MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree that their cooperation will be done in a mutually 
beneficial manner. It also says that they want to strengthen cooperation and promote regional 
connectivity with a framework beneficial to all.  
Common Development Norms are preferably present among the documents but do not take 
up too much space. It is an uncommon norm in the sense that they rarely write it out to be a 
goal they want to achieve in their cooperation in the documents, from what we can see, but 
there is still an undertone of this norm in the way the actor's act. In the Cooperation Agreement 
between Port System Authority of Eastern Adriatic Sea – Port of Triste and Monfalcone and 
China Communications Construction Company, the two parties agree on establishing 
cooperative relationships to explore opportunities to support, in collaboration, the development 
of projects, investment and infrastructure management.  
Standardization Cooperation Norms are another minor norm that are barely present in the 
agreements. In an MoU on cooperation on frontier health quarantine, the two parties agree on 
together developing norms and standards on prevention and control of infectious diseases. 
Culture 
Cultural norms are a common set of norms in the dataset we have, which could partly be 
explained by the willingness of the ministry of culture and heritage to contribute with cultural 
documents that are not open to the public. Partly it can also be due to Italy’s rich history, making 
this norm something that they put a high value on.   
Preservation of Cultural Heritage is a common norm, appearing in many documents. It is 
given much value. In the MoU on world heritage twinning projects, we can see that the countries 
agree on working together on conservation and enhancement of world heritage sites. These are 
two of the primary purposes of the agreement, making them rather central in this document. 
This is a norm that is not as present in the BRI-PD as it is in China-Italy BRI interactions. This 
dissertation argues that this is ‘an example of norm diffusion. The micro-process at play here is 
identified as Persuasion as China has adapted their otherwise small focus on this norm in the 
BRI-PD to become larger, sharing the view of Italy on its relevance.  
Cultural Diversity is a norm noticeable through the countries accepting and distributing their 
cultures to each other. This is a norm that is prevalent among the two countries BRI interactions 
and has much relevance as much effort is put into exchanging personal, joint projects and 
events. In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global 
strategic partnership, the countries expressed their satisfaction in the growing number of 
cultural exchanges as well as in the people-to-people exchanges. The parties also agree on 
encouraging the teaching of each other languages in middle and high schools.  
In the BRI-PD, this norm is seen as common and fairly important, while in Italy China BRI 
Relations, it is seen as common and important. The slight difference in importance makes it 




Fairtrade norms are present in the two countries BRI agreements, and the ones that are present 
are highly important.  
Norms on Equity being one of these fair-trade norms that have much importance to the 
countries BRI relationship as it is described as the spirit of the two countries bilateral relations. 
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the spirit of equity is highlighted as the spirit of 
their bilateral partnership. This norm is not present in the BRI-PD, nor is it an EU norm. Hence, 
it is outside the scope of this study.  
Transparency is another minor norm, but that has some presence in the agreements. In the 
joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also highlight the importance of transparency in a rule-based 
trading system of mutual benefit. Transparency is more important in China’s BRI interactions 
with Italy than it is in the BRI-PD, but not by much. If it is a case of norm diffusion, all three 
micro-processes could be the cause of this. It is mimicking due to China having to be transparent 
if they want to act in Italy, due to the laws of the EU on open procurement and trade. Social 
influence due to China being criticised for not being transparent in their dealings and wanting 
to avoid further backlash from the EU, and Persuasion due to China sharing the view of Italy 
on the question which is present due to the norm appearing in their joint press release, indicating 
that this is something they agreed on.  
Market Economy and Open Market Norms is another very relevant normative component 
in the two countries BRI interactions. It has an important norm in the agreements that are raised 
in both the press release and the original MoU with persuasive language. In the Original BRI 
MoU between China and Italy, the two parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to open and 
free trade and investment. They want to work to counter excessive macroeconomic imbalances 
and to oppose unilateralism and protectionism. In their cooperation in the BRI, they will 
promote free and open trade and industrial cooperation, open procurement and follow market 
principles. This norm is more common in the BRI-PD than it is in the China-Italy BRI 
interactions. This dissertation hence argues that norm diffusion has not taken place here. 
Mutuality  
Mutuality norms are present in the agreements between the two countries. While they are not 
mentioned a lot, they have some importance.  
Mutual Respect as a norm is mentioned once in the agreements but in a core place. In the 
original BRI MoU between Italy and China, we can see that the countries agree to promote their 
bilateral partnership in the spirit of mutual respect. This is one of the core values of the 
agreement. This is a non-EU norm, and hence outside our scope.  
Mutual Trust is mentioned in two documents, but do not seem to be central in the agreements. 
In the press release on global strategic partnership, the two countries draw up mutual trust as a 





Planned Economy and Government Control Norms  
This is a small norm in the two countries interactions and is only mentioned once. It does not 
seem to have high importance to the two countries cooperation. It is a step away from market 
economy norms, in the sense that agreements encourage their financial actors to conduct 
business with each other’s actors.  
Government Intervention is the only aspect found in the different agreements that have been 
studied. It is minor, and not central for the two nations agreements. The parties promise to 
encourage their financial institutions to engage in partnership with each other to support 
investments and financial cooperation together. This is not an EU norm, but it is neither present 
in the BRI-PD. It is hence outside our scope.  










EU-Liberal  Uncommon Fairly 
Important 
Common Fairly important  
EU-Peace Uncommon Important Common Important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Equality Common Important Uncommon Fairly important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Human Rights Uncommon Not important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion  
EU-Cooperation Very common Fairly 
important 
Common Important  
EU-Mutual Benefit  Common Fairly 
important 
Very common Important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Common Development Uncommon Fairly 
important 
Uncommon Fairly important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Standardization Cooperation Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Sustainable Development Very common Important Common Fairly important  
EU-Environmental Very common Important Common Fairly Important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Economic Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Social Uncommon Fairly 
Important 
None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion  
EU-Fairtrade Not common Important Common Fairly Important  
EU-Open Market Economy Uncommon Important Very common Important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Equity  Uncommon Important None-existent None-existent Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Transparency Norms Uncommon Fairly 
important 
Uncommon Not important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
Reciprocity Non-existent Non-existent None-existent None-existent No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Good Governance Common Fairly 
important 
Common Fairly Important  
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Financial Security Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Inclusive Norms Common Fairly 
important 
Common Fairly Important No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Rule of law  Very common Important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion  
EU-Accountability Common Important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion  
Cultural norms Common Important Common Fairly important  
EU-Cultural Heritage Preservation Common Important Uncommon Not important Norm Diffusion  
EU-Cultural Diversity Common Important Common Fairly important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
Mutuality Norms Uncommon Fairly 
important 
Uncommon Fairly important  
Mutual Understanding Norm Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Not important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Mutual Trust Uncommon Not important Uncommon Important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Mutual Respect Uncommon Important Uncommon Fairly important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Mutual Recognition of Standards  Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent No Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Economic Integration Non-existent Non-existent Common Fairly important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Gov Control/planned Economy Uncommon Not 
important 
Uncommon Not important  
Preferential Investment Possibilities Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Not important No Norm 
Diffusion 
Government Intervention  Uncommon Not important Non-existent Non-existent Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
Lack of Open Procurement Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent No Norm 
Diffusion 
Table 3: Prepared by the author. Describing China-Italy EU norm diffusion 
6.1.2 Relevant Interview Input 
Dr Giulio Pugliese (Personal Communication, 07 February 2020) and The Italian Professor 
(Personal Communication, 20 February 2020) both argue that the Italian government pushed 
China to include normative language in the BRI documents. Italy made these efforts due to the 
Italian government knowing that Italy joining the BRI would create a backlash, and therefore 
the Italian government made sure that the BRI MoU would include EU normative language. 
The Italian Professor (Personal Communication, 20 February 2020) means that it is to be seen 
if these norms will be fully respected in reality and more importantly if the MoU will have any 
results. This shows that China-Italy BRI interactions were experiencing an uncertain 
environment, making them adapt to the norms of the EU. To persuade Italy to sign the MoU, 
China made sure to mimic EU norms in the agreements to appease the worries of the Italians. 
This was a result of the Social influence of the EU who raised concerns regarding Italy joining 
the BRI. 
Dr G. Pugliese (Personal Communication 07 February 2020) argues that while the EU prides 
itself in its attention to human rights, Italy did not for a long time criticize China on issues such 
as Hong King. Italy’s lack of criticism is due to Italy wanting to be a part of the BRI for 
economic benefits and partly because these issues did not affect Italy. China’s economic 
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behaviour, on the other hand, is something that directly affects Italy’s national interests.  
Italy sees an opportunity in that if the standard of the BRI is raised, Western countries maybe 
could get a competitive edge over Chinese companies in getting contracts related to the BRI. 
The contracts might have to fulfil sustainability demands; something European companies are 
better on doing. Hence, promoting the norms of the EU in the BRI would profit Italy financially, 
and Dr G. Pugliese (Personal Communication 07 February 2020) thinks this is partly the reason 
Italy implemented these norms in the MoU (ibid). This dissertation argues that this is a case of 
Persuasion as Italy tries to create a shared understanding with China on the EU’s norms to be 
able to better compete on BRI projects.  
Our experts have not identified any specific norms that are more prevalent in Italy’s interactions 
with China. Nether the Italian Professor (Personal Communication, 20 February 2020), nor Ms 
G. Pompili (Personal communication, 13 February 2020) who also means that nothing concrete 
has happened after the signature was done (ibid). This makes it hard for us to know if the Norms 
we have observed in the documents translate into real actions.  
The only controversial issue is that happened is the cooperation on space issues. Italy must build 
a part of the Chinese space station, which goes against the U.S. will. The technology that Italy 
has and is to contribute to the space station is from NATO’s and the EU’s space agencies. It is 
forbidden in norms to do such a technology exchange. Italy stopped this agreement, meaning 
Italy do not have to build that part of the space station anymore (ibid). Here we can see the 
micro process of social influence taking place, as the China-Italy BRI interactions reacted to 
critique and adapted themselves to the norms of the EU and NATO.  
All the country experts seem to agree that the countries are treated differently based on their 
different levels of affiliation to the EU. 
The Italian Professor (Personal Communication, 20 February 2020) agrees with this 
dissertation’s hypothesis and means that this is due to two factors: The pragmatism of China 
(and its ability to play its cards at different tables) and the division of the EU.  
Ms G. Pompili (Personal communication, 13 February 2020) means that China’s foreign policy 
is wise enough to have different approaches in every country. The BRI is already weakening 
and is not so strong in Italy. China understood that Italy is the sick Child of the EU at the 
moment of the MoU signing, which made China push for the signing of MoU. Now there has 
been a change in government, and the situation is a bit more unclear (ibid).  
Dr G. Pugliese (Personal Communication 7 February 2020) argues that the difference with EU 
member countries contra non-EU member countries is that EU member countries can use the 
EU Framework as a tool in negotiating with China. Italy used the EU norms as a way to take 
cover and say no to China without causing damages to the two countries relations (ibid).  
The adaptation of the BRI to the different countries indicates a high level of mimicking of 
norms. China is adapting its approach to the countries depending on the country’s relation to 





Latvia only has 3 EU norms present in their interactions with China that were not originally 
part of the policy document while they also have four that are either not found in the EU’s 
internal norms or that are just slightly stronger in Latvia-China BRI interactions than they are 
in the 2015 BRI policy document.  
Latvia joined the BRI partly due to the high potential it would give Latvia to become a logistic 
coordination centre for the region (Zuokui, 2016, p.20). Latvia has numerous times stressed 
their strategic position between Russia and the EU, among other geographic advantages, as one 
of the reasons they should be an important part of the BRI. Latvia also boasts its infrastructure’s 
strength. Latvia has also expressed interest in improving a legal basis with the BRI partner 
countries (Ding, 2017). 
The China-EU Expert (Personal communication, 02 March 2020) means that Latvia is more 
active in the 17+1, then they are in the BRI. While Latvia’s focus lay on the 17+1 more, Latvia 
still participates in the BRI Forum and have some agreements concerning the initiative.  
The reason Latvia joined the BRI is to improve their economic relations with China and bring 
new opportunities into the country (ibid). The China-EU Expert (Personal communication, 02 
March 2020) means that in Latvia, the BRI is mostly focused on trade, connectivity, 
infrastructure, people-to-people exchanges and private investment over conventional 
infrastructure investment projects like the ones in Serbia. Furthermore, The China-EU Expert 
(Personal communication, 02 March 2020) means that there is a comparatively healthy 
Chinese-Latvian cultural exchange going on through the framework of the BRI. Both countries 
are teaching each other’s languages at higher institutions while Latvia also has the only China 
culture centre in the region.  
Joining the BRI has given Latvia a growth in China’s activity in the country. Increased small 
scale trade, improved economic relations as well as large scale trade. The BRI has also given 
the countries a better opportunity for the countries to talk, conduct exports, people-to-people 
exchanges. Compared to other Baltic states, Latvia do not have as many Chinese projects 
present in the country (China-EU Expert, Personal communication, 02 March 2020) 
 
6.2.1 Norms  
Liberal Norms 
Liberal Norms are not that common in the agreements, but when they appear, they are in critical 
places. The two EU norms that are present in China’s BRI interactions with Latvia are more 
influential in the BRI-PD. We can hence not establish that norm diffusion has taken place.  
Peace Is not a common norm in the Latvia-China BRI agreements, but it appears in key places, 
giving it some importance. In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties 
agree that they will uphold the Silk Road spirit of peace.  
Equality is rare as a norm in this case. In the agreement, it can be found that it is positioned as 
a critical principle. In an agreement on cultural cooperation, the two countries agree that they 




Cooperation norms are some of the most common norms in the agreement and are important 
for the two nations cooperation on the BRI. In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree on 
deepening their all-round cooperation with countries along the BRI on jointly establishing an 
open framework of economic cooperation. The two EU norms that are present in China’s BRI 
interactions with Latvia are more influential in the BRI-PD. We can hence not establish that 
norm diffusion has taken place. 
Mutual Benefit Is one of the core themes China-Latvia BRI cooperations. It is both important 
and common in the agreements. In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties 
agree that they will uphold the Silk Road’s spirit of mutual learning and win-win cooperation.  
Common Development is less important and common the previously mentioned norms, but 
still holds some relevance. In the original MoU between Latvia and China on the BRI, the two 
countries also agree on promoting coordinated development and common progress of the two 
countries economy society and environment. 
Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is not that relevant in the two countries cooperations. The two 
countries have not discussed it much in their agreements, and two out of the three sustainability 
norms are missing.  
Economic Sustainable Development is the only sustainable development norm present in the 
agreements between China and Latvia. It is minor and holds little importance. In the core BRI 
document between Latvia and China, the countries agree on translating their strengths into 
advantages for sustainable growth. This EU norms that are present in China’s BRI interactions 
with Latvia is more influential in the BRI-PD. We can hence not establish that norm diffusion 
has taken place. 
Fairtrade 
Fairtrade is another common norm, due to the many uncommon norms in it, and important norm 
that is present in the two nations BRI agreements.  
Market Economy Norms have a small presence, but the parties agree that their different 
cooperations and exchanges are to be done a though market-oriented approach, giving this norm 
some importance. In the core MoU, both countries agree that they are to conduct their different 
cooperations and exchanges through market-oriented approaches. This EU norms that are 
present in China’s BRI interactions with Latvia is more influential in the BRI-PD. We can hence 
not establish that norm diffusion has taken place. 
Transparency Norms is another small norm that is not that relevant in the various agreements. 
It is vaguely mentioned a few times and only once outright stated as a goal. In the core BRI 
MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the Silk Road spirit 
of openness. Through the BRI, the countries are to increase transparency. This EU norms that 
are present in China’s BRI interactions with Latvia is more influential in the BRI-PD. We can 
hence not establish that norm diffusion has taken place. 
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Equity is another norm with a small number of appearances in the agreements, but that is the 
basis of the Science and technology MoU. In an MoU on Science and technology, both 
countries agree that they need to take into consideration the needs and possibilities of the two 
countries. The entire agreement is based on this premise. This is a norm that is not present in 
the BRI-PD, nor is it an EU norm. Hence, it is either a norm developed later in the BRI’s 
lifespan or a norm found in Latvia.  
Reciprocity is a norm that has little spread and little importance outside science and technology 
MoU. In an MoU on science and technology, the two parties agree on jointly funding research, 
development, and innovation projects in areas of common interest, per the principle of 
reciprocity. This norm has the same situation as the Equity norm.  
Good Governance 
Good governance is a common norm with some importance to the country’s agreements. It is 
well spread out in many different agreements and take up some important topics.  
Financial Security is a minor norm in the agreement with small importance. In the original 
MoU, the countries agree to improve the investment environment and enhance the level of 
investment safety and facilitation.  This none-EU norm that is present in China’s BRI 
interactions with Latvia is more influential in the BRI-PD. We can hence not establish that norm 
diffusion has taken place. 
Rule of Law Norms Are is common in the countries agreements and hold a fairly important 
role. However, it is not found in the original BRI MoU between Latvia and China. In a cultural 
agreement between the two parties, they agree that the activities in the agreements shall be 
undertaken per the two countries national laws and regulations as well as their international 
obligations. This is a norm that is not present in the BRI-PD, but that has a reasonably strong 
presence in China’s BRI interactions with Latvia. Hence, we can establish that the existence of 
this norm comes from norm-diffusion. The case of Latvia is a bit different from Italy but rather 
the same. While the EU is not mentioned directly in the agreements, and Latvia’s joining was 
not as controversial. Latvia had already joined the 16+1, but the EU had still raised concerns of 
China not respecting EU laws in central and eastern Europe, for example in the Budapest–
Belgrade railway project which was criticised by the EU due to this regard (Kynge & Peel, 
2017). As a result of this criticism, a social influence micro-process could be taking place.  
Accountability Norms is a common norm and are important. It is found in the same places as 
the Rule of law norm is found and is probably a case of norm-diffusion for the same reasons as 
the Rule of law norm and due to the EU criticising China of not being accountable and 
conducting dept Trap diplomacy (Brattberg & Soula, 2018). 
Inclusiveness Norms are present in the original MoU and is stated as a historical principle of 
the Silk Road that they want to uphold. In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the 
two parties agree that they will uphold the Silk Road spirit of inclusiveness. This norm is 




Cultural Norms  
Cultural norms are strongly present in the BRI agreements between the countries. This could 
very well be due to our sample size, where two documents are culture related. Culture norms 
hold some importance in the agreements.  
Preservation of Cultural Heritage as a norm is not a common norm, but it has a presence in 
the agreements worth noting. It does not seem to have much importance, as it is never 
mentioned entirely by itself. In an agreement on cultural cooperation, the two countries agree 
that they shall encourage the exchange of experience and cooperation in the fields of restoration, 
protection, and conservation of cultural heritage. This norm is equally strong in the BRI-PD, 
meaning no norm diffusion is taking place.  
Cultural Diversity norms are, on the other hand, have a high presence and have been given 
much importance. The countries agree that to share many aspects of their cultures with each 
other and promote cooperations. In the core BRI MoU, we can see that the two parties are 
willing to cooperate in spreading each other’s cultures through cooperations and people-to-
people exchanges. This norm is slightly stronger in China’s interactions with Latvia than they 
are in the BRI-PD. This norm has also transferred to real outcome in building aa Chinese 
cultural centre in Latvia. It is unclear if this is a norm that is the result of norm diffusion, due 
to the small difference in importance and commonality. The micro-process of Persuasion could 
be at play, where China synchronise the strength of the norm to that of the EU, or it could just 
be that the data we have is skewed due to our small sample size and the centrality of cultural 
documents.  
Mutuality  
Mutuality norms not too common, but they do sometimes take up core places, giving them some 
relevance.  
Mutual Understanding is not a common norm, nor that important in the two parties’ 
agreements. In the cultural exchange program 2016-2020 agreement, the two parties agree that 
the agreement will lead to their common development of the understanding between their both 
peoples. This norm is not more noticeable than what it is in the BRI-PD.  
Respect is not as a norm that regular in the agreements but has some importance when 
appearing. The bilateral cooperation between Latvia and China that is mentioned in the core 
BRI MoU is to be promoted on the principle of respecting each other’s core interests and major 
concerns. This norm is not more robust than what it is in the BRI-PD. 
Mutual Recognition of Standards is another rare and not too important norm. In the Core BRI 
document, the two countries agree on will promoting cooperation on mutual recognition of 
standards. The EU norm is stronger here than what it is in the BRI-PD where it is non-existent, 
indicating that the presence of the norm is a result of norm diffusion. Mutual recognition of 
standards as a norm is more likely a case of mimicking due to it being about cooperation on 
recognition of standards, which is a standard operating procedure and work habit that are 
needed to function inside the EU minimally. If China wants to export to the EU, China needs 
to adapt their standards to the standards of the EU, and wise versa. Hence, this cooperation is 
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about mimicking each other’s norms to be able to function inside an institution, e.g. the EU 
minimally.  
Government Control/planned Economy Practices  
This norm is not that common in different agreements, but it takes up a large section of the 
original MoU. It is fairly important for their agreement as it shapes some critical components 
of it.  
Government Involvement and Intervention in Steering Businesses Norms are shaping a 
large part of the BRI interactions between these two countries. It is uncommon outside the 
original BRI MoU, but relevant and common in it. In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree 
to encourage two-way investment and various forms of mutually beneficial cooperation 
between their companies. The countries also agree on discussing the feasibility of jointly 
developing integrated industrial assembling, e-commerce, and consulting service centres in 
Latvia for promotion and easier access to Chinese exports to the EU market. In a section on 
financial cooperation, the two parties also agree on encouraging their financial institutions to 
provide financing support and services for trade and investment cooperation. They will 
facilitate the participation of Chinese companies in financing private, governmental, and 
regional projects in the Nordics and Baltics region. They are to do this by expanding 
cooperation between their state-owned and commercial financial institutions. They are also to 
encourage their companies to carry our cooperations in high and new technology and innovation 
by establishing new companies and innovation parks. In an MoU on Science and technology, 
both parties agree on encouraging their enterprises to launch cooperations in research, 
technological innovation, and product development together. This is not an EU norm, nor is it 
present in the BRI-PD. Hence it is outside our scope and not a case of EU norms diffusing.  
 










EU-Liberal  Uncommon Fairly important Common Important  
EU-Peace Uncommon Fairly important Common Important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Equality Uncommon Fairly important Uncommon Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Human Rights Non-existent Non-existent None-existent None-existent No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Cooperation Common Important Common Important  
EU-Mutual Benefit  Very common Important Very common Important No Norm Diffusion 
Common Development Uncommon Fairly Important Uncommon Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Standardization Cooperation Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Sustainable Development Uncommon Not important Common Fairly important  
EU-Environmental Non-existent Non-existent Common Fairly Important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Economic Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Social Non-existent Non-existent None-existent None-existent No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Fairtrade Common Fairly Important Common  Fairly Important  
EU-Open Market Economy Uncommon Fairly important Very common Important No Norm Diffusion 




EU-Transparency Norms Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
Reciprocity Uncommon Not Important None-existent None-existent Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
EU-Good Governance Common Fairly Important Common Fairly Important  
Financial Security Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Inclusive Norms Uncommon Fairly Important Common Fairly Important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Rule of Law  Common Fair Important None-existent None-existent Norm diffusion 
EU-Accountability Common Fairly Important None-existent None-existent Norm diffusion 
Cultural Norms Common Fairly Important Common Fairly important  
EU-Cultural Heritage 
Preservation 
Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Cultural Diversity Very Common Important Common Fairly important Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
Mutuality Norms Uncommon Not Important Uncommon Fairly Important  
Mutual Understanding Norm Uncommon Not important  Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
Mutual Trust Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Important No Norm Diffusion 
Mutual Respect Uncommon Fairly Important Uncommon Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Mutual Recognition of 
Standards  
Uncommon Not Important Non-existent Non-existent Norm diffusion 
EU-Economic Integration Non-existent Non-existent Common Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
Gov Control/planned 
Economy 
Uncommon Fairly Important Uncommon Not important  
Preferential Investment Possible Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
Government Intervention  Uncommon Fairly Important Non-existent Non-existent Possibly Norm 
Diffusion 
Lack of Open Procurement Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent No Norm Diffusion 
Table 4: Table prepared by the author. Describing China-Latvia EU norm diffusion. 
 
6.2.2 Relevant Interview Input – Latvia 
Professor U. Berzina-Cerenkiova (Personal Communication 29 January 2020) means that when 
looking at Latvian – Chinese agreement, the Latvian documents contain less Chinese normative 
discourse than what is usually present in non-EU cases (ibid). Furthermore, the Chinese norm 
of “shared future for mankind” is more prevalent in the agreement. The EU norms, such as 
“level playing field” are also entering the interactions of China and Latvia, propagated by the 
Latvian side (ibid). Professor Berzina-Cerenkiova (ibid) also believes that the role of the 
internal EU norms is most visibly respected differently along with the EU/non-EU divide. China 
shows more respect towards EU normative discourse in their interactions with countries such 
as Italy that are not in the CCE or the Baltics. 
The China-EU expert (Personal communication, 02 March 2020) further means that while 
China is expanding its presence in Latvia, Latvia is still following all the EU’s norms. 
Public tender is present in Latvia as well as other EU norms, even if the language depicting this 
does not have a strong presence in the agreements written between Latvia and China.  
One example the China-EU expert (Personal Communication, 02 March 2020) brought up is 
the Rail Baltica project. The project has a few hundred open tender procedures ongoing, and a 
lot of Chinese companies are interested in the project. Chinese companies have the same rights 
as all other companies. They are not given any preferential treatment and are following the EU’s 
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norms that are integrated into Latvia’s internal regulations on how these types of projects are 
done.   
The China-EU expert (Personal Communication, 02 March 2020) also highlights what they call 
the Latvian mentality on rules and regulations. Latvia is actively compliant with the rules and 
regulations of the EU. Strictly following rules and regulations is something that is rooted in 
Latvian political or bureaucratic culture. This is a culture related to the German political and 
bureaucratic culture.  
Latvia also really values their EU membership, meaning they want to stay within the 
frameworks, regulations and norms of the EU, the expert means (ibid).  
In the case of Latvia, we can see a lot of Mimicking of norms from China, based on what the 
two experts have said during their interviews. Latvia stands fast with EU laws and through the 
laws, EU’s norms. China mimics the norms to be able to operate in Latvia.  
 
6.3 Serbia  
Serbia has the most substantial amount of data accessible. The Serbian ministries cooperated 
and gave access to many documents that were not accessible online. Twelve agreements, plan 
of actions, and MoU’s written between Serbia and China related to the BRI have been analysed.  
Serbia joined the BRI to closer their relations with China and got new investment into the 
country. China and Serbia already enjoyed good relations, and Serbia is one of China’s key 
economic partners in the region. Serbia has an important geographical position for the BRI and 
acts as an essential link. Serbia is also in need of investment and loans to build its developing 
economy. This is something that China can provide them with, and Serbia sees the BRI as an 
opportunity to get China’s support in this regard (Dimitrijević, 2017, p.68-78) 
Both the Swedish Expert (Personal Communication 11 February 2020) and Professor I, 
Ladjevav (Personal Communication, 24 February 2020) mean that Serbia is playing different 
sides in their foreign relations. Serbia is both receiving investments from, and participating in 
the Initiatives of, Russia and China while also having EU accession as one of their main foreign 
policy goals. Despite the EU officials’ disagreements, Serbia participates in both the BRI and 
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. Serbia’s method of playing different sides is something 
that has been regulated against in the EU in recent years, as new stricter rules are made for who 
is allowed to join the EU. Corre and Vuksanovic (2019) also discuss how Serbia play different 
sides while ignoring open procurement regarding China and the EU’s scepticism against this.  
Professor I, Ladjevav (Personal Communication, 24 February 2020) mean that since 
establishing diplomatic relations between two respective countries relations were primarily 
built on the international law norms, mutual respect for each party and principles of peaceful 
coexistence. Guiding line in recent relations remained the same, but with introducing BRI, their 
relations went even further, meaning that each interaction is dedicated to mutual interests and 
achieving mutual benefits. In the agreements related to projects designed within BRI, there are 
positive norms and respect for the spirit of the law (ibid). 
Professor D. Pavlicevic (Personal Communication, 12 February 2020) highlights that Serbia is 
moving away from some liberal norms. Serbia is controlling the media, making changes in their 
high court, having weaker checks and balances, indicating democratic backsliding. This is also 
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something Ericsson (2019, p.46) has concluded in his dissertation. Serbia is not an EU country 
yet, and Serbia wants to use this flexibility to their advantage to get quicker and more funding 
as well as getting projects done quicker (ibid). 
6.3.1 Norms 
Serbia has five norms that are EU norms that are present in Serbia-China BRI interactions while 
not originally in the BRI. Seven Norms are either not found in the EU’s internal norms or are 
just slightly more influential in Serbia-China relations than they are in the 2015 Policy 
document.  
Cooperation 
Mutual Benefits are one of the most central norms in China-Serbia cooperations. It appears in 
five documents and is a large part of two of the primary documents, the original MoU between 
Serbia and China and the bilateral cooperation plan between the two countries. In the Bilateral 
Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the norm of mutual benefit through cooperation is mentioned as a goal to achieve. It 
is worded as a win-win cooperation. This norm holds the same importance and commonality in 
China-Serbia Interactions as it does in the BRI-PD, meaning we cannot establish the existence 
of norm diffusion.  
Common Development norm is a central part of the two countries BRI interactions, based on 
it being described as the spirit of the Silk Road and appearing in different ways in many central 
documents. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework 
of the Belt and Road Initiative, the norm of common development is present. Mutual learning 
and benefit as well sharing growth are mentioned as spirits of the Silk Road, and principles to 
achieve. This is a norm that is not an EU Norm, meaning we will not further discuss it.  
The Norm on Standardization Cooperation has a rather small presence and importance. In 
the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt and 
Road Initiative, the countries take it upon themselves to strengthen cooperation in the field of 
standardization. This norm is here weaker than it is in the BRI-PD, meaning there is no norm 
diffusion.  
Liberalism 
Liberal norms are not strong in the Belt and Road interactions between Serbia and China.  
Norms on equality and peace are the only one’s present. Liberal norms are backsliding in Serbia, 
as we discussed before, and this is also visible in liberal norms weak presence in China-Serbia 
BRI interactions. We can hence not see any cases of liberal norm diffusion.  
Equality Norms have a small presence in the agreement yet are said to be a central part of the 
countries relations, according to the framework agreement on production capacity 
development. Mostly, China position itself as a benefactor, not an equal, but there is a normative 
language of equality in one of the agreements. In the preamble of a framework agreement 
between China and Serbia on production capacity development, the agreement outlines that the 
agreement is going to be based on the principle equality. In the same document, they also agree 
on the principle of equal participation in their investment cooperation efforts.  
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Peace is the second liberal norm present. Peace is not discussed or brought up that much, but it 
has a place in the dealings between China and Serbia. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between 
Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the two parties state that 
they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of Peace and cooperation. This is the first norm that is 
presented in the document, showing its importance.  
Sustainable Development.  
Sustainable development norms have a central role in the interactions between China and 
Serbia.  
Environmental Sustainable development is a complex norm concerning Serbia-China BRI 
relations Looking at the original MoU between Serbia and China on the BRI, we cannot see 
any indications of environmentally sustainable development, but in the bilateral cooperation 
plan where the MoU is made into an actual plan, it is a large part of the agreement. While it is 
present in this document, it is not present in any other documents that are describing actual 
projects. However, it is worth noting that the document was released in 2019, while the other 
documents come from previous years. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and 
China under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the norm of environmentally 
sustainable development is partly apparent, right beside the encouragement of the development 
of the fossil fuel industries. They are also to develop the fossil fuel and mineral extraction 
equipment to make them more environmentally friendly. This norm is very common and 
important in the China-Serbia BRI interactions, but only in the new 2019 action plan. Here we 
can see that ether China or Serbia changed their focus to be more environmentally friendly.  
Pollution from Chinese owned companies and investments have been significant polluters in 
Serbia. The Chinese companies have invested in coal power plants and made investments in 
making these coal power plants more sustainable, for Serbia to be able to fulfil EU’s 
environmental requirements. One issue is though that even if there have been improvements 
made, such as creating filter systems, they have in the end not been used due to bureaucracy 
(D. Pavlicevic, Personal Communication, 12 February 2020). 
Here we can see two micro-processes at play: firstly Persuasion due to the EU’s norms on the 
environment being accepted and becoming more similar; secondly trying to achieve these, 
mimicking is accruing were China is trying to fulfil the environmental requirements Serbia 
needs to fulfil to be able to join the EU.  
Taking the 2019 action plan in mind, as a document written in 2019, while all other documents 
were years older, we can see that there has been a change in attitude about sustainability brought 
through with time. It could either be through pressure from the EU, or that China has changed 
their attitude. Looking at the efforts of the EU since the original MoU between Serbia and China 
was signed, we can see that the EU has made significant efforts in helping Serbia be more 
sustainable (European Commission, 2018). It is hence more likely that this norm development 
originates from the EU, even if China has made developments in their sustainability efforts.  
Economic Sustainable Development is present in the original MoU and the BRI cooperation 
plan. It is a noticeable norm but not one of the central norms that are present in the countries 
relations.  In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of 
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the Belt and Road Initiative, the norm of sustainable economic cooperation is present as the 
countries agree that intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms should be created and 
improved to create a favourable cooperation climate for long-term and sustainable cooperation.  
This is a norm that is more important and common in China-Serbia BRI interactions than in the 
BRI-PD but not by much. However, by qualitatively observing the differences, we can see that 
they are large enough to with certainty say that this is a case of norm diffusion. This norm is an 
example of mimicking as a result of social influencing. The BRI has been criticised for not 
being economically sustainable from many different actors, as discussed previously in this 
dissertation. To respond to this criticism, this dissertation argues, that China has taken a more 
severe position and started trying to follow some of the EU’s norms on sustainable economic 
development.  
Socially Sustainable Development is present to a rather small extent in the agreements 
between the two nations. It does not seem to be an important norm in Serbia – China BRI 
relations. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of 
the Belt and Road Initiative, the norm of socially sustainable development is also apparent. The 
countries agree that they should train their officials in among other things, social compliance. 
The two actors also recognize that improving workers skills, creating jobs and developing social 
security are important elements in improving people’s well-being. It also creates favourable 
environments for enterprises. This norm is more visible in China-Serbia BRI relations than it is 
in the BRI-PD. This is again probably a result of the same micro-processes as the ones discussed 
in the previous norm.  
Mutuality 
Mutuality norms are also present among the two nations. Mutual respect and trust for each other 
are present. None of the mutuality norms is more present in China-Serbia interactions than what 
they are in the BRI-PD, meaning that there is probably no norm-diffusion taking place.  
Mutual Respect is the most relevant norm in this category. It is an undertone in Serbia-China 
relations. In the preamble of a framework agreement between China and Serbia on production 
capacity development, the agreement outlines that the agreement is going to be based on the 
principle of mutual respect.  
Mutual Trust is a minor norm in the documents, that is barely not discussed. In the original 
BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work to deepen 
mutual trust.  
Fairtrade 
Fairtrade norms are a strong aspect of China – Serbia BRI relations. Market economy norms 
being the strongest, while reciprocity also being rather strong while equity not being as 
prevalent.  
Reciprocity is visible in Serbia – China BRI relations primarily through three different 
documents. It is not positioned as a central norm, but it is still apparent. In the 2017-2020 
program of cooperation in the field of culture and art between Serbia and China, both countries 
agree on basing the organisation of festivals in each other’s countries on the principle of 
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reciprocity. This norm is not an EU norm, but is non-existent in the BRI-PD, while it is common 
and fairly important in China-Serbia BRI relations. Hence, we cannot say that this is an EU 
norm that has affected China’s BRI interactions with Serbia, and it is outside the scope of this 
study to identify where this norm originates.  
Equity, on the other hand, is minor and not that visible in the nation’s agreement signing. In 
the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt and 
Road Initiative, the norm of equity appears in the section discussing the importance of 
combating climate change. Both sides stress the principle of fairness, common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities as well as considering the different situations of 
different countries in climate change work globally. This norm is also not found in the BRI-PD 
and is not an EU norm while being uncommon and not that important in China-BRI interactions. 
Hence, we will not look into it further.  
Market Economy and Open Market Norms are the most influential aspects of fair-trade 
norms. These are the norms that are commonly connected to capitalism and liberalised 
economies. This norm seems to have a central role in the agreement between the countries but 
still is also meet with the counter norm of planned economy/state-controlled norms that will be 
discussed further below. Meaning, both norms are highly present in different parts of the 
countries relations. In Article 2 of an MoU between the Serbian Ministry of Construction, 
Transport and Infrastructure and the Import-Export Bank of China, the two parties have 
determined that Serbia will determine the priority of projects at their discretion through taking 
into account the projects significance and feasibility. In the original BRI MoU between China 
and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work to open their markets for unimpeded 
trade. They should expand two-way trade flows and adopt international, market-oriented and 
professional approaches to their cooperation. Norm diffusion has likely not happened in this 
case due to these norms being more influential in the BRI-PD than what they are in China-
Serbia BRI interactions.  
Transparency is another norm that is lightly touched upon and not centred in the countries 
relations. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of 
the Belt and Road Initiative, we can see that transparency is lifted as a norm.  The two parties 
state that they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of openness. This norm is equally important 
and common in the BRI-PD and China-Serbia BRI interactions, making it not a case of norm-
diffusion.  
Culture 
Cultural norms are norms that are prevalent in the two countries interactions with each other. 
The norm is not in the spotlight but is still discussed. None of the cultural norms two are more 
visible in China-Serbia BRI interactions than what they are in the BRI-PD, meaning no norm 
diffusion has taken place.  
The Preservation of Cultural Heritage is present in one document and do not seem to be that 
central in the cultural diversity norm. In the 2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of 
culture and art between Serbia and China, both countries agree on having exchanges in the 
conservation of the intangible cultural heritage of each other’s countries.  
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Cultural Diversity is more noticeable and can be found in a few different documents. In the 
2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of culture and art between Serbia and China, 
both countries agree on trying to create mutual understanding on cultures and artistic 
achievements.  
Good Governance 
Good governance is a norm that is very visible in many different agreements and takes a central 
role in the two countries dealings with each other.  
Financial Security is a minor norm that can be found in the documents that still has relevance.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of financial security is lifted as an objective both parties want to 
achieve. They want to improve the investment and financing environment. This norm is more 
important in China-Serbia BRI interactions than it is in the BRI-PD, but it is not an EU norm 
and hence outside our scope.  
The Rule of Law Norm is present in a lot of the documents and is consistently a part of the 
two countries dealings with each other. In an agreement between the City of Nisha, the 
government of Serbia and the Xingyn Automotive lighting System Co LTD, the two parties 
outline that the investment discussed will be supported according to the Law on State Aid 
Control and other legal restrictions. This EU norm is none-existent in the BRI-PD while being 
very common and Important in China-Serbia BRI interactions. The presence of this norm is 
likely a result of norm diffusion, coming from the norms of the EU. In the Bilateral cooperation 
plan that came out in 2019, we can see that this norm is highlighted. This is again probably a 
result of the micro-process of Social Influencing as the EU has extensively focused on 
socialising Serbia into their norms on rule of law and this is a norm that Serbia has dedicated 
themselves to adapt (AFET, 2017, p.1, 19 -20). Combining this with EU’s criticism of China 
concerning rule of law norms as having been discussed before, the social influencing micro-
process becomes apparent.  
Inclusiveness is another minor norm. It is mentioned as a spirit of the silk road, but only 
discussed once more after that. It is not evident in the more practical documents. The Bilateral 
Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the BRI, highlight the 
norm of inclusiveness. The two parties state that they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of 
inclusiveness. This EU norm is more influential in the BRI-PD than it is in China-Serbia BRI 
interactions, meaning norm diffusion has not taken place. 
Accountability is the last norm in good governance. It is rather common and holds some 
importance. In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework 
of the Belt and Road Initiative, the norm of accountability is present. The countries agree that 
their enterprises should make independent decisions and be responsible for profits and losses at 
their own risks. It is also partly connected to the rule of law norm, being found in some of the 
same places. Serbia and China promise to uphold their already present international obligations, 
just like Italy and Latvia. Accountability is an EU norm that is not present in the BRI-PD, but 
that has a relatively strong presence in China-Serbia BRI interactions, indicating norm 
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diffusion. This is most likely a case of China mimicking the EU norms in Serbia as this is an 
EU norm that Serbia has adapted through different means (European Court of Auditors, 2014, 
p.40-45. State Audit Institution, 2012). It could also be a result of Social Influencing, due to the 
EU criticising China of not being accountable and conducting dept Trap diplomacy (Brattberg 
& Soula, 2018). 
Government Control/planned Economy Practices 
One of the most influential norms is the norms on government control or planned economy. A 
large part of the agreements has components of this. Meaning, the states are promising to 
intervene in the open market, not adhering to public procurement norms as well as giving 
companies preferential investment possibilities. The norms listed here are not a result of norm 
diffusion form the EU, as these norms are not a part of the EU. They contradict many of the 
EU’s norms.  
Preferential Investment Possibilities are a norm that is present and visible in the agreements. 
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of preferential investment possibilities is present. The Chinese 
side promises to support its enterprises to invest with priority in Serbia’s industries, giving them 
comparative advantages, high-added values, and a good prospect. The two sides will also give 
priority to cooperation in equipment manufacturing. The same document also promises a 
favourable tax environment for cross-border trade and investment.  
Government Involvement and Intervention in steering businesses is a more visible norm that 
is also more central in the two countries interactions with each other. In article 1 of the 
framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity development, the two 
parties agree on promoting cooperation in the field of production capacity of companies and 
financial institutions from both their countries.  
Lack of Open Procurement is the last norm. The norm is visible, but not too much in focus. 
The counties bypass public procurement in their dealings with each other at times, prioritising, 
for example, Chinese companies and products. In the MoU between the Import-Export Bank of 
China and The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Serbia, 
we can see that Chinese contractors are getting prioritised when Serbia takes loans from the 
Chinese bank, going against market economy norms. In the MoU on the Hungarian-Serbian 
Railway Project, the parties agree that they will examine all possibilities to utilize Chinese 
railway technology and equipment in the project, showing a clear preference towards Chinese 








Table 5: Prepared by the author. Describing China-Serbia EU norm diffusion 
 















EU-Peace Uncommon Fairly Important Common Important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Equality Uncommon Not important Uncommon Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Human Rights Non-existent Non-existent None-existent None-existent No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Cooperation Common Fairly 
Important 
Very common Important  
EU-Mutual Benefit  Very common Important Very common Important No Norm Diffusion 
Common Development Common Important Uncommon Fairly important Possibly Norm Diffusion 
EU-Standardization Cooperation Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Sustainable Development Very 
Common 
Important Common Fairly 
important 
 
EU-Environmental Very common Important Common Fairly Important Norm Diffusion 
EU-Economic Common Fairly Important Uncommon Not important Possibly Norm Diffusion 
EU-Social Uncommon Not important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion 
EU-Fairtrade Common Fairly 
Important 
Common Important  
EU-Open Market Economy Common Fairly Important Very common Important No Norm Diffusion 
Equity  Uncommon Not important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion 
EU-Transparency Norms Uncommon Not Important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
Reciprocity Common Fairly important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion 





Financial Security Uncommon Fairly Important Uncommon Not important Norm Diffusion 
EU-Inclusive Norms Uncommon Not important Common Fairly Important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Rule of Law  Very common Important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion 
EU-Accountability Common Important None-existent None-existent Norm Diffusion 





EU-Cultural Heritage Preservation Uncommon Not important Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Cultural Diversity Common Fairly Important  Common Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
Mutuality Norms Uncommon Not Important Very common Important  
Mutual Understanding Norm Non-existent Non-existent Uncommon Not important No Norm Diffusion 
Mutual Trust Uncommon Not important Uncommon Important No Norm Diffusion 
Mutual Respect Uncommon Not Important Uncommon Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Mutual Recognition of Standards  Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent Non-existent No Norm Diffusion 
EU-Economic Integration Non-existent Non-existent Common Fairly important No Norm Diffusion 
Gov Control/planned Economy Common Fairly 
Important 
Uncommon Not important  
Preferential Investment Possibl Common Fairly Important Uncommon Not important Possibly Norm Diffusion 
Government Intervention  Very Common Important Non-existent Non-existent Possibly Norm Diffusion 
Lack of Open Procurement Common Fairly Important Non-existent Non-existent Possibly Norm Diffusion 
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6.3.2 Relevant Interview Input  
Professor I, Ladjevav (Personal Communication, 24 February 2020) argues that China’s actions 
in relations to the BRI are not influenced by the EU, due to Serbia not being obliged by internal 
EU legislation. This is something Professor D. Pavlicevic (Personal Communication, 12 
February 2020) partly agrees with and he means China does not have to go through a transparent 
and open public procurement process that Serbia usually requires from other actors. The reason 
for this is that the Chinese government arranges the loans for the companies and negotiates their 
contracts. There is no bidding process or transparency. The process of reaching the agreements 
are not transparent. Hence, Serbia has become one of the major destinations for Chinese FDI in 
Europe. Different norms and different regulations do not apply to Chinese state actors like they 
are to other private actors (ibid). There are fewer restrictions on the projects due to Serbia not 
being a part of the EU. Serbia wants to use its flexibility to make it easier for themselves to get 
funding and projects done (ibid). Here we can see that while the BRI-PD has a robust open 
market economy norm, we cannot see that this norm is transferring over to China-Serbia 
relations. In practice then, China does not seem to follow these norms if the country does not 
force them too.  
This disregard of EU norms has led to the EU, putting significant pressure on Serbia, to make 
them change their public procurement procedures towards China. The EU is demanding that 
Serbia makes these procedures more transparent and more open to foreign competition (ibid). 
Serbia is facing much pressure, but it is right now unclear if the pressure is having any effect 
(ibid). Looking at the 2019 Bilateral Cooperation plan between Serbia and China under the 
framework of the BRI, we can see that these norms are appearing more and more, which could 
be a result of the social influence (micro-process) of the EU influencing the agreements.  
Professor D. Pavlicevic (ibid) also means that Serbia’s primary strategic goal is to join the EU, 
meaning it has to accept and implement EU regulations, laws, and norms to be able to do so. 
They will have to act within these norms to further integrated into the EU. By so doing, they 
are convinced by the EU to follow EU norms, which in turn forces China to follow the same 
norms through a Persuasion micro-process.  
Both Professor D. Pavlicevic (Personal Communication, 12 February 2020) and Professor I. 
Ladjevac (Personal Communication, 24 February 2020) argue that China adapts itself to the 
host country while following internal law norms. They both argue that China adapts their 
approach to the host countries legal and normative framework and that it is not within China’s 
interest to upset governments (ibid). Professor D. Pavlicevic (Personal Communication, 12 
February 2019) means that China wants to build long-lasting relations with the host countries 
so they can get more projects from the host government, so they want the host countries to be 
satisfied with their projects and interactions (ibid). China has promised that they will act within 
EU regulations and norms when acting in the EU. Outside of the EU, like in Serbia, China 
adapts itself to local government demands. Because of this, some norms and practices are taking 
place in Serbia-China relations that are different from the EU’s norms (ibid).  
EU is imposing its norms and regulations on Serbia, which will in the future change the way 
Serbia can interactions with China. In the future, China must follow the EU’s norms when 
dealing with Serbia, but right now they can work outside these norms for a while longer (D. 
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Pavlicevic, Personal Communication, 12 February 2020). From this perspective, norm diffusion 
from the EU to China only happens if the country China is working with has already accepted 
the norms of the EU and are still valuing and upholding them. 
For Serbia to become an EU member, Serbia needs to adopt 17 chapters of the EU legislation. 
Candidate countries might hence follow or prepper to follow EU norms based on wanting to 
become an EU member (G, Stahl Personal Communication, 23 February 2020), meaning that 
their affiliation with the EU should affect the amount of EU norms they adapt.  
Being inside or outside the EU is relevant, Dr G. Pugliese (Personal Communication 07 
February 2020) argues. Smaller EU countries will be more careful to follow the EU’s 
frameworks on trade agreements. China might also have more leverage on Serbia, as Serbia is 
outside of the EU and cannot protect itself behind EU norms or economic leverage that EU 
countries have. This makes it possible for China to exert its will to a greater extent than if Serbia 
was a full EU country. One example is the Budapest Railway project, where China is a co-
funder. EU protested the project as the project was against the rules and standards of the EU 
(ibid). 
It seems like the experts agree that EU membership gives countries leverage but less flexibility 
in negotiations with China, while not being in the EU gives the countries more flexibility but 
less leverage to use. If a country aims to join the EU, the countries need to adapt itself to the 
laws and norms of the EU, which can over time lead more EU norms being adhered to in China’s 
interactions with them. 
6.4 EU 
This dissertation has interviewed some generalist EU-China experts to get some overall insight 
and perspectives on the BRI. These experts have been able to come with some valuable input 
about the EU at large as a case. While our focus is not on EU as a case, the information here 
will aid us in our understanding and analysis of our cases. For more insight, please take a look 
at Appendix 4.  
6.4.1 Relevant Interview Input 
The Swedish Expert (Personal Communication 11 February 2020) brings up something very 
much worth noting when discussing China and norms from a western perspective. China’s 
definitions of different norms are different from what the EU defines them as. Their definitions 
of democracy and other liberal norms that are within the EU are defined differently by China 
than the way the EU defines them. While this dissertation has been unable to further dig deep 
into this topic, it is a valuable input to have in mind. With that said, if China is acting within 
the EU, China needs to follow and adapt to the EU’s legal system and the norms that are within 
these laws. Laws on environmental, social, and economic sustainable development are 
examples of laws that need to be adapted in the BRI projects that are present in the EU (Swedish 
Expert, Personal Communication 11 February 2020). This dissertation argues that this is an 
example of China having to mimic the norms of the EU to be able to function inside the EU 
countries as a commercial actor minimally. 
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Professor G, Stahl (Personal Communication, 23 February 2020) means that if an EU country 
wants to have cooperation with Chinese partners, based on a political commitment, they still 
need to have an opening tendering procedure. Hence there is a difference whether a country is 
an EU member, or not as membership entails respecting the rules of the EU on public 
procurement. 
MoU’s must be read and interpreted as political commitments that can only be applied based 
on the current laws in the country. A country can create information campaigns and give access 
to some information that the Chinese actors can use, but they still must participate in open 
procurement procedures like any other actor (ibid). In the EU-China connectivity platform, 
experts are discussing different BRI projects that are to be done in the EU. The experts together 
decide if the infrastructure that the projects are aiming to work on needs to be upgraded. Even 
when this is decided, they still must work within the EU’s rules. They cannot legally privilege 
Chinese companies (ibid). This is showing us that even if China manages to get political 
commitments from EU countries, Chinese companies are not allowed to be privileged according 
to EU norms and laws. Hence, China is forced to adapt their interactions with EU countries by 
following EU norms.  
The tangible nature of general objectives and investments needs to be differentiated. Policy 
objectives are different from investment. In the rules of the EU for investments, there might be 
policy objectives that are the EU norms. Impact assessments for social and environmental 
impacts are examples of requirements that the EU have for projects, that also contain policy 
objectives. The BRI does not have an environmental impact assessment, but if Chinese actors 
want to participate in projects in the EU, they need to respect these norms (ibid). 
Professor G, Stahl (Personal Communication, 23 February 2020) also discussed the normative 
impact the people-to-people exchange approach and the exchange of information has on China. 
In the EU-China Connectivity platform, Chinese experts and investors engaged together with 
EU experts in a training program where they were thought about EU rules and norms. The 
experts are doing studies together, to get knowledge and shared understanding for a joint 
investment project as well as building up a shared understanding of what economic decisions 
need to be based on. This dissertation argues that this is a clear example of how the Persuasion 
micro-process is used to socialise China into the EU’s norms.  
Professor G, Stahl (Personal Communication, 23 February 2020) argues that it is essential for 
the EU that China follows sustainability norms and have a green economic development. 
Common sustainable development is a goal of the EU. The EU is trying to make the BRI green, 
and while China still has a lot of non-green production and projects, China is an excellent 
partner in this endeavour as China is committed to making its civilization more ecological.   
The only difference in how EU countries approach China in a legal sense is based in the 
country’s implementation of the EU laws. The implementation might be different as there is 
sometimes more or less efficient bureaucracy in different countries of the EU. The types of 
interests China have with a country has been based on the different economic and geographic 
situations of the country. Investment in maritime infrastructure is more interesting in some areas 
more than others (ibid).  
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Our findings in this chapter indicate that a countries affiliation would play a significant role in 
how China can approach them. The EU seems to be trying to socialise China into becoming a 
more sustainable actor while upholding its norms. The laws of the EU do not allow China to go 





In this section of this dissertation, we are going to discuss our findings and answer our research 
question and see if we can strengthen our hypothesis or if we need to discard it.  
Our research question was: Are the internal norms of the EU affecting China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative related interactions with European countries and if so, how does the level of affiliation 
to the EU affect the degree of norms noticed in the interactions?   
Hypothesis: The EU’s internal norms will be reflected differently in the language and deeds 
China use in their BRI interactions with our case countries depending on the affiliation of the 
country to the EU. A higher degree of affiliation should mean more EU norms in China’s 
interactions with the country.  
To do this, we first need to compare the countries to understand the relevance of the EU 
affiliation and study different factors that might weaken our hypothesis.  
7.1 Country Comparison  
7.1.1 Settings 
First, we will compare the different settings the BRI agreements were signed.  
Italy signed the BRI document under an EU-sceptic government that did not respect EU norms 
much. Italy first wanted to avoid signing the BRI MoU with China but ended up signing it to 
save the many commercial agreements that would have been cancelled if Italy did not.  To avoid 
backlash from the EU, Italy made China mimic the EU’s norms by including some of the EU’s 
normative language. There have not been any major BRI projects concerning Italy, from what 
this dissertation can see, hence it is a bit hard to know how effective all the norms have been. 
This is partly due to the Sino-scepticism in the country and a change of government that has 
taken place. Italy still has an essential reliance on the EU, and many of its norms deeply 
integrated into their society and laws.  
Latvia aim with joining the BRI was rooted in their ambitions to become a logistical hub and 
improve their economic relations with China and to bring new opportunities into the country. 
Latvia is more engaged in the 17+1 than they are in the BRI, and their participation in the BRI 
is more focused on trade, connectivity, infrastructure and people-to-people exchanges as well 
as private investments rather than the type of investments done in Serbia. There has not been 
any activity in relations to the BRI. Latvia holds steady in their relations with the EU and their 
compliance with EU laws. According to our interviews, this is also reflected in their BRI 
Interactions.  
Serbia joined the BRI to closer their relations with China and to get more investments into the 
country. Serbia received many loans and investments through the BRI. Serbia has been heavily 
criticised for their interactions with China, due to the EU norms that Serbia is breaking in these 
interactions. Serbia’s aim of joining the EU has made them adapt to a lot of the EU’s norms, 
and we can see that in the 2019 documents, the newest document we have access to, the norms 
are more prevalent. 
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7.1.2 Differences Between the Cases – Norm Diffusion and Affiliation Relevance.  
Looking at the overall commonality and importance EU norms in our case countries, we can 
see that in the case of Italy has the most norms present and overall, the norms have more 
importance. Serbia and Latvia have the same amount of importance in the norms while Serbia 
has a more significant number of norms present in their interactions with China.  
China- Italy BRI interactions have five, Latvia BRI interactions have 3, and Serbia BRI 
interactions has four norms present that have resulted from EU norm diffusion. China- Italy 
BRI Interactions has 4, Latvia BRI interactions have one while Serbia BRI interactions have 
four other norms that are not clear cases of EU norm diffusion that we need to analyse to 
understand better.  
Just by looking at these numbers, we can see that while Italy has the most norms present in their 
agreements and other documents, Serbia comes next and Latvia last. This would indicate that 
our hypothesis should be discarded, but taking into consideration the expert’s input, it is not as 
simple as that.  
Sustainable development is very much highlighted in the case of China-Italy BRI interactions 
and is probably a case of norm diffusion. While the norm was generally mentioned a lot, 
environmentally sustainable development was the dominant norm that was the most mentioned 
in the category. While we cannot from the documents alone say that this is a case of norm 
diffusion, we can see that the EU has been pushing China to adopt this norm, and Italy also has 
an interest in socialising China into adopting sustainability norms to be better able to compete 
with Chinese companies over contracts. While this norm is not as crucial in Latvia, it is very 
important in Serbia due to the 2019 bilateral cooperation plan while not present in any other 
documents. It seems like Serbia is trying to adapt itself to the EU’s norms which have made it 
into the plan through persuasion.  
Per our experts, due to Latvia’s EU membership, sustainability norms and precautions still need 
to be taken, even if they are not discussed in the documents. Hence, while the norms are not 
present in the documents, they are present in reality. We acknowledge that China has itself 
adopted sustainable development as a norm in their policies since the 1990s, but argue that our 
findings show that they do not seem to push for these norms unless the host country does not 
promote these norms, as seen in Serbia where sustainable development only became a 
prominent norm in the interactions between the two countries after the EU put pressure on 
Serbia to adapt more sustainability norms and after Serbia became closer to the EU in 2019. 
 
Rule of law is another EU norm that stands out. It is Very Common and Important in both Italy 
and Serbia while it is only Common and somewhat important in Latvia. All three cases are signs 
of norm diffusion, but Latvia is standing out for not having this norm in the same level as the 
others in the documents. Looking it at this norm in relation to other norms and the interviews 
with the experts, we can see that while Serbia has a high level of rule of law in their documents, 
they are also being criticised for not following open procurement and similar laws that are in 
Serbia, meaning that while this norm is respected on paper, it is not fully being respected in 
reality. Latvia, on the other hand, has a strong culture of following the rule of law, according to 
our experts. Hence, rule of law norms is outside these documents more definite than they are in 
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Serbia, but probably equal to what they are in Italy, as both countries are within the EU 
framework and have to obey EU norms on this matter.  
 
Accountability norms is another norm diffusion that was done in the cases of Italy, Latvia, and 
Serbia. In Italy and Serbia, the norm has the same level of importance and commonality while 
the norm is less critical in Latvia. Serbia’s norm has a broader focus on financial accountability 
than any of the other countries, which do not cover this at all. We can also see that the norm is 
not as crucial in Latvia, and this is probably caused by the same reasoning as the Rule of Law 
norm.  
Cultural diversity norms are another norm that is a possible case of norm-diffusion in the cases 
of Italy and Latvia. Both countries focus on this norm. This could partly be a result of our data 
being skewed due to having many documents on the topic of culture. While the documents 
might be skewed, Latvia has actually in practice shown that they value this norm, and so has 
Italy. Hence, this is probably a case of norm diffusion in these two cases.  
Human Rights are only brought up in a joint press release in the case of Italy, making it the only 
liberal norm diffusion that stands out. The existence of Human Rights norms in the agreements 
is probably a case of mimicking. Equality norms is another norm that only is strong enough in 
the case of Italy for it to be a case of norm diffusion possibly, but this is somewhat unclear. 
Transparency norms are uncommon but found in fairly important places in the case of Italy, 
making them another possible norm diffusion example that is not found in the two other cases. 
Cultural heritage preservation is another norm diffusion only present in the case of Italy. This 
norm is probably more likely to be present due to Italy’s strong cultural heritage.  
Mutual recognition of standards is a norm diffusion that is present in the case of Latvia. No 
other country has this norm noticeably present. Italy has agreements on the export of different 
products, but in these agreements, Italy is required to recognise the standards of China and not 
wise versa.  
7.2 Socialisation and Micro-processes  
Comparing the different norm diffusion micro-processes taking place in our three cases sheds 
light on the importance of EU affiliation and gives us insight in how EU norms are adapted 
differently in our cases and what causes these differences.  
In the case of Italy, China is at times mimicking to avoid criticism while at times mimicking 
due to criticism from the EU. Mimicking is also a common micro-process affecting China, as 
China needs to mimic EU norms to be able to do any projects or trade in the EU, due to EU 
regulations which also contain these norms. Mimicking was used to handle the uncertain 
environment that would be created if Italy joined the BRI. At times, persuasion is also at play 
due to Italy and China agreeing on somethings. For example, it might be a norm that is present 
in the BRI, to begin with, but its importance is made higher when China is interacting with 
Italy. Persuasion is also relevant in China sharing Italy’s views on the importance of the EU. 
Social influence is also a strong micro-process due to China being criticised heavily by the EU 
and wanting to avoid such criticism. Social influence might have, in turn, lead to both 
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persuasion and mimicking norm diffusion micro-processes in Italy. A lot of the normative 
language in the MoU is also a result of Italy first threatening not to sign the MoU, which in turn 
made the Chinese agree on adapting EU norms to calm the Italian sides worries. Hence, the 
social influence micro-process was central for some of the norms to come into play in the 
agreements.  
In the case of Latvia, there are significantly fewer cases of norm diffusion micro-processes 
taking place than in the other case countries. Mimicking is a micro-process that has similar 
characteristics in Latvia as it has in Italy due to Latvia’s EU membership. China needs to adapt 
its approach to the EU’s norms to be able to act within Latvia.  While Latvia joining the BRI 
has not been that controversial, the EU has heavily criticised China for their actions in the past. 
EU’s past criticism might have caused them to adopt some EU norms to avoid criticism in the 
future. Persuasion is another micro-process that is minor. It is detectable in how China and 
Latvia seem to reach common ground on culture, but the existence of this micro-process is a bit 
unclear.  
In the case of Serbia, we can see that many Persuasion micro-processes are at work as Serbia is 
trying to adapt itself to the EU, making China having to mimic some of the EU norms as Serbia 
becomes closer and closer to the EU. As this process takes place, Mimicking becomes 
noticeable as well, as China needs to adapt itself to Serbia’s norms to operate in the country as 
well as to be able to perform the projects that at times are aimed at helping Serbia achieve the 
standards and norms of the EU. China is hence at times helping Serbia adapt to the norms of 
the EU.  
Social influencing is also present in the case of Serbia, as the EU has been critical of both 
China’s practices in Serbia, in the projects and investments they have done, and China’s 
practices in other countries. Serbia has also been criticised by the EU, and it seems to have 
worked to get Serbia to adapt some of the EU’s norms. It seems that the EU is indirectly 
socialising China by criticising and integrating Serbia into the EU, making China have to follow 
the norms through mimicking or pressuring China through social influencing.  
It seems that the normative power of the EU is connected to how much the country in question 
accepts and adapt themselves to the norms of the EU. If the country is within the EU, then China 
needs to adapt itself to (mimic) the norms and laws of the EU if they want to participate in 
projects, invest or conduct any other kind of business. If a country is outside the EU but aims 
to get closer to the EU, they might adapt to the norms of the EU, but this is optional and might 
develop over time, as we have seen with Serbia. When it comes to the softer norms such as 
norms on liberalism, we can see that it is more up to the countries themselves as these norms 
are not as firmly anchored into laws and regulations. Here we can see that a countries affiliation 
to the EU and their attitude towards the EU is relevant. 
7.2.1 EU Socialisation Methods.  
Looking at how the EU is socialising China both indirectly and directly also gives us some 
insight into the normative power of the EU. We have found three methods that are being used 
regarding China’s BRI interactions with our case countries.  
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Informational diffusion is one of the methods used by the EU directly and indirectly towards 
China. It is used when the different institutions and critical figures criticise the behaviour and 
actions of China, similar to the Social influence micro-process.  
Transference diffusion happens when China is interacting with EU counties and wanting to 
have any transactions with them. To be able to operate in the EU (carrot), China needs to follow 
the norms of the EU. Otherwise, they will be excluded, like they are being in the cases of 5G 
where the EU do not believe China is following their norms due to allegations of espionage and 
surveillance. This is an example of the EU using sanctioning  
A cultural filter can also be seen as the EU is slowly socialising Serbia into having a European 
EU identity. It works similarly to the persuasion micro-process. The EU is also using the BRI 
to socialise China through the EU-China connectivity platform where the EU is conducting 
training programs in EU norms and regulations. This is just another way that the EU has a 
normative influence on China through the BRI and similar attempts by China trying to be an 
actor in the European market. This is an example of a norm negotiation taking place.  
7.3 Hypothesis and Research Question Answered 
Does then the hypothesis hold? We have some mixed findings. In some ways, it does, while in 
other ways the hypothesis is not strengthened by our findings. By just looking at the documents, 
we get a skewed image influenced by both time and rhetoric, but when we combine our data 
and expert interviews as well as some second hand and third-hand sources, it seems like we 
partly can strengthen our hypothesis.  
In Italy, we can see that the norms of the EU are very present. This is to a great extent due to 
the influence of the EU. There have not been any significant BRI deeds to date, but this is what 
we can argue based on the documents, interview, and other sources we have gathered. In Latvia, 
the BRI is not very active and the sources we have do not show, relative to our other cases, a 
lot of normative languages. Serbia has originally not shown a lot of normative languages. 
Looking at the documents that were published before 2019, we can say that the hypothesis is 
strengthened, but by including the document from 2019, there is more normative language in 
the case of Serbia, and our hypothesis is not strengthened.  
Considering all our data and interviews, the EU’s internal norms were reflected differently in 
China’s interactions with our case countries depending on the kind of affiliation of the country 
to the EU. The same cannot be said about language, as the case of Serbia and Latvia shows. 
Latvia is more closely affiliated with the EU than Serbia is, but has less normative language. 
This can be explained with that the documents coming from Latvia being older than the 
documents coming from our other case countries, and the scope of Latvia and China’s 
cooperation. Hence, only part of our hypothesis is strengthened and not the entirety of it.  
Looking at our research question, we can say that yes, the internal norms of the EU are affecting 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative related interactions with European countries. The level of 
affiliation to the EU seems to be rather crucial in the way that China interact with the countries. 
If the country is an EU country, China is Mimicking the norms of the EU to be allowed to 
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invest, participate in projects, and do other activities. China is persuaded to share some of the 
EU’s norms. China is also exposed to the social influence of the EU or is trying to avoid 
criticism by adapting itself to the EU. The more a country is affiliated with the EU, the stronger 
is the incentive of following the norms of the EU as well. 
This is both present in Italy, where an EU sceptic government still had to include EU norms in 
their agreements and press-releases regarding the BRI, and in Latvia who, while not have much 
normative language in their agreements, are strictly upholding the norms of the EU when 
dealing with China. The size of Latvia is also a factor to have in mind. While both Serbia and 
Italy are rather large countries geographically, Latvia it not, which could be an explanation of 
the type of agreements subsequent norms in the two countries interactions.  
Looking at Serbia, this is even more apparent that EU affiliation affects the degree of norms in 
China’s BRI interactions with a country. Looking at the agreements that were signed before 
2019 and the 2019 Framework Agreement, we can see a clear difference in them that we can 
only explain with time, and we can also see that Serbia during this time has gotten closer to the 
EU through the accession process. 
Differences are not only based on affiliation with the EU it seems, but also on dependency and 
the countries attitude towards the EU. Italy being EU sceptic but still reliant on the EU; Latvia 
being dependent on the EU and having a strict rule-based culture; Serbia trying to adapt to the 
EU while also trying to use their non-EU membership as an excuse to get benefits from their 
relations with China. It is also worth discussing the difference in our findings from the 
documents and the expert interviews. The documents are only reflecting the written agreements 
between the countries, while the expert can bring us more context and empirical knowledge on 





To conclude, the internal norms of the EU are contributing to shape the BRI. The level of 
affiliation to the EU matters. The more a country is affiliated with the EU, the more EU norms 
are present in China’s BRI interactions with said country. This can change over time and be 
affected by the countries attitude towards- and dependency of the EU. While our hypothesis 
was partly not strengthened due to the language not reflecting these norms, we can explain the 
reason for it and still reach this conclusion. The deeds related to the BRI in these countries are 
reflecting the EU’s norms depending on their affiliation with the EU. With that said, while we 
have to discard our hypothesis due to the degree of EU norms found in the language not being 
correlated with the degree of affiliation with the EU, we can still see a high relevance of EU 
affiliation when it comes to the overall norms present in China’s interactions with our case 
countries.  
In this dissertation, we have parted with the current research trend of looking at how the BRI is 
affecting European countries and instead started looking at how China’s BRI interactions in 
Europe are affected by the norms of the EU. We explored the normative power of the EU and 
the relevance of affiliation to the EU. We used three case countries: Italy as a core EU country, 
Latvia as a relatively new EU country which is active in the 17+1, Serbia, as an aspiring EU 
country in the EU accession process. The dissertation made sure to explore what the norms of 
the EU are and establish different socialisation micro-processes that the EU is using, giving us 
the framework of analysis, we needed for this research. In retrospect, we can say that Latvia 
might not have been a good case due to their focus on the 17+1, their relative size and the time 
of their joining of the BRI, but they were one of the few countries in Europe who had any 
transparency regarding their interactions with China, and in the end, even if it was through 
much hard work, we managed to get some relevant insight through including them.  
After that, we made extensive searches on government websites and similar open sources to get 
an overview of the documents present online and relevant documents missing. We then 
contacted all involved governments and their different ministries. Over a three-month long 
period, calls were made, and emails were sent to try to reach the right people to be able to get 
access to some of the documents that are not open to the public. After this period, we had 
enough documents to start our analysis. At the same time, we also contacted experts all over 
Europe to get more insights into the BRI. Few answered, but the experts who contributed with 
excellent insights into our cases and the EU. We then used qualitative content analysis, iterative 
sampling method, and an inductive coding method to analyse our data. While this method was 
a good one to use, it was a prolonged method. In retrospect, using more advanced content 
analysis digital tools to easier analyse our data would have been more efficient. 
While doing the analysis, we identified the norms initially found in the 2015 BRI policy 
document, to be able to see what norms originally were in the BRI so we can know what norms 
are the result of norm diffusions. We made graphs over the different norms found in China’s 
BRI interactions with our case countries, checked if they corresponded with EU norms and 
checked them towards the BRI-PD norms before and discussed them. This was a long ordeal 
which resulted in the approximately 53 pages appendix. This dissertation argues that the long 
appendix is necessary, and justifiable, to be transparent and ensure reproducibility as well as 
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simplify criticism. We then presented samples from our interviews and then compared the 
results of our qualitative content analysis, to get more dept and perspective on our research. 
This gave us a better, empirical understanding of our cases as well as some insights from experts 
who have been working with the topic of the BRI for a long time.  
The interviews were a great resource in our research, and the extensive knowledge of the experts 
enriched our results extensively. A lack of Latvian researchers was a challenge, as we initially 
only found two experts on the topic, which one of them was out of their office while the other 
busy. Through some extensive searching and networking, we found an EU-China expert 
knowledgeable on Latvia to interview. 
The methodology was well suited, while the theories used could have been more deliberate. 
Combining the qualitative content analysis with expert interviews ended up being an excellent 
choice. Using the 2015 BRI policy document ended up not being optimal, and in retrospect, one 
should study other policy documents and speeches, but this was not entirely possible within the 
timeframe this research had. We acknowledge that the norms we presented are not clear cut, 
but also argue that is the nature of norms. We have shown the norms that the actors are 
emphasising through their documents and also discussed them through the results from our 
expert interviews.  
Overall, finding information, experts, documents, and more was a significant challenge in this 
research. Much criticism can be given to the states involved with the BRI for not being more 
transparent. With that said, without the hard-working individuals in the ministries that agreed 
to help us, this research would not have been able to get such a good sample. One of the 
documents that helped the research was the 2019 Serbian BRI Framework Agreement that both 
gave us more in-depth insight and skewed our research a bit, which required a lot of thought 
and research to understand. Another issue we had in this research was the unwillingness of 
Chinese embassies and officials to answer our attempts to reach out to them. Having Chinese 
experts’ perspective on the topic might have been helpful as well, but this was hindered by the 
Covid-19 virus outbreak due to it preventing the researchers return to China.  
While there are many different uncertainties in our results, due to the BRI not yet leading to 
many projects in two of our case countries (Latvia and Italy), the possibility that China’s 
internal norms have developed over time, we have managed to reach some conclusion and see 
some clear and logical patterns from the material we had. 
This research has contributed to our better understanding of the BRI, China’s integration into 
the global world order, EU as a normative power, and the different case countries normative 
relations with the EU. Most importantly, it has provided us with an insight that China’s 
interactions with European countries are being influenced by the EU’s internal norms. Other 
than that, we have used documents that have not been accessed by academics before to get deep 
insights into some of the inner workings of the BRI. Our findings have also shown that small 
actors indeed do have agency when they interact with larger actors and can have an influence 
on them.  
Using documents as the primary source of analysis could make some question the value of this 
study. We would like to address this possible criticism as words in bilateral agreements are the 
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result of long deliberations between countries. In such deliberations, diplomats meet, exchange 
ideas, and have discussions. The diffusion of norms happens through these negotiations than 
shape the documents. They also occur through the meetings and dialogues that lead up to such 
documents being signed. The documents are a result of deliberations like these, and the 
language in them reflect the norms that both actors can minimally agree on. Regulations, 
agreements and MoU’s founded in the norms of the actors developing them. We do however 
acknowledge that this is a limiting factor of our study, but we have tried to counter this issue 
by using expert interviews to give more empirical examples of the deeds behind the documents 
and resulting from the documents.  
Micro-processes do not mean that the EU’s norms will turn the BRI into a European enterprise, 
of course. We have to consider that there can be different degrees of socialisation. People, such 
as government officials and diplomats, agree on the specific wording of the documents that 
reflect their ideas. These ideas all reflect some kinds of norms. These people agree on having 
these words in the documents and do not object to having them in the document. We can from 
this understanding argue that the documents at least represent the shallowest form of 
socialisation. While we have not looked at the degree of norm diffusion in this thesis, we 
acknowledge that there should be further studies on this topic.  
Our findings can also be generalised with other European countries interactions with China. 
The cases represent three different types of European countries. The norms present in these 
countries interactions with China should be determined partly by the same factors as we have 
identified in our cases. With that said, other factors can also have influenced our findings. The 
historical relations between the countries, world events, or other institutions could influence 
their interactions. Having this in mind, we still argue that our findings are generalisable, but we 
do encourage further research to be done on this topic when more documents and empirical 
events are available and from different approaches.  
8.1 Recommendations and Alternative Theories 
This dissertation would also like to highlight the alternative theory that the normative 
development we have found is a result of international norms developing over time, and a result 
of not norm diffusion from the EU. An extensive study on China’s and the BRI’s internal norms 
should hence be done, studying how these norms have developed over time and how they are 
influenced by different world events to be better able to understand what norms are initially 
from China and what norms are coming from other actors such as the EU in China’s interactions 
with our case countries.  
This dissertation would like to suggest that researchers interested in this topic further dig into 
this and try to analyse and understand how China is being affected by the normative power of 
the EU. Using other case countries and comparing non-European countries with European 
countries could be a way of clearing up uncertainties.  
An interview-based study would also be interesting to conduct. Getting the perspectives of the 
different people involved in forming the BRI agreements, MoU, action plans and similar 
documents to be able to see how the process looks like and who contributed with what norms 
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and how the different socialisation processes between the diplomats and different decision-
makers look like if they are present at all.  
Studying the two-way socialisation process that is theorised to happen during socialisation 
would also be interesting as a way of understanding how the EU and China’s interactions with 
each other end up influencing each other’s normative outlook and the results of the interactions.   
We also suggest that a proper academic database is made where everyone can access all the 
different BRI agreements, MoU, action plans, business agreements, and other documents. This 
would increase the transparency of the Initiative, calm some of the worries towards the BRI and 
simplify research which in turn can help make the BRI a sustainable initiative that can fulfil the 








9.1 Appendix 1 – Coding 
Coding has been done through the use of the themes and sub-themes presented below. The sub-
themes are coded through finding keywords in our data that reflect the norm or through seeing 
the sub-theme reflected in actions described in the texts. One example of such an action would 
be agreeing on having cultural exchanges, which is an action promoting cultural diversity.  
 
9.1.1 Main Themes and Sub-themes.  
Theme 1 – Liberal Values 
Description: Liberal values are values usually connected to liberalism. These values range 
from peaceful coexistence, liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom. 
Sub-theme 1.1 – Peace 
Description: Normative language that promotes peace and peaceful coexistence.  
Keywords and Indicators: world peace, peace, peaceful, peaceful coexistence, Spirit of peace, 
peaceful development, promote peace in the region of the BRI, protecting the peace, partnership 
for peace, regional peace. 
Sub-theme 1.2 – Equality  
Description: A core value of democracy. Present the countries as equals.  
Keywords and Indicators: Equality, Equal treatment, equal opportunity. Principle of equality, 
level playing field, re-balanced trade, share risk and benefits.  
Sub-theme 1.3 – Human Rights 
Description: Normative language that promotes Human rights norms in the countries 
interactions or promises to promote human rights together.  
Keywords and Indicators: Protect Human rights, Human rights.  
Theme 2 – Cooperation 
Description: Language that describes cooperation norms between the two nations 
Sub-themes 2.1 – Mutual Benefit  
Description: Language that describes cooperation based on mutual benefit between the 
countries. When the outcome of an agreement is mutually profiting in both countries.  
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Keywords and Indicators: win-win cooperation, mutual benefits, beneficial to all, mutual 
learning, mutually beneficial cooperation, common prosperity, shared benefits, actions in the 
international space that promote each other’s interests, equal benefit, mutual benefits. 
Sub-theme 2.2 – Common Development  
Description: Language that denotes common development. Actions that are meant to develop 
both countries together.  
Keywords and Indicators: Common development, coordinated development and common 
progress, cooperation on training each other’s professionals, joint research and development, 
common development through cooperation, mutual learning, sharing growth, common interest. 
Sub-theme 2.3 – Standardization Cooperation 
Description: cooperating on standardization, exchanging normative documents and 
information on national standards.  
Keywords and Indicators: Together develop norms and standards, Standardisation, exchange 
information and experience, national standards, improve cooperation mechanisms, people 
exchange to increase standardization. 
Theme 3 – Sustainable Development 
Description: Language connected to sustainable development norms.  
Sub-themes 3.1 – Environment 
Description: Language connected to sustainable environmental development.  
Keywords and Indicators: green, low-carbon, climate change, wind power, solar power, clean 
energy, renewable energy, ecological progress conserving eco-environment, protecting 
biodiversity, environmental, sustainable energy, promote green and low-carbon industry 
projects, Paris Accord, sustainable transport, environmentally friendly approach, low carbon 
and circular development, ecological and environmental protection, Agenda 2030, 
environmental protection, sustainable energy industry, reduce pollution, clean fossil fuel, 
energy efficiency, agreements on climate change fighting, green economy.  
Sub-themes 3.2 – Economy 
Description: Language connected to sustainable economic development.   
Keywords and Indicators: Sustainable growth norms, financially sustainable, circular 
development, economically viable, Long-term, and sustainable cooperation, sustainable input, 
sustainable economic development, good corporate governance, a balanced framework of 
economic cooperation.  
Sub-themes 3.3 – Society 
Description: Language connected to sustainable societal development.  
Keywords and Indicators:  poverty reduction activities, living conditions, poverty-stricken 
areas, Sustainable Urbanisation, Agenda 2030, Socially sustainable investments, socially 
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sustainable development, Social compliance, workers skills, creating jobs, social security, 
social responsibility. 
 
Theme 4 – Fairtrade 
Description: Language showing a will to have fair trade conducts as well as transparency, open 
competition, equity, and reciprocity. 
Sub-themes 4.1 – Open Market Economy  
Description: Market economy norms found. Competition, doing projects based on economic 
viability while leaving it to the open market to conduct and form the projects.  
Keywords and Indicators: opening-up, world’s economic system, market operations, market 
rules, market allocate resources, letting enterprises act independently, unimpeded trade, remove 
investment and trade barriers, trade liberalisation, improve openness, investment cooperation, 
Investment, Defending open world economy, open world economy, combat protectionism, 
promote liberalisation, facilitation of trade and investment, oppose unilateralism and 
protectionism, promote free and open trade, open procurement, follow market principles, 
promoting cooperation while allowing actors to decide the content of the cooperation, 
Commercial and market-based principles, feasibility studies, market-oriented approaches, 
feasibility, feasibility study-based decisions, market decisions, independent decisions, 
responsible for their own profits and loses, market-based approach, market demand, equal 
opportunity, unimpeded trade, international and market-oriented as well as professional 
approach. 
Sub-theme 4.2 - Equity  
Description: Language that shows equity norms in the agreements. The countries agreeing that 
they are to dedicate the number of resources that their economies, budgets or such allows for. 
Participating in or contributing to different amounts depending on their capabilities. 
Keywords and Indicators: Equity, the spirit of equity, considering the countries respective 
needs and assets, Financial resources available, within their capabilities, needs and possibilities, 
fairness, common but different responsibilities, different situation, different capabilities.  
Sub-theme 4.3 – Transparency 
Description: Normative language depicting norms regarding transparency in the financial and 
political systems and processes. Showing the dedication of the countries being transparent in 
their actions.  
Keywords and Indicators: Openness, transparency, open framework, wide consultation. 
Sub-theme 4.4 – Reciprocity 
Description: Normative language that promotes a culture of reciprocity in the two countries 
interactions with each other.  
Keywords and Indicators: Principle of reciprocity, Reciprocity.  
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Theme 5 – Good Governance 
Description: Normative language that promotes good governance in the countries and the 
nations. Consensus oriented, Participatory, follows the rule of law, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive, responsive, transparent, accountable.  
Sub-theme 5.1 – Financial Security.  
Description: Language that promotes financial security as a norm in the countries. Making 
investments safer to conduct and improve the investment environment.  
Keywords and Indicators: a sound business environment, investment protection agreements, 
lawful rights, interests of investors, improve the investment environment, investment safety, 
financial security, improve the financial environment, prevent crimes that can affect financial 
security, Favourable environment for economic and financial cooperation.  
Sub-theme 5.2 – Inclusive 
Description: A core value of democracy. A language that shows a will to include all aspects of 
a society or includes all people in a country. 
Keywords and Indicators: Inclusive, cultural inclusiveness, welcomes participation, 
Inclusiveness, inclusive framework, encouraging people from all sectors to participate, Spirit 
of inclusiveness, inclusive economic cooperation, non-discriminatory, non-discriminatory 
financial interactions, open, inclusive growth.   
Sub-theme 5.3 – Transparency  
Description: Normative language depicting norms regarding transparency in the financial and 
political systems and processes.  
Keywords and Indicators: Open, transparency, Spirit of Openness, open framework, 
transparent procurement, transparency promotion. 
Sub-theme 5.4 – Rule of Law 
Descriptions: Language that describes respect for the rule of law. That laws need to be 
respected in their dealings.  
Keywords and Indicators: National laws, national legislations, international obligations, 
existing laws, international agreements, legal restrictions, domestic laws, EU regulations, 
observe application, compliance towards the local laws of the country, obligation, EU 
obligations, intellectual property rights, international standards, rule-based. 
Sub-theme 5.5 – Consensus Oriented 
Description: Consensus oriented decision-making is agreed upon as a norm in the country’s 
interactions with each other.  




Sub-theme 5.6 – Accountable  
Description: Language that shows that the countries promote accountability norms in their 
interactions with each other. Taking responsibility for their actions and the subsequent results 
of these actions.   
Keywords and Indicators: Responsible for their own risks, responsibility towards bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation is being upheld, Synergies fulfilling obligations. + Some of the 
same keywords and indicators as the rule of law norm.  
Theme 6 - Cultural Norms  
Description: Normative language that shows respect for each other’s cultures and promotes 
cultural diversity.  
Sub-theme 6.1 – Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
Description: actions and language that show the importance of preserving cultural heritage.  
Keywords and Indicators:  Protect World Heritage sites, Cultural heritage, Conservation and 
enhancement of world heritage sites, protection of cultural heritage, hindering criminal 
activities regarding cultural goods, promote the return of cultural goods, exchanges and 
cooperation on cultural heritage, restoration of cultural heritage, exchange of expertise and 
cooperation in the field of restoration, protection and conservation of cultural heritage, 
museums, cultural values. 
Sub-theme 6.2 – Cultural Diversity  
Description: Actions and language where the countries promote the spread of each other’s 
cultures in each other’s countries to create a mutual understanding of cultures.  
Keywords and Indicators: cultural exchanges, culture events, joint art production, tourism 
cooperation’s, cultural cooperation’s, media cooperation, explore and promote cultural 
heritage, promote cultural heritage sites, world heritage twinning project, tourism programs, 
language teaching, spreading cultural heritage, spreading knowledge, promote tourism, people-
to-people cultural exchanges, acquaint each other with each other’s culture, translating 
literature, cultural study, mutual understanding of cultural and artistic achievements, exchanges 
of artists, popular cultural understanding deepening.   
Theme 7 – Mutuality  
Description: Language and actions that show mutual respect, trust and understanding for each 
other.  
Sub-theme 7.1 – Mutual Understanding 
Description: Promoting mutual understanding between each other people and society.   
Keywords and Indicators: mutual understanding, Common development of understanding,  
Sub-theme 7.2 – Trust  
Description: Mutual trust between the countries. Political mutual trust. 




Sub-theme 7.3 – Respect  
Description: Respecting the core interests and major concerns of each other when working 
with each other.  
Keywords and Indicators: Respect, mutual respect, respectful of development path, Spirit of 
mutual respect, Principle of respect of core-interests, respect for core interests and major 
concerns. 
Sub-theme 7.4 – Mutual Recognition of Standards.  
Description: Mutually agreed-upon standards and respect for each other’s standards of raw 
materials, products, services, and procedures.  
Keywords and Indicators: Mutual recognition of regulations, mutual standards. 
Sub-theme 7.5 – Economic Integration 
Description: Integration into each other’s economies and financial systems through the 
coordination of economic policies and strategies.  
Keywords and Indicators: integration of markets, economic policy coordination, regional 
cooperation, economic integration, financial integration, coordinate economic development 
strategy.  
Theme 8 - Government Control/Planned Economy Practices 
Description: Language that shows government control over the projects and companies 
involved. Not promoting free and fair competition for contracts, instead of handing them out to 
their own companies or steering businesses.   
Theme 8.1 – Preferential Investment Possibilities  
Description: Prioritising one states enterprises investment into the country’s own enterprises. 
Give comparative advantages and high-added values and similar measures.  
Keywords and Indicators: Investment facilitation, intervene in financial institutions actions 
to give possibilities, competitive advantages, giving priority to cooperation, favourable, 
favourable tax environment. 
Sub-theme 8.2 – Government Involvement and Intervention in Steering Businesses. 
Description: Language that encourages governments to steer or encourage the nation's 
companies to do different activities.  
Keywords and Indicators: Promote financial partnerships, promote and support investment, 
Two-way investment, mutually beneficial cooperation between companies, jointly developing 
integrated industry and services, encourage financial actions, giving another state better chances 
in projects, establishing new companies and innovation parks, government-sanctioned projects, 
promote projects, promote commercial cooperation, create cooperation between companies.  
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Sub-theme 8.3 – Lack of Open Procurement 
Description: Actions that shows that contractors or manufacturers do not have to participate in 
open procurement, going against market economy norms.  
Keywords and Indicators: prioritised, preferential, preferential buying, utilize one specific 
nations equipment and products or services.   
9.2 Appendix 2 – Data Collection and Sampling Process. 
Data was collected under a 3-month time. First through online searches on government websites 
similar sources, before contacting the ministries themselves. To reach some of the ministries, 
academics were contacted who had connections within the ministries, and who helped in 
establishing a connection. The Latvian government was contacted via email but did not get back 
to us. As the leading China-Latvia experts, Professor Berzina-Cerenkova who is doing similar 
research suggested that the documents we had found online were the only relevant in this 
research, this dissertation did not pursue the matter more. In the case of Serbia, we got in touch 
with the ministry of economics and ministry of culture, who both provided relevant documents 
that were not found online. The Italian ministries did, after a long conversation, provide the 
documents we requested.  Italian professors and one journalist also gave great insights and 
assistance.  
After the initial data-gathering process and discussion with academics and other experts, we 
could establish the sample. The sample was set to be more focused on critical documents where 
we could see normative language. The list of documents was slimmed down, and other 
documents were sought out. We then read all the documents, articles, and interviews we had, 
continued to slim down the sample while complimenting it with other sources. The data 
collection and sampling stopped when there was no more data to be found, and all the actors 
that could provide additional data had been contacted (a large number not responding).  
The sample size ended up being large enough for the research to be concluded.  
9.3 Appendix 3 Qualitative Content Analysis – Full Results.  
Here are the full results of the analysis, excluding the theoretical sections that are found in the main 
body of text in this dissertation.  
9.3.1 2015 Belt and Road Initiative Document 
Document Used: 
The document used to understand China’s original BRI plan is: Vision and actions on jointly 
building Belt and Road – Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Issued by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic 







Looking at the original BRI document, we can see that there are a bunch of norms present. 
These can give us insight to which norms that are apparent in China’s interactions with our case 
countries are more likely to come from China initially.  
Liberal Norms 
Liberal Norms are not that prominent the BRI. Few liberal norms appear, and peace seems to 
be the only relevant norm present.  
Peace is brought up in a few different places; some of them mentioned below and seemed to be 
one of the more central norms of the initiative due to the weight it is given.  
In the policy document, China claims that the BRI inject new positive energy into world peace. 
The initiative is claimed to lead to a more harmonious world where people can live in peace 
and prosperity.  
China also expresses that they are willing to take on more responsibility and obligations within 
their capacities and make more significant contributions to world peace.  
The BRI is to be in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence. The initiative is to 
seek common ground while shelving differences and drawing on each other’s strengths for all 
countries to be able to co-exist in peace. The BRI is to be a common road towards peace and 
friendship.  
Equality is framed as one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence but is not mentioned 
more than that in the document, making it not so common. It is an undertone of the document, 
giving it some importance.  
Cooperation 
Cooperation has once again one norm connected to it that is relevant, while having another 
minor norm that is not as present but is an undertone, giving it some importance.   
Mutual benefit is a recurring norm throughout the entire document. It seems to be one of the 
guiding norms of the BRI. It is in many formative places of the document, giving it importance 
to the BRI.  
The BRI is to be a win-win cooperation, built on mutual benefits for the parties, which is 
repeated throughout the text repeatedly. This seems to be an important norm in the policy 
document. 
China writes that they want to build a regional economic cooperation architecture that is 
beneficial to all. Furthermore, China means that the BRI will contribute to mutual learning 
among the people of the BRI countries.  
China also means that the BRI will help them to strengthen their mutually beneficial 
cooperation with countries all over the world.  
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Mutual benefit is also framed as one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.  
The initiative is to accommodate the interests and concerns of all parties involved and seek 
common ground. Mutual benefit is pained as the goal of this.   
Encouraging different countries to learn from each other, and flourish together is said to be one 
of the aspects of required for mutual benefit and common security. 
Common Development Is only mentioned once but is an undertone of the document. It is rare, 
but of some importance to the initiative.  
The initiative is to promote common development and prosperity.  
Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is brought up in the policy document a few times. Mostly, 
environmental sustainability is discussed, and there is a complete lack of economic 
sustainability.  
In the policy document, China writes that the BRI aims to realize balanced and sustainable 
development in the countries involved.  
Environmentally Sustainable Development Norms are present in the document and rather 
prevalent. Yet, there is some contradiction in this norm, as they also discuss developing fossil 
fuel industries which are not so environmentally sustainable  
In the policy document, we can also read that China encourages the promotion of green and 
low-carbon infrastructure construction and operation management where they are to take into 
full account the impact climate change has on construction. Wind power, solar power and other 
clean and renewable energy sources are to be developed together. In the same sentence, fossil 
fuel development is also propagated. 
The BRI should also promote ecological progress in investment and trade according to the 
policy document. The countries are to cooperate in conserving eco-environment, protecting 
biodiversity and tackling climate change, and together make the BRI an environmentally 
friendly project.  
Socially Sustainable Development is discussed about poverty. It is minor and not central in 
any way to the BRI, at least from the perspective of this document.  
The document also outlines a will to increase exchanges and cooperations between NGO’s in 
the BRI countries. The cooperations are to promote poverty reduction activities. They are to 
improve the production and living conditions for poverty-stricken areas in the BRI. This paper 
argues that poverty is a socially sustainable development due to poverty being a quality of life 
issue.  
Fairtrade 
There is only one fair-trade norm present in the 2015 document, but it has vast importance to 
the BRI, seen from the policy documents perspective.  
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Open and Market Economy Norms appear in different parts of the text and are given much 
importance.  
In the policy paper, China promises to be committed to their opening-up policy, and to build a 
new pattern of all-round opening-up, and to integrate China deeper into the world’s economic 
system. The BRI is to help China in this endeavour. 
China also promises that the Initiative will follow market operations, abide by market rules, 
international norms and let the market allocate resources while letting enterprises act 
independently.  
In the cooperation priorities of the policy documents, we can read that the countries should 
promote policies on unimpeded trade. 
The countries are also to strive to improve their investment and trade facilitation as well as 
remove investment and trade barriers to contribute to a healthy business environment.  
China also wants to enhance trade liberalisation and facilitation among the countries.  
China also encourages the parties to improve the openness of their service industries to the BRI 
member in order to accelerate the development of regional service industries. The actors are 
also to explore a new mode of investment cooperation. 
China welcomes companies from other countries to also invest in China and encourages 
Chinese companies to invest in BRI countries. 
China also promises to open up the Chinese economy further and strengthening interactions 
and cooperation among its different regions. This is again promised in other parts of the text.  
Good Governance  
Good governance is missing some of its key components but has a consistent presence in the 
policy document.  
Financial Security is not given much space or importance in the agreement, but it is still present 
as a goal to achieve.  
The policy document promotes a sound business environment to be shaped within the related 
regions and countries. The countries are also to eliminate investment barriers, push forward 
negotiations on bilateral investment protection agreements and double taxation avoidance 
agreements to protect the lawful rights and interests of investors.  
Inclusive Norms can be found in some critical areas of the policy document, and while it is not 
too common, it has an importance to it.  
China writes that they want to build a regional economic cooperation architecture that is 
inclusive. The BRI is to be inclusive and harmonious. The Chinese government also advocates 
inclusiveness in the initiative.  
The Initiative is to build a community with shared interests, destiny, responsibility featuring 
cultural inclusiveness.  
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The development of the BRI is to be open and inclusive, and China welcomes the active 
participation of all countries, international and regional organisations into the BRI.  
Transparency Norms Are a small norm that is not too visible. It is only mentioned a few times, 
and it is not given much importance ether.   
China writes that they want to build a regional economic cooperation architecture that is open, 
which this dissertation interpretive as an indication of transparency. The Chinese government 
also advocates openness in the initiative. The policy document also writes that the countries 
should lower non-tariff barriers and jointly improving the transparency of technical trade 
measures.  
Culture Norms  
Cultural norms are found in the sense that the BRI want to promote the spreading of different 
cultures among the nations. This is given some importance and is fairly common.  
Preservation of Cultural Heritage is not discussed more than being mentioned once. 
Meaning, this norm had small importance to the BRI.  
The policy document encourages the actors to jointly apply for and protect World Heritage 
sites. This is the only cultural heritage preservation action mentioned, and it is not well defined 
or discussed.  
Cultural Diversity Norms are discussed to a greater extent. The policy document encourages 
cultural diversity along the BRI and gives it some importance.  
In the policy document, China means that the BRI will promote cultural exchanges among the 
members of the initiative.   
Enhancing cultural exchanges is also said to be one of the aspects required for mutual benefit 
and common security. Cultural exchanges are brought up a few different times.  
The countries are also to have culture years, different cultural festivals and fairs in each other’s 
countries as well as producing art together. Tourism cooperations are also suggested.  
The countries promise to enhance international exchanges and cooperation on culture and media 
and leverage the role of the internet and new media tools to promote a harmonious and friendly 
cultural environment and public opinion.  
The countries are also to explore the history and cultural heritage of the BRI.  
Mutuality Norms 
Mutuality Norms are widely discussed, and some of them are given much importance.  
Mutual Understanding Norms are present in the agreements to a small extent and are not 
displayed as too important outside the cultural sphere.    
In the policy document, China writes that the BRI will contribute to mutual understanding for 
the people of the countries involved in the initiative. The initiative is to enhance mutual 
understanding to gain common development and prosperity and peace and friendship.  
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Trust is an important norm in some of the critical aspects of the BRI. It is not common, but 
where it appears, it takes a prominent role.  
In the policy document, China writes that the BRI will contribute to mutual trust among the 
populations of the countries involved in the initiative. Mutual trust is again mentioned as a way 
to gain mutual peace and common development and prosperity.  
The Initiative is to build a community with shared interests, destiny, responsibility featuring 
mutual political trust. Deepening political trust is said to be one of the aspects required for 
mutual benefit and common security. To implement the initiative, the countries are to enhance 
policy coordination. Enhanced mutual political trust is written as an important factor for this.  
Respect is another norm that has not been mentioned much but has been mentioned in defining 
places.  
China also means that the initiative will lead to people in the initiative countries respecting each 
other more. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is argued to be one of the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence that the BRI want to achieve. 
China writes that the initiative is to be respectful of the paths and modes of development that 
have been chosen by different countries. 
Mutual Recognition of Standards is a norm that is rarely expressed and do not seem to have 
much relevance.  
Mutual recognition of regulations, improved cooperation in the field of inspection and 
quarantine, certification and accreditation and standard measurement is also encouraged in the 
countries along the BRI by the policy document.  
Economic Integration is a norm that is common and appears in relatively important parts of 
the document.  
The BRI is said in the document to be embracing economic globalisation with deep integration 
of markets, economic policy coordination and in-depth regional cooperation of higher 
standards.  
The Initiative is to build a community with shared interests, destiny, responsibility featuring 
economic integration.  
In the cooperation priorities of the policy documents, we can read that the countries should 
promote policies on financial integration.  
Countries along the BRI are encouraged to coordinate their economic development strategies 







Government Control/planned Economy Practices 
This is a norm with little mention and relevance in the 2015 policy document.  
Preferential Investment Possibilities is the only component this norm has, and it is not a 
common, nor relevant aspect of the policy document.  
Speeding up Investment facilitation by the involved governments in the BRI are encouraged in 
the BRI policy document.  
 
9.3.2 Case Countries 
Analysis of our cases and listing of the documents used in our analysis.  
Italy  
In the case of Italy, being the largest country of our cases, we have a large sample size 16 
documents that we have analysed. They are a diverse selection, and the only type of agreement 
of relevance that was not found was agreements on education. It is unclear if there is any such 
agreement. The ministry of education of Italy has been reached out through different channels 
to but choose not to respond.  
Documents Used: 
1. Bonisoli, A., and Shugang, L. (2019). “Ministero per Beni e Le Attivita Culturali. 
Restituzione Di 796 Reperti Archeologici appartenenti Al Patrimoni Culturale Cinese.” Rome.  
Description: A resolution depicting Italy returning 796 cultural heritage objects to China.  
2. Borgonzoni, L., and Yuzhu, L. (2019). Memorandum Di Intesa fra il Ministero per i Beni e 
le Attivita Culturali della Repubblica Italiana e I’Amministrazione Nazionale per il Patrimonio 
Culturale Cinese (NCHA) della Repubblica Popolare Cinese sul Progetto di Gemellaggi Volto 
alla Promozione, conservazione, conoscenza, valorizzazione e fruizione dei siti italiani e cinesi 
iscritti nelle Liste del Patrimonio Mondiale dell’Unesco.” Rome.  
Description: A document on twinning together Chinese and Italian world Heritage sites and 
cooperation on UNESCO world heritage preservation.  
3. Comaschi, G. and Decong, Y. (2019). “Gemellaggio tra l'Associazione per il Patrimonio dei 
Paesaggi Vitivinicoli di Langhe-Roero e Monferrato e l'Associazione "Terrazzamenti del Riso 
di Honghe Hani" dello Yunnan volto alla promozione della conoscenza, valorizzazione e 
fruizione dei siti iscritti.” Rome.  
Description: Agreement on twinning the Langhe-Roero and Monferrato Wine Landscapes 
Association and the Yunnan" Rice Terraces of Honghe Hani world heritage sites. The 
agreement is aimed at promoting knowledge, enhancement and use of the registered sites. 
4. Grillo, G., and Ruiyu, L. (2019a). “Protocol Between the Ministry of Health of the Italian 
Republic and the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China on 
Health Requirements for Bovine Semen to be Exported from Italy to China.” Rome.  
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Description: Protocol on Health Requirements for Bovine Semen export from Italy to China.  
5. Grillo, G., and Ruiyu, L. (2019b). “Plan of Action on Health Cooperation Between the 
Ministry of Health of the Italian Republic and the National Health Commission of the People’s 
Repbublic of China Plan of Action for the years 2019-2021.” Rome 
Description: An action plan for the two countries health cooperation.  
6. Grillo, G., and Ruiyu, L. (2019c). “Protocol Between the Ministry of Health of the Italian 
Republic and the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China on 
Inspection, Quarantine and Veterinary Sanitary Requirements for Frozen Pork to be Exported 
from Italy to China.” Rome.  
Description: Protocol on inspection, quarantine, and veterinary sanitary requirements for 
frozen pork to be exported from Italy to China.  
7. Per il Ministero per i Beni e le Attivita Culturali della Repubblica Italiana., and Per 
I’Amministrazione per il Patrimonio Culturale della Repubblica Popolare di Cina. 
“Memorandum d’Instesa Tr ail Ministero per I Beni e le Attivita Culturali della Repubblica 
Italiana e I’amministrazione Nazionale per il Patrimonio Culturale della Repubbliva Popolare 
Cinese (NCHA) sulla prevenzione dei furti, degli scavi clandestine, importazione, esportazione, 
traffic e transito illecito di beni culturali e sulla promozione della loro restituzione.” Rome.  
Description: An MoU on theft prevention, illegal excavation, import, export, traffic and transit 
illicit cultural property and the promotion of its return.  
8. Sboarina, F. and Chengchao, M. (2019). “Patto di gemellaggio tra la Città di Verona e la 
Città di Hangzhou per la promozione della conoscenza, valorizzazione e fruizione dei rispettivi 
siti iscritti nelle Liste del Patrimonio Mondiale dell'Unesco.” Rome.  
Description: The twinning agreement between the City of Verona and the City of Hangzhou 
for the promotion of knowledge, enhancement and use of the respective sites registered in the 
UNESCO World Heritage Lists. 
9. Sequi, E. and Ruiyu, L. (2019). “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of 
Health of the Italian Republic and the General Administration of Customs of the People’s 
Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Frontier Health Quarantine.” Beijing.  
Description: MoU on cooperation in the field of frontier Health Quarantine.   
10. Speranza, R., and Xiaowei, M. (2019). “Implementation Programme of the Plan of Action 
for the Years 2019-2021 on Health Cooperation Between the Ministry of Health of the Italian 
Republic and the National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China.” Rome.  
Description: A implementation program of the action plan on health cooperation.  
11. Repubblica Italiana., and Repubblica Popolare Cinese. (2019). “Comunicato Congiunto Tra 
La Repubblica Italiana E La Repubblica Popolare Cinese Sul Rafforzamento Del Partenariato 
Strategico Globale.” Rome.  





12. The Government of the Italian Republic., and The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. (2019). “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Italian 
Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation Within the 
Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative.” Rome.  
Description: The original China-Italy BRI MoU.  
13. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Tourism of the Italian Republic., and For 
the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China. (2019). “Protocollo 
sui requisiti fitosanitari per l’esportazione di agrumi freschi dall’Italia alla Cina tra il Ministero 
delle Politiche Agricole, Alimentari, Forestali e del Turismo della Repubblica Italiana e 
l’Amministrazione Generale delle Dogane della Repubblica Popolare Cinese.” Rome.  
Description: A protocol on the sanitary requirements for the export of fresh citrus fruits from 
Italy to China. 
14. The Port System Authority of the Eastern Adriatic Sea., Ports of Trieste., and China 
Communications Construction Company. “Accordo Di Cooperazione Fra Autorita’ Di Sistema 
Portuale Del Mare Adriatico Orientale – Porti Di Trieste E Monfalcone E China 
Communications Construction Company.” Rome.  
Description: A cooperation agreement between the three parties regarding the development of 
the Eastern Adriatic Sea ports.  
15. Valditara, G., and Ruiyu, L. (2019). “Memorandum d’Intesa tra Il Ministero dell’Istruzione, 
Universita e Ricerca della Repubblica Italiana e Il Ministero della Scienza e Tecnologia della 
Repubblica Popolare Cinese sul Rafforzamento della Cooperazione sulla Scienza, Tecnologia 
e Innovazione.” Rome.  
Description: MoU on strengthening cooperation on science, technology, and innovation. 
16. Xinshou, Z., and Tria, G. (2019). “中华人民共和国政府和意大利共和国政府对
所得消除双重征税和防止逃避税的协定.” Rome.  
Description: An agreement on eliminating double taxation on income and the 




Sustainable development is a significant norm in China-Italy BRI cooperation. Sustainability is 
brought up in many different documents as something that needs to be adhered to in 
investments, development and cooperations. It is something the parties want to advocate. 
Nevertheless, they do not always specify what type of sustainable development they want to 
achieve. Below are some examples of that.  
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In the MoU on world heritage twinning projects, the two parties agree that they should aim at 
identifying innovative fruition projects and carry them out according to the principle of 
sustainable development.  
In a joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, which was published right before signing the MoU on the BRI, the two countries 
say that their strategic partnership is aimed at contributing to sustainable development.  
In the same press release, they also underline their desire to contribute to strengthening 
sustainable development, working on 2030 agenda and the Paris agreements.  
In it, the parties also further say that they want to strengthen the role of the UN in actions of 
promoting sustainable development.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the countries further discuss the need to promote 
sustainable development, in line with the Paris Accord on Climate change and line with 2030 
Agenda.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties promise to work towards promoting 
sustainable development. In this document, there is an entire section dedicated to sustainable 
development.  
In the twinning partnership agreement between the city of Verona and the City of Hangzhou, 
the two parties highlight the importance of sustainable development.  
It is also apparent in the twinning agreement between the Langhe-Roero and Monferrato Wine 
Landscape association and the “Rice Terraces of Honghe Hani” Association of the Yunnan. 
Sustainable Environmental Development is the most prevalent of sustainability norms. It is 
the one that has been the most clearly defined as well, and the parties put much importance to 
this norm.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also highlight their support of implementing the 2017-2020 Italy-
China action Plan to further boost cooperation in the areas of Environmental and sustainable 
energy. The countries bring up environmentally sustainable development in a large section of 
the text, discussing cooperation, their commitment, and their will to promote green and low-
carbon industry projects.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties highlight the importance of the Paris 
Accord on Climate change. They agree that their development of transports, logistics and 
infrastructure should include a shared vision about sustainable transport. The parties agree to 
work together in developing renewable energy and cooperate in sustainable transport solutions. 
They also agree on developing connectivity with an environmentally friendly approach, where 
they actively promote the global process towards a green, low carbon and circular development. 
The parties are to work on green development, ecological and environmental protection as well 
as climate change. They are also to help other countries together in this matter.  
In the twinning agreement between the Langhe-Roero and Monferrato Wine Landscape 
association and the “Rice Terraces of Honghe Hani” Association of the Yunnan, the two actors 
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agree to promote some of the policies in Agenda 2030. The examples they bring out are more 
focused on environmental issues.  
Sustainable Economic Development is only outright mentioned in one of the documents. It 
has a small impact and relevance on the countries BRI interactions. 
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree that their BRI interactions are 
to be guided by sustainable growth norms. The countries agree that they are to develop 
connectivity following a financially sustainable approach and have an approach of circular 
development. Investments are also supposed to be economically viable (sustainable). They are 
also to help other countries in this matter together.  
Societal Sustainable Development is also a minor norm that is mentioned a few times. It does 
not seem to be the most prevalent norm.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also highlight their support of implementing the 2017-2020 Italy-
China action Plan to further boost cooperation in the areas of sustainable urbanisation.  
In the Core BRI MoU, the parties also agree on actively promoting the implementation of 
Agenda 2030 of sustainable development and work towards socially sustainable investments. 
They are also to help other countries in this matter.  
Good Governance 
Good governance norms are highly visible in the two nations agreements with each other. It is 
the largest norm present in our data and is almost found in all documents.  
Financial Security is the smallest norm in this category of norms and is only really mentioned 
in one document.  
In the original China-Italy BRI MoU, the two countries agree to communicate and coordinate 
on fiscal, financial, and structural reform policies to create a favourable environment for 
economic and financial cooperation.  
The Rule of Law norm is highly relevant, on the other hand, and shows respect towards Italy’s 
EU membership, and is present in almost all the agreements. The documents keep repeating 
this norm repeatedly, and it is central in their agreements.  
In the agreement on eliminating double taxation and preventing tax evasion, the two countries 
agree that the agreement needs to be complete per the parties’ tax laws.  
In the MoU on world heritage twinning projects, the two parties agree that the MoU will be 
carried out per national and international laws, and for Italy, with the obligations deriving from 
Italy’s membership of the EU.  
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
parties agree on different measures to protect intellectual property rights and base intellectual 
property rights on the two nations laws and international laws.  
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In the same agreement, the countries again agree that the MoU is to be implemented in 
compliance with both countries’ legislation, international laws and for Italy, their obligations 
to the EU.  
In a Protocol on inspection, quarantine and veterinary sanitary requirements for frozen pork to 
be exported from Italy to China, both countries have agreed that the production plats 
supervision will be done in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations of Italy and China 
on veterinary health and Public health. The export needs to be done following Chinese Food 
safety laws. Medication is to be used, under Chinese and Italian laws and regulations. 
Pathogenic agents are also not supposed to be present, per Chinese and Italian laws and 
regulations as well as international standards.  
The protocol is agreed to be implemented per Italian and Chinese legislation and international 
laws. The obligations of Italy towards the EU will be respected as well.  
The previously mentioned section is again repeated in a protocol on the export of Italian citrus 
fruits to China.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also agree on the importance of a rule-based multilateral trading 
system, that also needs to be strengthened.  
In the same press release, the parties also agree on the need to encourage full intellectual 
property protection and highlights its importance in many different places in the press release.  
In a plan of action on health cooperation 2019-2021, the two countries agree on supporting the 
public-private Sino-Italian Healthcare partnership per Italian and Chinese regulations and laws. 
Furthermore, the entire plan of action is to be according to the two countries laws and 
legislations, international law and per Italy’s obligations towards the EU. The countries will 
cooperate based on the principle of protecting intellectual property rights.  
Health care activities are to be carried out in line with the laws and regulations, on medical care 
and professions and other non-medical professions, of the host country.  
In an MoU on preserving cultural heritage to fighting illicit trade and theft of cultural heritage 
items, both nations once again promise that the agreement should be according to their local 
laws as well as international laws while respecting Italy’s obligations towards the EU.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to work following their 
respective domestic laws and regulations, in consistence with their respective international 
obligations. Intellectual property rights are also brought up as something that needs to be 
respected within the countries BRI cooperation.  
Finally, at the end of the core BRI MoU, the parties once again agree that their MoU will be 
interpreted following the legislations of the Parties as well as international laws, and for Italy, 
the obligations their have from their EU membership.  
This final section is again repeated in a plan of action for implementing health cooperation in 
the years of 2019-2021 and again repeated in the Cooperation Agreement between Port System 
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Authority of Eastern Adriatic Sea – Port of Triste and Monfalcone and China Communications 
Construction Company. The same paragraph is repeated in an MoU on cooperation in the field 
of frontier health quarantine and the in the twinning partnership agreement between the city of 
Verona and the City of Hangzhou. 
Transparency is another minor norm, but that has some presence in the agreements.   
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also highlight the importance of transparency in a rule-based 
trading system of mutual benefit.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree that they want to strengthen 
cooperation and promote regional connectivity with an open framework beneficial to all. 
In the same document, the two parties highlight the importance of transparent procurement 
procedures. In the BRI, the two parties promise that they will promote transparency in trade 
and industrial cooperation.  
Inclusiveness is another common norm in the agreements. It is in core places for the 
agreements, making it fairly relevant.  
In a joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the countries agree on defending an inclusive world economy. 
In the same press release, both countries say that they want a fair, non-discriminatory, open and 
inclusive multilateral rule-based trading system.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, they agree that they want to strengthen 
cooperation and promote regional connectivity with an inclusive framework beneficial to all. 
In the MoU, the countries also agree to promote inclusive growth.  
Regional connectivity will also be promoted, per the core MoU, through an inclusive 
framework. Transport and logistics should be inclusive.  
In the Original BRI MoU between China and Italy, the two parties highlight the importance of 
non-discriminatory procurement procedures. In the BRI, the two parties promise that they will 
promote non-discriminatory trade and industrial cooperation. 
Accountability Norms are a very common norm that is re-accruing. It is also important in the 
agreements.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to explore synergies and make 
sure consistency and complementarity with existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
mechanisms and regional cooperation platforms.   
More examples of these norms can be found in the rule of law norm, which is partly a part of 






Liberal norms are common and seem to be somewhat relevant in the country’s agreements with 
each other. There are specific liberal norms present, while many are not, which is a common 
theme among our entire dataset.  
Equality Norms are noticeable in the agreements, both as a way they want to approach each 
other and in how they want to shape the global arena.  
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
countries agree to base their promotion and support of cooperation between Chinese and Italian 
research entities and institutions on the principle of equality.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two parties highlight the importance of having a level playing field and that 
they need to gradually rebalance their bilateral trade in its growth and increase mutual 
investment to strengthen economic cooperation, bilateral exchange as well as mutual 
investment between them. 
In a plan of action on health cooperation 2019-2021, the two countries agree on making their 
cooperation be based on the principle of equality.  
In the Original BRI MoU between China and Italy, the parties express a will to promote a level 
playing field. 
Peace as a norm in international relations is present and highlighted as important for both 
parties. It is a minor norm in the number of mentions, but the two countries have put much 
importance to it.  
In a joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, which was published right before signing the MoU on the BRI, the two countries 
say that their strategic partnership is aimed at contributing to world peace.  
In it, the parties also further say that they want to strengthen the role of the UN in actions of 
protecting the peace. In the same press release, the countries also agree on their commitment to 
deepening the Sino-European Partnership for peace.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties promise to work towards promoting 
regional peace.  
Human Rights Norms in the international arena were slightly touched upon, and is not 
discussed in-depth, but is still relevant to bring up.  
In a joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the countries write that they want to strengthen the role of the UN in actions to 






The norm of cooperation is spread out and at times, strong among the nations. It is present in 
some core places, making it an important norm for China-Italy BRI interactions.   
Mutual Beneficial Cooperation Norms are what gives the cooperation norm its importance. 
This norm is outlined as a goal for how the cooperations are to be done under the BRI. 
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
two countries agree that the principle of mutual benefit is a core part of their MoU. They further 
agree to base their promotion and support of the cooperation between Italian and Chinese 
research entities and institutes on mutual benefit.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the two countries also highlight their wish of a trading system based on mutually 
beneficial collaboration.  
In a plan of action on health cooperation 2019-2021, both parties agree on making the 
cooperation partly about mutual benefit and result sharing.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree that their cooperation will be 
done in a mutually beneficial manner. It also says that they want to strengthen cooperation and 
promote regional connectivity with an open, inclusive and balanced framework beneficial to 
all. In the same document, a balanced framework beneficial to all is again suggested.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to work towards mutually 
beneficial cooperation. They also agree on promoting substantive mutually beneficial 
cooperation in the field of trade and investment.  
In an implementation program of the plan of actions for the 2019-2021 health cooperation, the 
parties agree that the implementation program is to be done under the principle of mutual 
benefit.  
Common Development Norms are rather present among the documents but do not take up too 
much space. It is an uncommon norm in the sense that they rarely write it out to be a goal they 
want to achieve in their cooperation in the documents, from what we can see, but there is still 
an undertone of this norm in the way the actor's act.  
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
countries agree that they will support research related actors to conduct joint research and 
development.  
In the Cooperation Agreement between Port System Authority of Eastern Adriatic Sea – Port 
of Triste and Monfalcone and China Communications Construction Company, the two parties 
agree on establishing cooperative relationships to explore opportunities to support, in 
collaboration, the development of projects, investment and infrastructure management.  




In an MoU on cooperation on frontier health quarantine, the two parties agree on together 
developing norms and standards on prevention and control of infectious diseases.  
Culture 
Cultural norms are a common set of norms in the dataset we have, which could partly be 
explained by the willingness of the ministry of culture and heritage to contribute with cultural 
documents that are not open to the public. Partly it can also be due to Italy’s rich history, making 
this norm something that they put a high value on.   
Preservation of Cultural Heritage is a common norm, appearing in many documents. It is 
given much value.  
In the MoU on world heritage twinning projects, we can see that the countries agree on working 
together on conservation and enhancement of world heritage sites. These are two of the primary 
purposes of the agreement, making them rather central in this document.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the countries are satisfied with the development in activities regarding the 
protection of cultural heritage.  
In the MoU on the prevention of theft, clandestine excavation, importation, the export of, traffic 
and transit of illicit cultural goods and the promotion of their return, we can see that the 
countries agree on preventing illicit trade, theft and so on of cultural heritage objects, and 
promise to preserve them through preventing such harmful actions.  
We can also see norms of preserving cultural heritage In the twinning partnership agreement 
between the city of Verona and the City of Hangzhou and the twinning agreement between the 
Langhe-Roero and Monferrato Wine Landscape association and the “Rice Terraces of Honghe 
Hani” Association of the Yunnan. The two parties agree on different exchanges and cooperation 
with this purpose in mind.  
Italy also returned 796 archaeological finds of importance to China’s cultural heritage, which 
was apparent in a resolution.  
Cultural Diversity is a norm noticeable through the countries accepting and distributing their 
cultures to each other. This is a norm that is prevalent among the two countries BRI interactions 
and has much relevance as much effort is put into exchanging personal, having joint projects 
and events.  
In the MoU on world heritage twinning projects, the two countries agree on promoting each 
other’s cultural heritage sites. These are two of the primary purposes of the agreement, making 
them rather central in this document. 
The countries are to promote the twinning project through events and create programs to visit 
the World Heritage sites.  
In the joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the countries expressed their satisfaction in the growing number of cultural 
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exchanges as well as in the people-to-people exchanges. The parties also agree on encouraging 
the teaching of each other languages in middle and high schools.  
We can also see norms of spreading cultural heritage In the twinning partnership agreement 
between the city of Verona and the City of Hangzhou and the twinning agreement between the 
Langhe-Roero and Monferrato Wine Landscape association and the “Rice Terraces of Honghe 
Hani” Association of the Yunnan. This is apparent in joint activities to spread knowledge about 
the sites and promote tourism.  
Fairtrade 
Fairtrade norms are present in the two countries BRI agreements, and the ones that are present 
are highly important.  
Norms on Equity is one of the fair-trade norms that have much importance to the countries 
BRI relationship as it is described as the spirit of the two countries bilateral relations.  
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
two countries agree to conduct joint research activities and finance them jointly, within the 
limits of their ordinary budget.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the spirit of equity is highlighted as the spirit of 
their bilateral partnership.  
In an implementation program of the plan of actions for the 2019-2021 health cooperation, the 
parties agree that the implementation program is to be implemented while considering the 
countries respective needs and assets.  
Market Economy and Open Market Norms is another very relevant normative component 
in the two countries BRI interactions. It has an important norm in the agreement that is raised 
in both the press release and the original MoU with persuasive language.  
In a joint press release between Italy and China on the strengthening of their global strategic 
partnership, the countries agree on defending an open world economy. The parties also say that 
they agreed on combating all forms of protectionism and to promote liberalisation and 
facilitation of trade and investment.  
In the same press release, the countries also agree on widening and easing the market access of 
their respective countries.  
In the Original BRI MoU between China and Italy, the two parties reaffirm their mutual 
commitment to open and free trade and investment. They want to work to counter excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances and to oppose unilateralism and protectionism. In their cooperation 
in the BRI, they will promote free and open trade and industrial cooperation, open procurement 
and follow market principles. Furthermore, the two parties highlight the importance of open, 
transparent, and non-discriminatory procurement procedures. The parties are also to work to 
expand the two-way investment and trade flow. 
In an MoU on cooperation in science, technology and innovation between Italy and China, the 
two parties agree that they should base the activities of their joint laboratories on the 
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researcher’s research proposals. The governments do not suggest any topics they should focus 
on.  
Mutuality  
Mutuality norms are present in the agreements between the two countries. While they are not 
mentioned a lot, they have some importance.  
Mutual Respect as a norm is mentioned once in the agreements but in a core place  
In the original BRI MoU between Italy and China, we can see that the countries agree to 
promote their bilateral partnership in the spirit of mutual respect. This is one of the core values 
of the agreement.  
Mutual Trust Is mentioned in two documents, but do not seem to be central in the agreements.  
In the press release on global strategic partnership, the two countries draw up mutual trust as a 
pillar in their cooperation.  
In the core BRI MoU between Italy and China, the parties agree to work towards mutual trust.  
Planned Economy and Government Control Norms 
This is a small norm in the two countries interactions and is only mentioned once. It does not 
seem to have high importance to the two countries cooperation. It is a step away from market 
economy norms, in the sense that agreements encourage their financial actors to conduct 
business with each other’s actors.  
Government Intervention is the only aspect found in the different agreements that have been 
studied. It is minor, and not central for the two nations agreements.  
The parties promise to encourage their financial institutions to engage in partnership with each 
other to support investments and financial cooperation together. These cooperations are to be 
done in bilateral and multilateral levels, as well as towards third countries within the BRI 
framework.   
Latvia  
Documents Used: 
1. Government of the Republic of Latvia., and Government of the People’s Republic of China. 
(2015). “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Latvia 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation Within the Framework 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative.” Riga.  
Description: Original BRI MoU between China and Serbia. Outlines the cooperation between 
the countries.  
2. Latvijas Republikas Kulturas ministrijas varda., and Kinas Tautas Republikas Kulturas 
ministrijas varda. (2015). ”Latvijas Republikas Kulturas ministrijas un Kinas Tautas 
Republikas Kulturas ministrijas kulturas apmainas programma 2016–2020. Gadam.” Riga.  
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Description: Agreement on Cultural Exchange Program for the years 2016-2020. 
3. Latvijas Republikas Veselibas Ministrijas Varda., and Kinas Tautas Republikas Nacionalas 
Veselibas un Gimenes Planosanas Komisijas Varda. (2017). “Latvijas Republikas Veselibas 
Ministrijas un Kinas Tautas Republikas Nacionalas Veselibas un Gimenes Planosanas 
komisijas Ricibas Plans Par Sadarbibu Vaselibas Joma 2017-2020. Gada.” Budapest.  
Description: Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Health Care 2017-2020.  
4. Selga, M., and Baosheng, C. (2017). “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Latvia and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperations the Field of 
Education.” Beijing.  
Description: Agreement between China and Latvia on a cooperating in Education.  
5. Selga, M., and Zhigang, W. (2018). “Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Latvia and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in the field of 
Science and Technology.” Beijing.  
Description: Agreement between China and Latvia on cooperation in Science and technology.  
6. Voldiņš, S., and Melbarde, D. (2017). Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Latvia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field 
of Culture.” Riga. 




Liberal values are not that common in the agreements, but when they appear, they are in critical 
places.  
Peace Is not a common norm in the Latvia-China BRI agreements, but it appears in key places, 
giving it some importance 
In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the 
Silk Road spirit of peace. The two parties also agree on working together to deepen mutually 
beneficial cooperation to realize peaceful development. The balanced framework of economic 
cooperation suggested in the Original BRI MoU is to promote peace in the region of the BRI.  
Equality is a rare norm. In the agreement, it can be found it is positioned as a critical principle 
in an agreement on cultural cooperation, and the two countries agree that they will base their 
cooperation and exchanges on the principle of equality.  
Cooperation 
Cooperation norms are some of the most common norms in the agreement and are important 
for the two nations cooperation on the BRI.  
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In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the 
Silk Road spirit of cooperation. The two countries also agree that they expect countries along 
the BRI will step up their cooperation and deepening their all-round cooperation with countries 
for a myriad of reasons.  
In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree on deepening their all-round cooperation with 
countries along the BRI on jointly establishing an open framework of economic cooperation.  
Mutual Benefit Is one of the core themes China-Latvia BRI cooperations. It is both important 
and common in the agreements.   
In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the 
Silk Road spirit of mutual learning and win-win cooperation. The two parties also agree on 
working together to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation to get shared prosperity.  
The balanced framework of economic cooperation suggested in the Original BRI MoU is to be 
beneficial to all.  
The bilateral cooperation between Latvia and China are to be promoted on the principle of joint 
contribution and shared benefits. The countries are to adopt a vision of cooperation, 
development and win-win progress.  
The parties are also to form synergies, give each other support and share experiences to 
complement and display each other’s strengths in the different bilateral cooperation mechanism 
and multilateral mechanisms that both parties are a part of, as well as in regional cooperation 
platforms.  
In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree to encourage two-way investment and various 
forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between their companies.  
In an agreement on cultural cooperation, the two countries agree that they will base their 
cooperation and exchanges on the principle of mutual benefit. This is again repeated regarding 
education in an MoU on education cooperation.  
In an action plan health cooperation 2017-2020, the Parties agree to promote mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the field of health and medicine between health, medical, scientific, 
research, educational and other organizations within the financial resources available and within 
their capabilities. 
Common Development is less important and common the previously mentioned norms, but 
still holds some relevance.  
In the original MoU between Latvia and China on the BRI, the two countries also agree on 
promoting coordinated development and common progress of the two countries economy 
society and environment. 
The two parties also agree on working together within the BRI to realize their common goal of 
common development.  
The two countries are to aim to strengthen transport cooperations, support Latvia in developing 
multimodal distribution and logistics platform.  
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In an agreement on cultural cooperation, the two countries agree that they will cooperate in 
training cultural and art professionals as well as heritage practitioners in specific areas. 
Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is not that relevant in the two countries cooperations. The two 
countries have not discussed it much in their agreements, and two out of the three sustainability 
norms are missing.  
Economic Sustainable Development is the only sustainable development norm present in the 
agreements between China and Latvia. It is minor and holds little importance.  
In the core BRI document between Latvia and China, be countries agree on translating their 
strengths into advantages for sustainable growth. The countries also agree on deepening their 
all-round cooperation with countries along the BRI on jointly establishing a balanced 
framework of economic cooperation.  
Fairtrade 
Fairtrade is another common, due to the many uncommon norms in it, and important norm that 
is apparent in the two nations BRI agreements.  
Market Economy Norms have a minimal presence, but the parties agree that their different 
cooperation’s and exchanges are to be done a though market-oriented approach, giving this 
norm some importance.  
In the core MoU, both countries agree that they will discuss opening direct flights between 
Latvia and China. The discussion is to be done based on commercial and market-based 
principles and feasibility studies. The countries are to conduct their different cooperations and 
exchanges through market-oriented approaches.  
Transparency Norms is another small norm that is not that relevant in the various agreements. 
It is vaguely mentioned a few times and only once outright stated as a goal.   
In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the 
Silk Road spirit of openness. Through the BRI, the countries are also to increase transparency.  
In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree on deepening their all-round cooperation with 
countries along the BRI on jointly establishing an open framework of economic cooperation. 
In the same document, the bilateral cooperation between Latvia and China are to be promoted 
on the principle of wide consultation.  
Equity is another norm with a little appearance in the agreements, but that is the basis of the 
Science and technology MoU.  
In an action plan, health cooperation 2017-2020, the Parties agree to promote mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the field of health and medicine within the financial resources 
available and within their capabilities. 
In an MoU on Science and technology, both countries agree that they need to take into 
consideration the needs and possibilities of the two countries. The entire agreement is based on 
this premise.  
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Reciprocity is a norm that has little spread and little importance outside science and technology 
MoU.  
In an MoU on science and technology, the two parties agree on jointly funding research, 
development, and innovation projects in areas of common interest, following the principle of 
reciprocity.  
Good governance 
Good governance is a common norm with some importance to the country’s agreements. It is 
well spread out in many different agreements and take up some important topics.  
Financial Security is a minor norm in the agreement with small importance. In the original 
MoU, the countries agree to improve the investment environment and enhance the level of 
investment safety and facilitation.  
Rule of Law Norms Are is common in the countries agreements and hold a fairly important 
role. Nevertheless, it is not found in the original BRI MoU between Latvia and China.  
In a cultural agreement between the two parties, they agree that the activities in the agreements 
shall be undertaken in accordance with the two countries national laws and regulations as well 
as their international obligations.  
In the education MoU between Latvia and China, the two countries agree that their national 
laws and regulations, as well as international obligations, need to be respected in all activities 
covered in the MoU.   
In an agreement on science and technology, the countries agree to protect Intellectual property 
rights arising from cooperation through an agreement between the two countries, per their 
existing laws and regulations. 
Inclusiveness Norms are present in the original MoU and is stated as a historical principle of 
the Silk Road that they want to uphold.  
In the core BRI MoU between Latvia and China, the two parties agree that they will uphold the 
Silk Road spirit of inclusiveness. The countries also agree on deepening their all-round 
cooperation with countries along the BRI on jointly establishing an inclusive framework of 
economic cooperation. People’s in all sectors of society are to be encouraged to participate in 
the BRI.  
Cultural Norms   
Cultural norms are strongly present in the BRI agreements between the countries. This could 
very well be due to our sample size, where two documents are culture related. Culture norms 
hold some importance in the agreements.  
Preservation of Cultural Heritage as a norm is not a common norm, but it has a presence in 
the agreements worth noting. It does not seem to have much importance, as it is never 
mentioned entirely by itself.  
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In an agreement on cultural cooperation, the two countries agree that they will deepen 
cooperation between museums, archaeological research institutions and institutions involved in 
the protection and restoration of cultural heritage. The Parties shall encourage the exchange of 
experience and cooperation in the fields of restoration, protection and conservation of cultural 
heritage.  
In an agreement on a cultural exchange program 2016-2020, both countries agree that they 
should exchange personal and information on the preservation of museums and cultural values.  
Cultural Diversity norms are, on the other hand, have a high presence and have been given 
much importance. The countries agree that to share many aspects of their cultures with each 
other and promote cooperations.  
In the core BRI MoU, we can see that the two parties are willing to cooperate in spreading each 
other’s cultures through cooperations and people-to-people exchanges. In an agreement on 
cultural cooperation, the two countries agree that they have exchanges in a verity of different 
cultural fields.  
In the agreement of a cultural exchange program 2016-2020, the two parties promise to acquaint 
each other with their cultural heritage and the achievements of contemporary culture. This is to 
be done by supporting the exchanges of information and personal within different cultural 
fields. A verity of exchanges is suggested, including performing artists and art exhibitions. The 
countries are also to explore the possibility of translating literature and do other literature 
cooperations.  
In an agreement on education, both parties also agree on supporting each other’s language and 
culture studies in their countries.  
Mutuality  
Mutuality norms not too common, but they do sometimes take up core places, giving them some 
relevance.  
Mutual Understanding is not a common norm, nor that important in the two parties’ 
agreements.  
In the cultural exchange program 2016-2020 agreement, the two parties agree that their 
agreement will lead to their common development of the understanding between their both 
peoples.  
Respect is not as a norm that regular in the agreements but has some importance when 
appearing.  
The bilateral cooperation between Latvia and China that is mentioned in the core BRI MoU is 
to be promoted on the principle of respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns.  
In an agreement on cooperation in the field of education, the two parties shall base their 
cooperation on the principles of mutual respect and partnership, encourage and support different 
forms of cooperation in the field of education.  
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Mutual Recognition of Standards is another rare and not too important norm. The two 
countries will promote cooperation on mutual recognition of standards.  
Government Control/planned Economy Practices 
This norm is not that common in different agreements, but it takes up a large section of the 
original MoU.  It is fairly important for their agreement as it shapes some critical components 
of it.  
Government Involvement and Intervention in Steering Businesses norm is shaping a large 
part of the BRI interactions between these two countries. It is uncommon outside the original 
BRI MoU, but relevant and common in it.  
In the original BRI MoU, the countries agree to encourage two-way investment and various 
forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between their companies. The countries also agree on 
discussing the feasibility of jointly developing integrated industrial assembling, e-commerce, 
and consulting service centres in Latvia for promotion and easier access to Chinese exports to 
the EU market. In a section on financial cooperation, the two parties also agree on encouraging 
their financial institutions to provide financing support and services for trade and investment 
cooperation. They will facilitate the participation of Chinese companies in financing private, 
governmental, and regional projects in the Nordics and Baltics region. They are to do this by 
expanding cooperation between their state-owned and commercial financial institutions. They 
are also to encourage their companies to carry our cooperations in high and new technology 
and innovation by establishing new companies and innovation parks.  
In an MoU on Science and technology, both parties agree on encouraging their enterprises to 
launch cooperations in research, technological innovation, and product development together.  
Serbia  
Serbia has the most significant amount of data accessible. The Serbian ministries cooperated 
and gave access to many documents that were not accessible online.  Twelve agreements, plans 
of action, and MoU’s written between Serbia and China related to the BRI have been analysed.  
Documents Used: 
1. Beijing International Studies University., and Institute for Research of Cultural 
Development, Belgrade. (2016). “Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperation of 
National Academic Institutes in Cultural Trade among China and the Institute of Research of 
Cultural Development.” Belgrade.   
Description: An MoU on cooperation between two different academic institutions.  
2. Knezevic, G., Bulatovic., D., and Zhou, X. (2019). “Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the City of Nish and the entity "Xingyu Automotive 
Lighting Systems Co LTD.” Niš.  
Description: An MoU on developing investment and industrial development from a Chinese 
automotive lighting system manufacturer in a Serbian city.  
110 
 
3. Mihajlovic, Z., Lixin, X., Najafov, F. (2019). “Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation for the realization of the Project: Belgrade Bypass Project Construction of the 
Highway E70/E75 and Freight Railway: Section Bubanj Potok-Pancevo (Section C).” Beijing.  
Description: An MoU on the development of an infrastructure project.  
4. Mihajlovic, Z., and Rougu, L. (2014). “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation of 
The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Serbia and The 
Import-Export Bank of China” Belgrade.  
Description: An MoU between Serbia’s ministry of construction, transport and infrastructure 
and the Chinese Import-Export Bank on strengthening cooperation on infrastructure projects. 
5. Shaoshi, X.,  Szijjártó, P., and  Zorana Mihajlović, Z. (2014). “Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation of the Hungarian-Serbian Railway Project between The 
National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China and The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and The Ministry of Construction, Transport 
and Infrastructure of the Republic of Serbia.” Belgrade. 
Description: An MoU between Serbia, Hungary, and China on cooperation on developing a 
Railway project.  
6. The Chinese Cultural Heritage Academy., and The Provincial Bureau of the Protection of 
Cultural Monuments Serbia. (2018). “Оквирни Споразум Између Кинеске Академије За 
Културно Наслеђе И Покрајинског Завода За Заштиту Споменика Културе – 
Петроварадин О Номинацији Историјског Места Бач Са Окружењем.” Belgrade.  
Description: Agreement on cooperating in nominating Bac to become a World Heritage Site.  
7. The Government of the Republic of Serbia., and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China, (2015). “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic 
of Serbia and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on jointly promoting the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative.” Belgrade.  
Description: Original BRI MoU between Serbia and China.  
8. The Government of the Republic of Serbia., and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China. (2019). “Bilateral Cooperation Plan between the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative.” Belgrade.  
Description: Action plan on how to implement the BRI MoU.  
9. The Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia and the Ministry of Culture 
of the People’s Republic of China. (2017). “Програм Сарадње У Области Културе И 
Уметности Између Министарства Културе И Информисања Републике Србије И 
Министарства Културе Народне Републике Кине За Период 2017 – 2020. Године.” 
Belgrade. 
Description: Culture and Art cooperation program for the period of 2017-2020.  
10. The Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Serbia., and National Development and 
Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China. (2016). “Framework Agreement 
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between The Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Serbia and the National Development 
and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China In respect of Developing 
cooperation in the field of production capacities.” Belgrade.  
Description: Framework agreement on developing cooperation in the field of production 
capacities.  
11. The Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunication (MTT) of the Republic 
of Serbia., and The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of the People’s 
Republic of China. (2013). “Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign 
and Internal Trade and Telecommunication (MTT) of the Republic of Serbia and The Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China on 
Cooperation on Information and Communication Technologies.” Belgrade.  
Description: MoU on Cooperation on Information and communication technologies.  
12. Vujovic, D., and Ruogu, L. (2014). “Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement on Phase 
II of the Package Project Kostolac-B Power Plant Project.” Belgrade.  
Description: An agreement on preferential loan taking for a power-plant development project.  
Norms 
Cooperation 
Mutual Benefits are one of the most central norms in China-Serbia cooperations. It is apparent 
in 5 documents and is a large part of two of the primary documents, the original MoU between 
Serbia and China and the bilateral cooperation plan between the two countries.  
In the preamble of a framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the agreement outlines that the agreement is going to be based on the principle of 
equal benefit.  
In an MoU between the Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunication of the 
Republic of Serbia and The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s 
Republic of China on cooperation on Information and Communication Technologies, the two 
parties being their agreement with devoting themselves to mutually beneficial cooperation in 
the field of ICT.  
In the MoU on the cooperation of the Hungarian-Serbian Railway project between Serbia, 
China and Hungary, the parties agree that the project is to be carried out in the principle of win-
win cooperation and mutual benefits.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of mutual benefit through cooperation is mentioned as a goal to 
achieve. It is worded as a win-win cooperation.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
towards the goal of bringing benefit to both countries’ people. This is underlined in the 
document and is a re-accruing theme in the MoU.  
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Common Development norm is a central part of the two countries BRI interactions, based on 
it being described as the spirit of the Silk road and being apparent in different ways in many 
central documents.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of common development is present. Mutual learning and benefit 
as well sharing growth are mentioned as spirits of the Silk Road, and principles to achieve.  
Furthermore, the agreement also outlines that the two parties should promote projects that are 
in line with their common interests.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
towards the goal of common development. This is repeated in a few places and seems central 
to the agreement.  
The Norm on Standardization Cooperation has a rather small presence and importance.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the countries take it upon themselves to strengthen cooperation in the field 
of standardization. They will exchange experience, information, publication, normative 
documents, national standards, and technical regulations. They will improve cooperation 
mechanics, organise visits and joint learning.  
Liberalism 
Liberal norms are not strong in the Belt and Road interactions between Serbia and China.  
Norms on equality and peace are the only one present.  
Equality Norms have a small presence in the agreement yet are said to be a central part of the 
countries relations, according to the framework agreement on production capacity 
development. Mostly, China position itself as a benefactor, not an equal, but there is a normative 
language of equality in one of the agreements.   
In the preamble of a framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the agreement outlines that the agreement is going to be based on the principle 
equality. In the same document, they also agree on the principle of equal participation in their 
investment cooperation efforts.  
In the bilateral cooperation plan, the parties agree to share the risk and benefits of investments, 
indicating equality in this sector.  
Peace Norms is the second liberal norm present. Peace is not discussed or brought up that 
much, but it has a place in the dealings between China and Serbia.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the two parties state that they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of Peace 




In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should 
promote peace in their framework of economic cooperation.  
Sustainable Development.  
Sustainable development norms have a central role in the interactions between China and 
Serbia.  
Environmentally Sustainable development is a complex norm concerning Serbia-China BRI 
relations. Looking at the original MoU between Serbia and China on the BRI, we cannot see 
any indications of environmentally sustainable development, but in the bilateral cooperation 
plan where the MoU is made into an actual plan, it is a large part of the agreement. While it is 
present in this document, it is not present in any other documents that are describing actual 
projects. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the document was released in 2019, while the 
other documents are older.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of environmentally sustainable development is partly apparent, 
beside the development of fossil fuel industries. China encourages its enterprises to participate 
in the development of solar power and environmental protection industry in Serbia. In the same 
document, both parties agree on developing Serbia’s energy industry and making it more 
sustainable. They are to expand the proportion of renewable energy and reduce pollution 
emissions while focusing their power sector cooperation on advancements of environmental 
protection and energy conservation for Serbia’s existing thermal power plants, and on new 
construction of clean and efficient units.  
They are also to develop the fossil fuel and mineral extraction equipment to make them more 
environmentally friendly.  
Investments in Solar and wind energy will be made in Serbia, by Chinese companies, following 
the agreement mentioned before. 
In large parts of the document, the parties agree to continue developing sustainable energy 
sources and energy efficiency improvements. Both parties also recognise the significance of 
environmental protection to social health and sustainable development. Both countries also 
agree on the importance of combating climate change and discuss international agreements and 
plans to combat it. They also express that they want to develop a green economy in Serbia.  
Economic Sustainable Development is present in the original MoU and the BRI cooperation 
plan. It is a noticeable norm but not one of the central norms that are present in the countries 
relations.   
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of sustainable economic cooperation is present as the countries 
agree that intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms should be created and improved to create 
a favourable cooperation climate for long-term and sustainable cooperation. The norm is again 
brought up in the same document, where it materialises through the countries promising to 
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provide a sustainable impetus for the economic development of the two countries.  They have 
also clarified the importance of good corporate governance.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
towards the goal of sustainable growth. The countries are to have a balanced framework of 
economic cooperation.  
Socially Sustainable Development is present to a rather small extent in the agreements 
between the two nations. It does not seem to be an important norm in Serbia – China BRI 
relations.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of socially sustainable development is also apparent. The 
countries agree that they should train their officials in among other things, social compliance. 
The two actors also recognize that improving workers skills, creating jobs and developing social 
security are important elements in improving people’s well-being. It also creates favourable 
environments for enterprises.  
The two parties have promised to attach great importance to social responsibility in their 
promotion of investments.  
Mutuality 
Mutuality norms are also present among the two nations. Mutual respect and trust for each other 
are present.  
Mutual Respect is the most relevant norm in this category. It is an undertone in Serbia-China 
relations.  
In the preamble of a framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the agreement outlines that the agreement is going to be based on the principle of 
mutual respect.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of respect is adhered to. The two sides promise to respect each 
other’s core interests and major concerns.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should 
respect each other’s core interests and major concerns.  
Mutual Trust is a minor norm in the documents, that is barely not discussed.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
to deepen mutual trust.  
Fairtrade 
Fairtrade norms are a strong aspect of China – Serbia BRI relations. Market economy norms 




Reciprocity is visible in Serbia – China BRI relations primarily through three different 
documents. It is not positioned as a central norm, but it is still apparent.  
In the 2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of culture and art between Serbia and 
China, both countries agree on basing the organisation of festivals in each other’s countries on 
the principle of reciprocity. Later in the agreement, both countries agree on having direct 
collaboration and exchanges between writers and literary translators from the two countries 
based on a reciprocal basis.  
In the ICT MoU between Serbia and China, the two parties agree on setting up joint ventures 
in the field of ICT based on reciprocity.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of reciprocity is apparent in a section discussing political 
dialogues and interpersonal exchange between customs authorities.  
Equity, on the other hand, is minor and not that apparent in the nation’s agreement signing.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of equity is apparent in the section discussing the importance of 
combating climate change. Both sides stress the principle of fairness, common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities as well as considering the different situations of 
different countries in climate change work globally.  
Market Economy and Open Market Norms are the strongest aspects of fair-trade norms.  
These are the norms that are commonly connected to capitalism and liberalised economies. This 
norm seems to have a central role in the agreement between the countries but still is also meet 
with the counter norm of planned economy/state-controlled norms that will be discussed further 
below. Meaning, both norms are highly present in different parts of the countries relations.  
In Article 2 of an MoU between the Serbian Ministry of Construction, Transport and 
Infrastructure and the Import-Export Bank of China, the two parties have determined that Serbia 
will determine the priority of projects at their discretion through taking into account the projects 
significance and feasibility.  
In the MoU on the Hungarian-Serbian Railway Project, we can see Market economy norms 
through how the parties agree on organising a feasibility study that would outline the feasibility 
of different decisions on upgrading and expanding the plan as well as to see the modality of 
cooperation. 
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, Market economy norms are present in the form of the two parties agreeing 
on promoting cooperation projects based on the in-depth proof of demand and objective 
analysis of feasibility.  Later-on in the text, the parties agree that they should observe market 
rules with government guidance. Following the principle of enterprises leading while decisions 
being made by the market. The countries also agree that their enterprises should make 
independent decisions and be responsible for profits and losses at their own risks, indicating 
Market economy norms.  
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In the same cooperation plan, both parties agree to strengthen the cooperation in agriculture 
trade by market-based approaches. They will also encourage their financial institutions to 
establish branches in each other’s territories, according to market demand. Equal opportunity 
will also be given to the nation's enterprises as well as provide them with a fair competition 
environment. They will also get a favourable tax environment for cross-border trade and 
investment.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
to open their markets for unimpeded trade. They should expand two-way trade flows and adopt 
international, market-oriented, and professional approaches to their cooperation.  
Culture 
Cultural norms are norms that are prevalent in the two countries interactions with each other. 
The norm is not in the spotlight but is still discussed.  
The Preservation of Cultural Heritage is present in one document and do not seem to be that 
central in the cultural diversity norm.  
In the 2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of culture and art between Serbia and 
China, both countries agree on having exchanges in the conservation of the intangible cultural 
heritage of each other’s countries.  
Cultural Diversity is more apparent and can be found in a few different documents.  
In the 2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of culture and art between Serbia and 
China, both countries agree on trying to create mutual understanding for each other’s cultures 
and artistic achievements.  
In the same document, the parties also agree on conducting exchanges of artists to spread their 
cultures.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the countries agree to promote cooperation in language and academics. 
Teaching each other’s languages in higher education institutes. The countries are also to deepen 
their populations cultural understanding of the other.  
Good Governance 
Good governance is a norm that is very visible in many different agreements and takes a central 
role in the two countries dealings with each other.  
Financial Security is a minor norm apparent in the documents that still has relevance.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of financial security is highlighted as an objective both parties 
want to achieve. They want to improve the investment and financing environment. The 
countries also agree on signing administrative agreements on bilateral social security, to bring 
benefits to enterprises working in each other’s countries, making their markets easier to 
cooperate in. The countries are also to cooperate in the fight against commercial fraud and 
improve the investment climate and security.  
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In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree on the need to improve 
the investment environment and improve the level of investment facilitation and safety.  
The Rule of Law Norm is apparent in a lot of the documents and is consistently a part of the 
two countries dealings with each other.  
In the first article of the framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the parties agree to promote the cooperation in the field of production capacity 
of companies and financial institutions per national legislation and international agreements 
concluded by the countries.  
In an agreement between the City of Nisha, the government of Serbia and the Xingyn 
Automotive lighting System Co LTD, the two parties outline that the investment discussed will 
be supported according to the Law on State Aid Control and other legal restrictions.  
Rule of law norms are again apparent in the document, in many places and take up ample space. 
The investment is to be supported by the Serbian side within the laws of Serbia.  
In an MoU between Beijing international studies university and the Institute for research of 
cultural development of Serbia, the two parties agree that the MoU is to be signed following 
the administrative rules and procedures governing each party.   
In the ICT MoU between Serbia and China, the parties write that the agreement shall be 
implemented per relevant domestic laws of the parties.  
The same is again repeated in the MoU on the cooperation of the Hungarian-Serbian Railway 
project between Serbia, China, and Hungary. The standards, laws and regulations of Serbia and 
Hungary need to be followed in the project.   
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the rule of law norm is present as the parties agree that both sides should 
observe market rules, international norms, and European regulations. In the same document, 
the rule of law norm keeps appearing in many variations.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, the norm of rule of law is apparent in that 
they agree to observe each other’s applicable and effective laws and regulations.  
Consensus Oriented Actions, Decision Making, or Language is a minor norm that is not 
discussed that much in the agreements, but due to the nature of the cooperations being based 
on mutual free will, they are all based on consensus. The actions within the two countries 
dealing with each other in relations to the BRI are consensus-based, even if it is not outright 
written.  
In the MoU on the Hungarian-Serbian Railway Project, the parties agree that they will take joint 
decisions on the development of the plan, showing a norm for consensus-oriented decision-
making  




In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, we can see that transparency is lifted as a norm.  The two parties state that 
they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of openness.  
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
towards the goal of promoting an open (transparent) economic cooperation and development in 
the region. 
 
Inclusiveness is another minor norm. It is mentioned as a spirit of the silk road, but only 
discussed once more after that. It is not apparent in the more practical documents. 
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of inclusiveness is raised by the states. The two parties write that 
they will adhere to the Silk Road Spirit of inclusiveness. 
In the original BRI MoU between China and Serbia, both countries agree that they should work 
towards the goal of promoting inclusive economic cooperation and development in the region. 
Accountability is the last common norm that is important. This norm is partly found in the 
same places as the rule of law norm.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of accountability is present. The countries agree that their 
enterprises should make independent decisions and be responsible for profits and losses at their 
own risks.  
In many of the different documents, the countries also agree to still uphold their responsibilities 
in existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms and regional cooperation 
platforms.   
Government control/planned Economy Practices 
One of the most influential norms is the norms on government control or planned economy. A 
large part of the agreements has components of this. Meaning, the states are promising to 
intervene in the open market, not adhering to public procurement norms as well as giving 
companies preferential investment possibilities.  
Preferential Investment Possibilities are a norm that is present and visible in the agreements.   
In Article 3 of the framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the two countries agree on encouraging their financial institutions to provide 
financing, co-financing, guarantees and long-term insurance for bilateral cooperations in the 
field of production capacities.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of preferential investment possibilities is present. The Chinese 
side promises to support its enterprises to invest with priority in Serbia’s industries, giving them 
comparative advantages, high-added values, and a good prospect. The two sides will also give 
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priority to cooperations in equipment manufacturing. The same document also promises a 
favourable tax environment for cross-border trade and investment.  
Government Involvement and Intervention in Steering Businesses is a more visible norm 
that is also more central in the countries’ interactions with each other.  
In article 1 of the framework agreement between China and Serbia on production capacity 
development, the two parties agree on promoting cooperation in the field of production capacity 
of companies and financial institutions from both their countries.  
In article 5 of the same agreement, the two parties also agree on coordinating and promoting 
priority investment and cooperation projects. They also agree on initiating the establishment of 
business associations for economic cooperation development as well as supervising the projects 
being implemented efficiently. In the 2017-2020 program of cooperation in the field of culture 
and art between Serbia and China, the countries agree that they will create cooperations between 
publishing houses, associations, TV and radio institutions and companies.  
In the Bilateral Cooperation Plan between Serbia and China under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the norm of government guidance is apparent when the two parties agree 
that the government should guide the enterprises. In the same document, the countries agree to 
encourage their businesses to deepen their cooperation in areas of fossil fuel processing. The 
Chinese companies are also encouraged to cooperate in the development of green technologies, 
ICT, food processing, textile and garment, home building materials, electronic and more. China 
encourages investments in Serbian free trade zones and more similar actions.  
Lack of Open Procurement is the last norm. It is available but not too focused upon the norm. 
The counties bypass public procurement in their dealings with each other at times, prioritising, 
for example, Chinese companies and products. 
In the MoU between the Import-Export Bank of China and The Ministry of Construction, 
Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Serbia, we can see that Chinese contractors are 
getting prioritised when Serbia takes loans from the Chinese bank, going against market 
economy norms.  
In the MoU on the Hungarian-Serbian Railway Project, the parties agree that they will examine 
all possibilities to utilize Chinese railway technology and equipment in the project, showing a 
clear preference towards Chinese projects and undermining norms of open procurement.  
 
9.4 Appendix 4 – Interview Questions and Interviews.  
9.4.1 Questions 
1. Do you think China’s actions (agreement writing, official statements, project 
methodology, diplomacy, etc.) regarding the BRI towards the case country you picked are 
affected by the EU’s internal norms and if so, how? 
2. Are there any specific norms that are more prevalent in China’s BRI interactions with the 
case country you picked? If so, which norms? 
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3. Do you think the internal norms of the European Union are respected by China, in their 
interactions with European countries, to different extents depending on the country’s 
affiliation to the European Union? Meaning, will EU norms be respected differently 
depending on if countries are core EU countries like Italy or a relatively new EU country 





Interview with Dr Giulio Pugliese 2020-02-07  
A lecturer at King's college and Italy- Asia-Pacific expert. Dr Pugliese is based in DC and has 
discussed the topic of the BRI with Italian diplomats. 
 
Question 1. 
Dr Pugliese argues that the Italian government pushed China to include normative language in 
the BRI documents. Language such as international norms and Asia Connectivity Strategy was 
included due to the Italian government’s efforts, and China was receptive to these efforts. At 
the time, the Italian government was anti-EU. They were looking for other actors to cooperate 
with to lessen their reliance on the EU. They needed to triangulate their international relations 
with other states, such as China.  
Italy knew that them joining the BRI would create a backlash, which is the reason that they 
used the normative language as a cover.  
Dr Pugliese means that the Italian BRI MoU was the first MoU that had this kind of normative 
language while other MoUs were more China-specific.  
 
Dr Pugliese further means that in 2019, China had a lot of pressure from both inside and outside 
regarding the BRI. In China, there was a lot of scepticism against the BRI, even from elite 
members of the Communist Party.  Elite members thought that the BRI was a waste.  
This helped Italy in its negotiations with China, making China scaling the BRI down in relation 
to Italy and abiding international good practice while Italy joining helped China as Italy became 
a symbol, and showed that the BRI is something that can be adapted and re-defined if it is 
needed. 
  
Question 2.  
Dr Pugliese further argues that China likes to deal with its BRI counterparts bilaterally.  
The difference with EU countries contra non-Eu countries is that they can use the EU 
Framework as a tool in negotiating with China.  
Italy used the EU norms as a way to take cover and say no to China without causing damages 
to the two countries relations.  
Dr Pugliese means that the BRI is a lot of symbolism. Joining the BRI through signing an MoU 
plays up these symbols and gives China recognition in the international space, while Chinese 




The EU wants China to become a responsible stakeholder in international politics, but the EU 
also prides itself in its attention to human rights.  
This is something that Italy has kept quiet on, not criticising China on Hong Kong and similar 
issues, partly due to their interest in being a part of the BRI for the economic benefits. Joining 
the BRI hence entails some self-censorship where the actors will try to please China in the 
international space.  
While the Human rights of China do not directly affect Italy, China’s economic behaviour is 
something Italy cares more about due to it affecting the national interests of Italy. Hence this is 
something that was focused on. If the standard of the BRI rises, western companies might get 
the contracts that fulfil sustainability (financial/quality, environmental and social).  
Promoting these norms will profit Italy financially, and this is hence one of the reasons they did 
so in the MoU.  
 
Question 3.  
Dr Pugliese means that there is a difference in if you are a part of the EU or if you are outside 
the EU. Smaller EU countries will be cautious about following the EU’s frameworks on trade 
agreements.  
China might have more leverage on Serbia as Serbia is outside the EU and cannot adequately 
protect itself behind EU norms. Serbia does not have the same economic leverage that EU 
countries have, which can make it possible for China to exert its will more.  
One example of how Serbia is different in the case of the Budapest Railway, where China is a 
co-funder. The EU was against the project as it did not follow the rules and standards of the EU.  
Interview with an Italian Professor 20/02/2020 
Another Italy-China expert was interviewed over email due to them being very busy. They 
asked to have their answers anonymised. The professor is highly accredited and has worked 
with East Asia issues for a long time.  
Question 1. 
Yes, they are affected. It is due to the nature of the agreement Italy signed with China. As you 
know, it was very controversial and, in its final version, the impact has been reduced. I mean 
the “exception” of Italy signed the MoU (the only G7 country) must have been lowered because 
of the tension it caused. So, a strong call to the EU’s internal norms was, in a sense, obliged. 
Italy could not do otherwise. Still, it is to be seen if those norms will be fully respected and, 
more importantly, if the MoU will have any result. 
Question 2. 
No, there are no specific norms. Maybe the “elasticity” of such norm could be seen, but not in 






Yes, they will be respected at different levels (like the one you highlighted). This is due to two 
main factors: the pragmatism of China (and its ability to play its cards at different tables) and 
the division of the EU 
Interview with Italian Journalist Ms Giulia Pompili 13/02/2020 
Pompili is an Italian journalist working with China questions and is seen as an expert on China-
Italy relations and China-Italy BRI interactions. She has contributed to this research with an in-
depth background to Italy joining the BRI and some of its developments.   
 
Question 1.  
Ms Pompili means that when the MoU was signed, the government was EU sceptic and 
sceptical on EU norms. The government wanted to build bilateral relations outside of the EU.  
 
Italy started to negotiate about the MoU in 2017, which was before the populist government 
came to power.  
The BRI negotiations were sped up due to pressure from the Leagues and Luigi Di Maio, the 
now former leader of the Five-Star Movement willingness. Michele Geraci undersecretary of 
the ministry of economic development and Mr Di Maio sped up the BRI negotiations during 
the import-export fair in Shanghai. During the meeting, Di Maio and Geraci promised Chinese 
officials that Italy would join the BRI. When they got back from the expo, the League started 
being more critical towards the BRI.  
March 2019, the date that Italy joined the BRI had already been decided for a state visit for 
when the MoU and other agreements were going to be signed. Domestic worries appeared about 
Italy being the first G7 country to join and worries from the Trump administration.  
Italy said they would not be able to sign the MoU, due to it being too big. This led to China 
threatening to cancel the state visit, which made Italy decide that they would sign the MoU. If 
the government would not sign and the state visit would be cancelled, other agreements would 
be cancelled as well, which is something Italy wanted to avoid.  
 
Italy decided that they would sign the MoU, but that it would have a clear commercial profile 
and open the doors for other EU countries to join the BRI.  
The government tried to calm Italian sceptics and the U.S. by fixing the language to make it 
more friendly.  
 
During the negotiations, the press was not allowed to participate, undermining transparency 
norms. The two parties only published the MoU after it was signed.  
 
The president of Italy promised that all strategic sector would not be affected, but this was not 




Italy was not putting forward many demands in the negotiations. The Chinese side dictated the 
terms, and it was their text. Italy only added the last part where they agree that all decisions that 
Italy make must be decided within the framework of the EU.  
 
Ms Pompili means that If one read the agreement, everything is profiting the Chinese side while 
Italian national interests are not apparent.  
 
Italy is the only country that let the minister of economic development sign the MoU. The MoU 
was discussed in Italian propaganda as a commercial agreement.  
 
Salvini started to push a lot of propaganda against China. He wanted to skip all the official 
events with China. Salvini started to blame China for Human Rights issues, commercial issues, 
and trade without common rules.  
 
The League changed their mind on China and the BRI. A considerable delegation from Italy 
went to Taiwan, and the League used their social network to make the visit public.  
The League also raised the Hong Kong issues, but all this was not a result of EU norms, instead 
of a result of U.S. influence. The League wanted to get closer to the Trump administration.  
 
Question 2 
Ms Pompili means that there are no norms that are noticeably more prevalent and that nothing 
concrete has happened after the signature was done. There have not been any EU norms violated, 
either. 
 
The only controversial issue is the cooperation on space issues. Italy must build a part of the 
Chinese space station, which goes against the U.S. will. The technology that Italy has and is to 
contribute to the space station is from NATO and EU space agency. It is forbidden in norms to 
do, such as technology exchange. Italy stopped this agreement, meaning Italy do not have to 
build that part of the space station anymore.  
 
None of the BRI projects has been done yet, in Italy. After the MoU was signed, The U.S. and 
the E.U. asked Italy to approve a law on limiting foreign direct investment. Golden power-law 
it is called, and the EU wants Italy to approve it. The government can control foreign direct 
investment into the strategic infrastructure. This law was approved without the Italian vote. 
Italy has been asked to adapt the law on a country level, which Italy did. The law was approved.  
 
Ms Pompili means that Italian ports are safe from Chinese investments, as China does not need 
these ports. The agreements on these were just an advertising campaign from China’s side. 
China understands that Italy is too complicated for them to use the same method as they used 
in Greece. They cannot use the same method as the ministry of infrastructure is very powerful 
in local ports.  
 
The MOU was not negotiated by all the stakeholders in Italy. The League, which is the most 
powerful public opinion party, started an anti-Chinese propaganda campaign, where they 
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promoted the golden power laws. When this law is enforced, it will influence the next decisions 
on Chinese Foreign direct investment. 
 
Before the sing of the MoU, Italy discussed with China about China’s predatory attitude.  
The league recognised after signing the MoU that there would be an issue for their alliance with 
the U.S.  
 
Ms Pompili means that 5G and Human Rights issues are discussed by the leading parties. The 
discussion is not a deep one; rather, it is a populist one. This resistance against China is not 
influenced by the EU, as both parties are EU-sceptic, but rather more about the Leagues 




China foreign policy is wise enough to have different approaches in every country.  
The project is already weakening, not so strong. China understood that Italy is the sick Child of 
the EU at the moment of the MoU signing, which made China push for the signing of MoU. A 




Interview with Dr Dragan Pavlicevic - 12-02-2020  
 
The first Serbian expert that was interviewed was Professor Dragan Pavlicevic, a China – EU 
relations expert from Serbia.  
He teaches at Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University and has done a lot of research on China’s 
international relations.  
 
Question 1. 
Professor Pavlicevic means that Serbia usually has to approach projects through transparency. 
Projects need to go through public procurement - be transparent, bided on, submit interest for, 
make a case for the project, and so on.  
With China, this is not the case. Chinese companies do not have to go through public 
procurement, as the Chinese government arranges the loans for the companies and fix contracts 
for the companies. There is no bidding process or transparency. The process of reaching the 
agreements are not transparent. Hence, Serbia has become one of the major destinations for 
Chinese FDI in Europe.  
 
Different norms and different regulations do not apply to Chinese state actors like they are to 




This has led to the EU, putting much pressure on Serbia, to make Serbia change their public 
procurement procedures towards China. The EU is demanding that Serbia makes these 
procedures more transparent and more open to foreign competition.  
 
Professor Pavlicevic means that Serbia is facing much pressure, but that it is unclear if the 
pressure is having any effect.  
 
The Professor further means that China is worried about the discourse on China being a 
corrupting force in the societies and economies they invest in. China wants to be seen as a 
responsible actor in the international arena.  
 
China has promised that they will act within EU regulations and norms when acting in the EU.  
 
Professor Pavlicevic also means that Serbia’s primary strategic goal is to join the EU, meaning 
it has to accept and implement EU regulations, laws and norms to be able to do so. They will 
have to act within these more and more, the closer they get to the EU.  
 
Professor Pavlicevic means that Serbia is experiencing democratic backsliding, where they are 
moving away from some liberal norms. Serbia is controlling the media, making changes in their 
high court, having weaker checks and balances, but this has nothing to do with their interactions 
with China.   
Professor Pavlicevic means that China does not care about liberal norms. China’s focus lays on 
Economic exchange and investments, but some of the joint projects China and Serbia are doing 
might contribute to the backsliding. Serbia is provided with the smart city and digitalisation 
technologies, giving the data of Serbian citizens to the Serbian government, so that they can 
control their people like China does.  
 
Pollution from Chinese owned companies and investments have also been seen as significant 
polluters. The Chinese companies have invested in coal power plants and made investments in 
making these coal power plants more sustainable, for Serbia to be able to fulfil EU’s 
environmental requirements. One issue is though that even if there have been improvements 
made, such as creating filter systems, they have in the end not been put to use due to bureaucracy.  
 
Professor Pavlicevic means that it is up to local governments to decide which norms that China 
has to follow when working in their countries. China does not want to get entangled into projects 
that are pushing something on a country that they do not want.  
 
China wants to build long-lasting relations with the host countries so they can get more projects 







Question 2.  
 
Many projects in Serbia have been done through the state to state interactions. Infrastructure 
projects have been done through direct negotiations, instead of following the open tender norms.  
There are fewer restrictions on the projects due to Serbia not being a part of the EU.  
Serbia wants to use its flexibility to make it easier for themselves to get funding and projects 
done.  
 
Question 3.  
 
Some norms and practices are taking place in Serbia – China relations that are different from 
those that are required by the EU.  
 
EU is imposing its norms and regulations on Serbia, which will in the future prevent Serbia’s 
interactions with China in the way they previously have interacted.  
In the future, China must follow the EU’s norms when dealing with Serbia, but right now, they 
can work outside these norms for a while longer.  
 
4. From Italian Professor Pugliese: 
when China gave money for the Budapest railway, EU was against it as it would not follow the 
rules and standards of the EU. Is Serbia trying to comply with EU standards after criticism? 
 
Both Hungary and Serbia have agreed with China on a state to the state level. EU pressed both 
countries to use the open tender process. Hungary did it this way, but Serbia did not do it. They 
kept to their agreements with China. The railway is a Serbian project that is funded by Russian 
and Chinese loans, meaning the EU has less influence over it.  
 
Interview with Dr Ivona Ladjevac – 24/02/2020  
Dr Ivona Ladjevac is the Head of Belt and Road Centre at the Institute of International Politics 
and Economics in Belgrade 
The Dr was not able to participate in an oral interview but answered the questions over email. 
Question 1. 
Although one of the four main Serbian foreign policy goals are accession to the EU, Serbia still 
is not obliged by internal EU legislation.  
That is the most obvious in the foreign policy area considering that Serbia, unlike the EU itself, 
has high-quality relations not only with China but with Russia too. Despite the EU officials’ 
disagreements Serbia nourishes special connections with given countries and chose to 
participate in their initiatives. When (it) comes to China, it is (the) Belt and Road, while 





Since establishing diplomatic relations between two respective countries, that happened about 
70 years ago, their relations firstly were built on the international law norms, based on mutual 
respect for each party and principles of peaceful coexistence. 
Guiding line in recent relations remained the same, but with introducing BRI, their relations 
went even further, meaning that each interaction is dedicated to mutual interests and achieving 
mutual benefits. 
Each of the agreements concluded to realize projects designed within BRI are set along with 
positive norms and respect the spirit of the law. 
Question 3. 
China is known as a country that fully respects its international obligations and thus respects 
the set of international law norms. In cases of dealing with a particular country, China always 
acts within the legal framework of that respective country. It is not China’s manner to make 
frauds or to play deceiving games. Of course, different countries have different legal systems, 
and that is what determines the content of relations between China and the given country, but 
it is always within a set legal framework. 
Latvia 
In the case of Latvia, there are very few experts present. One of the experts have been away 
from the office and not responding to our email. Two experts have been willing to participate.  
Interview with Dr Una Aleksandra Berzina-Cerenkova - 29/01/2020 
Dr Berzina-Cerenkova is one of the few Latvia-China experts in existence. She is the Head of 
the New Silk Road programme at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Her answers 
were submitted over email.  
 
Question 1.  
The agreements contain less Chinese normative discourse than in non-EU cases. 
 
Question 2. 
“Shared future for mankind” on the Chinese side. EU norms, such as “level playing field” are 
also entering the interactions, propagated by the Latvian side. 
 
Question 3.  
I believe that the role of the internal EU norms are most visibly respected differently along the 
EU/non-EU divide, but some differences in China’s approach to what it perceives as “CEE” 
(although strictly speaking the Baltics are not CEE) and non-CEE countries (like Italy) is 
different, with more respect towards EU normative discourse in the latter case. We will see how 






Interview with EU-China Expert on Latvia - 02/03/2020  
 
This expert stressed their anonymity, and hence we will not discuss any details of who they are. 
They are an expert in China-EU relations and have studied and worked with the BRI.  
 
The China-EU expert means that Latvia is more active in the 17+1, then they are in the BRI. 
While Latvia’s focus lay on the 17+1 more, Latvia still participates in the BRI Forum and have 
some agreements concerning the initiative.  
Latvia joined the BRI to improve their economic relations with China and bring new 
opportunities into the country.  
In Latvia, the BRI is mostly focused on trade, connectivity, infrastructure, people-to-people 
exchanges and private investment over classical infrastructure investment projects like the ones 
in Serbia. Latvia is also strengthening other types of cooperation than financial ones, such as 
cooperation on cultural and people to people exchanges 
There is a comparatively strong Chinese-Latvian cultural exchange going on through the 
framework of the BRI. Both countries are teaching each other’s languages at higher institutions 
while Latvia also has the only China culture centre in the region.  
 
Joining the BRI has given Latvia a growth in China’s activity in the country. Increased small 
scale trade, improved economic relations as well as large scale trade. The BRI has also given 
the countries more significant opportunities for the countries to talk, conduct exports, people-
to-people exchanges. Compared to other Baltic states, Latvia do not have as many Chinese 
projects present in the country.  
 
While China is expanding its presence in Latvia, Latvia is still following all the EU’s norms. 
Public tender is present in Latvia as well as other EU norms, even if the language does not have 
a strong presence.  
One example the EU-China expert rose is the Rail Baltic project. It has a few hundred open 
tender procedures ongoing, and a lot of Chinese companies are interested in the project. Chinese 
companies have the same rights as all other companies. They are not given any preferential 
treatment and are following the EU’s norms that are adapted. Latvia’s internal regulations of 
how things are done.   
The expert also highlights what they call the Latvian mentality on rules and regulations. Latvia 
is really compliant with the rules and regulations of the EU. Strictly following rules and 
regulations is something that is rooted in Latvian political or bureaucratic culture. This is a 
culture related to the German political or bureaucratic culture.  
  
Latvia values their EU membership, meaning they want to stay within the frameworks, 






Some EU-China experts were also contacted to get a better overview of EU-China relations 
related to the BRI.  
 
Interview with Swedish EU-China Expert - 11/02/2020 Swedish  
A Swedish EU-China expert who has chosen to remain anonymous with their interview answers. 
The Expert is a professor and has a history of working in China together with top Chinese 
universities.  
 
The Swedish expert means that the EU has tried to effect China 3-4 years ago through its 
Strategic partnership. In the strategic partnership, the EU has tried to effect China through its 
norms on democracy and Human Rights. The BRI is rather a normative tool for China. It is a 
tool to spread China’s normative power the expert means.  
The BRI is a competitor to the EU’s normative power, and the expert does not think that the 
EU can affect China through the BRI. EU is trying to defend against the BRI’s normative 
influence through the EU-Asia connectivity strategy.  
 
Constellations such as the 17+1 and the BRI are challenges to the normative power of the EU.  
The EU countries that are a part of these constellations have been distancing themselves from 
the norms of the EU. The EU knows that the BRI has a political and normative undertone, but 
they are not sure if this is a bad thing for the EU, or if it also could be a good thing.  
 
China is using the BRI to get political support in the International system. EU member countries 
that are a part of the BRI are helping China in their international relations, in for example 
blocking EU’s protests of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea conflict and stopping the 
EU from acting as a normative power.   
 
With that said, If China is acting within the EU, China needs to follow the EU’s legal system 
and the norms that are within these laws. China needs to adapt to these laws.  
Laws on Environmental, social, and economic sustainability need to be adapted.  
China does not buy into the notion that the EU is a normative power. Instead, they just see the 
EU as a power. China has previously, ten years ago, tried to get the EU to support their notion 
of creating a multi-polar world, with the EU as one of the world poles.  
 
The Swedish expert also raises that China’s take on different norms are different from what we 
define them as. Their definitions of democracy and other liberal norms that are within the EU 
are defined differently by China than the way the EU defines them.  
 
The Swedish expert also raises that the EU has this year made stricter rules, for who is allowed 
to join the EU. They are preventing the foreign relations tactics that countries like Serbia are 
using. Countries like Serbia can no longer play both sides, such as wanting to join the EU while 




Another factor that the Swedish expert raise is that when China uses Chinese workers. These 
workers are not following the host countries laws, such as many Chinese projects in African 
countries. Environmental norms might have been adapted towards the EU norms, but the expert 
was not sure if they had actually materialised outside of agreements. 
 
The expert did raise that China is looking to adopt some of the EU’s norms of medical and 
social care. The expert also raised that infrastructure investments are not for free. China wants 
something in return, and this could be the exchanges of experience, technology, and culture.  
 
Interview with Professor Gerhard Stahl – 23/02/2020  
Professor at the Peking University HSBC Business School in Shenzhen in China and a former EU 
official: Secretary-General of the Committee of the regions of the European Union. He has a background 
in the national economy.  
Professor Stahl was asked early before the BRI was started to participate in some export 
meetings in Shanghai, where he was to share his experience in the EU. He has followed the BRI 
from the start.  
Professor Stahl means that the initiative has developed over time. At first, it looked far less 
ambitioned and was more focused to link up China to neighbouring countries. Now it has 
become a catchword for the external dimensions of Chinese initiatives. It is a fairly broad 
concept.  
Among the broad titles of the BRI, one also has concrete projects and activities related to 
investment projects and development projects, some of which are related to EU countries.  
Professor Stahl means that if an EU country wants to have cooperation with Chinese partners, 
based on the political commitment, one still needs to have an opening tendering procedure if 
one is to have infrastructure projects or other such agreements.  
Competition policies are an essential issue. If you agree in an MoU to give benefits to the 
Chinese government /companies, this is a typical issue for states. Legislations on environmental 
issues must be respected as well. There is a difference whether you are an EU member, or not. 
If you are an EU member, you need to respect the rules of the EU on public procurement and 
other EU norms.  
Professor Stahl also mentioned Serbia’s EU negotiations. Serbia needs to adopt 17 chapters of 
the EU legislation for Serbia to become a member of the EU. Candidate countries might hence 
follow or prepper to follow EU norms based on wanting to become an EU country.  
MoU’s must be read and interpreted as political commitments that can only be applied based 
on the current laws in the country. You can make information campaigns and give access to 
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some information that, for example, the Chinese actors can use, but they still must participate 
in procedures like anyone else.  
In the EU-China connectivity platform, some experts discuss the different BRI projects. The 
experts need to decide together that the infrastructure that the projects are aiming to work on 
needs to be upgraded. Even when this is decided, they still must work within the EU’s rules. 
They cannot legally privilege Chinese companies.  
The Hungarian and Italian government signed MoU to show their distance from EU.  
If you compare the economic figures, you can see that the EU countries that China works with 
are still respecting the legal framework and having a market economy mindset about how they 
get funding.  
Italy was a late starter in their cooperation with China relative to other EU countries. Italy 
wanted to increase their internal mobility by giving Chinese companies a higher profile. In the 
context of the EU, we cannot make bilateral agreements that promise concrete quantitative 
objectives about purchases of goods and investments.  
Professor Stahl means that a few different EU member states have joined the BRI, but that all 
they have joined for different reasons. Italy signed for internal policy. The new government that 
might be a bit less focused on the China issue, but before they wanted to mobilise Chinese 
public agreements between Italian companies. 
Professor Stahl means that the precise nature of general objectives and investment needs to be 
differentiated. Policy objectives are different from investment.  
In the rules of the EU for investments, there might be policy objectives that are the EU norms. 
Impact assessments for social and environmental impacts are examples of requirements that the 
EU have for projects, that also contain policy objectives.  
BRI does not have an environmental impact assessment, but if China or Chinese actors want to 
participate in projects in the EU, they need to respect these norms.  
Professor Stahl also discussed the normative impact the people-to-people exchange approach 
and the exchange of information has on China. In the EU-China Connectivity platform, Chinese 
experts and investors engaged together with EU experts in a training program where they were 
thought about EU rules and norms. In this platform, there is an exchange of information, which 
is building up a common understanding between the EU and China. The experts are doing 
studies together, to get knowledge and common understanding for a common investment 




Two areas are essential for the EU: Reciprocity in the treatment of EU companies taking part 
in the BRI financing and how EU financing is handled in projects that use BRI financing as 
well.  
Professor Stahl means that it is essential for the EU that China follows sustainability norms and 
have a green economic development. Common sustainable development is a goal of the EU. 
EU is trying to make the BRI green, and China is a good partner in this, but China has a lot of 
non-green production and projects as well. Nevertheless, China is committed to making its 
civilization more ecological.  
Serbia is not an EU member state and has its laws. Professor Stahl does not know the laws of 
Serbia, but he means that they are probably different from the EU framework, but that Serbia 
is a candidate country to joining the EU. They must show that they can respect the essential EU 
legislation if they want to become a member of the EU.  
In the process of joining the EU, they need to show that they can adapt to the EU’s framework 
and norms.  
Professor Stahl means that differences can only be explained by economic and geographic 
explanations. Not the rules of the game.  
Latvia almost being a metropolitan area, not much of a country, can have a bit of flexibility for 
investments. Latvia can get quicker investment agreements than Italy, that is a larger country 
with a more complex bureaucracy.  
The only difference in how EU countries approach China in a legal sense is based in the 
country’s implementation of the EU laws. The implementation might be different as there is 
sometimes more or less efficient bureaucracy in different countries of the EU. The differences 
are mainly in bureaucracy and administrative implementations. The types of interests China 
have been based on the different economic and geographic situations of the country. Investment 
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